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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the reputation–quality mechanism in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A). This study specifically examines whether investment bank reputation 
is a determinant of M&A advisory service quality, and whether sell-side analyst reputation 
is a determinant of the predictive ability of stock recommendations.  
   
To begin with, this research investigates whether top-tier M&A financial advisors improve 
their acquirer clients’ performance in both the short and long term, and whether top-tier 
advisors can help their acquirer clients to gain bargaining advantage, allowing them to pay 
lower bid premiums. I find that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors outperform in the 
long term and pay lower bid premiums, suggesting that top-tier advisors do have superior 
skills.  
 
Furthermore, the social loafing hypothesis suggests that individuals exercise less effort 
when they work collectively. My research therefore explores whether multiple top-tier 
financial advisors can cooperate effectively to create value for their clients or whether they 
suffer from social loafing. This study finds that acquirers advised by multiple top-tier 
advisors gain greater long-term returns and pay lower bid premiums than acquirers advised 
by a single top-tier advisor. The results suggest that top-tier advisors care more about their 
reputational capital, and therefore do not suffer from social loafing. Instead, they can make 
concerted efforts to improve their clients’ performance and bargaining power. 
 
In addition, my study examines whether the pre-acquisition stock recommendations of 
sell-side analysts can be used to predict acquirer performance, and more importantly 
ii 
 
whether the recommendations of star analysts have stronger predictive ability for acquirer 
announcement performance than those of non-star analysts. I find that pre-deal consensus 
recommendations are an effective predictor of acquirer performance; however, star 
recommendations are not predictive of acquirer performance, while acquirers with more 
favourable non-star consensus recommendations gain higher announcement returns. In 
other words, non-star recommendations have stronger predictive ability than star 
recommendations.  
 
Overall, this thesis provides new evidence on the reputation–quality mechanism in the 
context of M&A. The results suggest that market share-based league tables are reliable to 
reflect financial advisors’ skills, while sell-side analyst rankings are a kind of popularity 
contest.  
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
 
The reputation–quality mechanism of the product market has long been a point of interest 
for scholars and researchers (e.g. Nelson, 1970; Klein and Leffler, 1981; Shapiro, 1982; 
Rogerson, 1983; Shapiro, 1983; Allen, 1984; Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Dawar and 
Parker, 1994; Landon and Smith, 1998; Jin and Kato, 2006; Caruana and Ewing, 2010; 
Dana Jr and Fong, 2011; Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn, 2013). Based on classical reputation 
theory, consumers use product price or producer reputation as an indicator of product 
quality when making purchasing decisions (Nelson, 1970; Shapiro, 1982; 1983). 
High-quality products attract more consumption through word-of-mouth advertising and 
repeat purchase (Rogerson, 1983), whereas consumers will react negatively to businesses’ 
attempts to provide low-quality products (Allen, 1984). Producers’ efforts to establish 
their reputation will be rewarded with a price premium and long-term profitability (Klein 
and Leffler, 1981). At the same time, price premiums encourage producers to maintain 
and improve product quality (Shapiro, 1983). As a consequence, quality and reputation 
could constitute a positive feedback loop that enhances consumers’ loyalty (Caruana and 
Ewing, 2010).   
 
Given the classical reputation theory, this thesis focuses on the reputation–quality 
mechanism in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Investment banks play a pivotal 
role in mergers and acquisitions. In this thesis, two divisions of investment banks are 
analysed – investment banking and securities research.  
 
Initially, this thesis examines the relationship between bank reputation and quality of 
M&A advisory service. Prestigious banks dominate the investment banking industry. 
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Specifically, more than half M&A advisory services are provided by the top 10 banks.1 
Top-tier investment banks charge premium advisory fees and are supposed to provide 
high-quality service, thereby improving their clients’ bargaining power and takeover 
performance. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence on this reputation–quality mechanism is 
mixed. The effects of top-tier financial advisors on value creation have been questioned by 
scholars. Top-tier advisors receive a larger proportion of incentive fees that are contingent 
on deal completion (Rau, 2000). Even if an M&A deal will destroy shareholder value, 
incentive fees stimulate top-tier advisors to complete such deals, and top-tier advisors 
have greater skills in completing them compared to non-top-tier advisors. As a result, the 
majority of studies in this area challenge the effectiveness of the market share-based 
league table, since top-tier advisors do not outperform non-top-tier advisors and may even 
underperform in terms of M&A advisory service quality (Bowers and Miller, 1990; 
Michel, Shaked and Lee, 1991; McLaughlin, 1992; Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Rau, 2000; 
Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; da Silva Rosa et al., 2004; Walter, Yawson and Yeung, 2008; 
Chahine and Ismail, 2009; Schiereck, Sigl-Grüb and Unverhau, 2009; Ismail, 2010).  
 
Meanwhile, other empirical studies suggest that prestigious banks have greater skill in 
identifying profitable targets to yield synergies and improve bargaining power to 
guarantee their clients a greater share of any potential synergy gains (Kale, Kini and Ryan, 
2003; Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). In addition, having a higher reputation than 
their competitors helps prestigious banks to obtain a greater market share. There is 
therefore strong motivation for top-tier advisors to maintain their reputation through 
providing a high-quality advisory service. As a consequence, acquirers benefit from the 
retention of top-tier advisors, and gain a superior performance in acquisitions.  
 
                                                 
1 Data Source: Thomson One Banker. 
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Although the investment bank reputation–quality mechanism has been widely discussed, 
most studies explore whether top-tier advisors improve acquirer announcement 
performance, while only a few have examined the effects of the retention of top-tier 
advisors on acquirer long-term performance. In fact, financial advisors engage in not only 
deal negotiation but also post-deal integration. If the synergies identified and secured by 
top-tier advisors exist, then it will take time to transfer them into improved performance 
through post-deal integration and to demonstrate them to the market. In other words, the 
positive effects of top-tier advisors should be reflected in the long term rather than the 
short term. Therefore, Chapter 2 investigates whether top-tier advisors create value for 
their acquirer clients in both the short and long term through examining a sample of 3,103 
completed M&A deals in the US over the period 1990–2009. In this thesis, top-tier 
financial advisors are defined as the top 10 investment banks listed in the market 
share-based league table. As a consequence, Chapter 2 finds that acquirers advised by 
top-tier advisors outperform acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors in the long term, 
whereas there is an insignificant difference in the announcement performance of acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors compared to those advised by non-top-tier advisors. These 
results confirm the conjecture that top-tier advisors help their acquirer clients create 
synergies, and the synergies will be materialized in the long term.  
 
In addition, the previous literature has not distinguished between the effects of single 
top-tier advisors and multiple top-tier advisors. This thesis is also interested in whether 
top-tier financial advisors can cooperate effectively to improve their clients’ performance 
or suffer from social loafing. Social loafing refers to people’s tendency to make less effort 
when they work collectively, leading to underperformance. However, social loafing can 
be alleviated by some factors, such as work complexity (Jackson and Williams, 1985) and 
social identity (Karau and Williams, 1993). In other words, complex tasks and a concern 
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for reputation motivate individuals to enhance their performance. More reputable advisors 
acquire a greater market share in the investment banking industry. Prestigious banks 
should therefore care more about their reputational capital. It is plausible that multiple 
top-tier financial advisors cooperate effectively to prevent social loafing that may destroy 
their reputation. As a consequence, Chapter 2 finds that acquirers advised by multiple 
top-tier financial advisors outperform acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor, 
suggesting that multiple top-tier advisors do not suffer from social loafing; instead, the 
collective work of top-tier advisors leads to outperformance. In addition, the number of 
top-tier advisors retained is positively related to acquirer long-term performance, whereas 
the number of total advisors retained is negatively related to acquirer long-term 
performance. This direct comparison highlights top-tier advisors’ superior skills and 
concern for their reputation.  
 
Chapter 3 further examines whether the retention of top-tier advisors influences takeover 
premiums. On one hand, since the contingent fee structure encourages top-tier advisors to 
complete deals (McLaughlin, 1990; Rau, 2000), they may ask their acquirer clients to pay 
a higher bid premium to achieve transaction agreement. One the other hand, if top-tier 
advisors have strong deal negotiation techniques, they should be able to help their acquirer 
clients obtain a bargaining advantage to minimize bid premiums. Even though the 
relationship between bank reputation and acquirer performance has been discussed in 
detail, only a small number of those studies have investigated the effects of bank 
reputation on bid premiums. To clarify this issue, Chapter 3 analyses a sample of 3,430 
completed US M&A deals during 1990–2012, and find that acquirers pay significantly 
lower bid premiums in deals advised by top-tier advisors than in deals advised by 
non-top-tier advisors. In other words, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors gain a 
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bargaining advantage in the negotiation process and therefore pay lower bid premiums, 
implying top-tier advisors’ superior deal negotiation skills.  
 
Chapter 3 is also interested in the performance of multiple top-tier advisors in deal 
negotiation. If multiple top-tier advisors suffer from social loafing, their acquirer clients 
will not gain a bargaining advantage and may even overpay in deals advised by multiple 
top-tier advisors. However, Chapter 3 finds that acquirers advised by multiple top-tier 
advisors pay significantly lower bid premiums than those advised by a single top-tier 
advisor, suggesting that multiple top-tier advisors can effectively cooperate to improve 
their clients’ bargaining power.  
 
Although top-tier advisors help to reduce transaction costs, they charge premium advisory 
fees. Hence, there is concern about whether the benefits of savings in bid premiums 
outweigh the disadvantage of high advisory fees. In particular, the concern of 
overpayment will be more severe when multiple top-tier advisors are retained. To resolve 
this concern, Chapter 3 defines cost reduction as the sum of the reduction in the cost of bid 
premiums and acquirer total advisory fees. As a result, Chapter 3 finds that acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors have significantly lower costs than those advised by 
non-top-tier advisors, and the cost reduction effects are even more significant in deals 
involving multiple top-tier advisors. In other words, top-tier advisors contribute 
significantly to cost reductions, and therefore concern about overpayment is unnecessary.          
 
This thesis has also investigated in-house deals, although in-house deals only account for 
less than 8% of the sample. Chapter 2 suggests that in-house deals do not create value for 
acquirers, and Chapter 3 finds that acquirers sometimes pay higher bid premiums in 
in-house deals. 
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In addition, Chapter 4 examines the reputation–quality mechanism in another division of 
investment banks – securities research teams. Unlike previous studies that examine 
financial analyst behaviour around mergers and acquisitions, and focus more on analyst 
conflicts of interest, (e.g. Bradley, Morgan and Wolf, 2007; Kolasinski and Kothari, 2008; 
Haushalter and Lowry, 2011; Sibilkov, Straska and Waller, 2013; Becher, Cohn and 
Juergens, 2014; Tehranian, Zhao and Zhu, 2014), Chapter 4 explores whether sell-side 
analysts’ stock recommendations can be used to predict acquirer announcement 
performance, and more importantly investigates the relationship between analyst 
reputation and recommendation predictive ability for acquirer performance.  
 
Previous literature suggests that market misvaluation drives mergers and acquisitions 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Specifically, overvalued firms are more likely to become 
acquirers, and use their overvalued stocks to purchase undervalued firms. However, 
overvalued acquirers tend to underperform around takeover announcements (Dong et al., 
2006). In addition, well-managed firms with growth opportunities are more likely to 
become value-enhancing acquirers (Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991). 
Therefore, if analyst stock recommendations appropriately reflect firm valuation and 
growth prospects, pre-deal recommendations should be predictive of acquirer 
announcement performance. Specifically, acquirers with favourable pre-deal 
recommendations should outperform acquirers with unfavourable pre-deal 
recommendations, since analysts issue favourable recommendations for undervalued firms 
with growth prospects and unfavourable recommendations for overvalued firms without 
growth prospect. At the same time, some scholars suggest that star analysts can make 
more accurate earnings forecasts and more profitable stock recommendations than 
non-star analysts (Stickel, 1992; Desai, Liang and Singh, 2000; Leone and Wu, 2007; 
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Fang and Yasuda, 2009; Loh and Stulz, 2011; Fang and Yasuda, 2014), whereas many 
others argue that star analysts do not outperform non-star analysts, and star analyst 
elections are a kind of popularity contest where performance is not the key determinant of 
the rankings (Gleason and Lee, 2003; Emery and Li, 2009). Therefore, Chapter 4 is also 
interested in whether stock recommendations made by more reputable analysts have 
stronger predictive ability for acquirer performance.  
 
To verify these predictions, Chapter 4 examines a sample of 10,169 M&A deals in the US 
made by acquirers with stock recommendations during 1996–2010, and define star 
analysts as analysts elected as members of the All-America Research Team (including 
first, second, third, and runner-up teams) by Institutional Investor magazine. Chapter 4, 
consequently, finds that more favourable pre-deal consensus recommendations are 
associated with higher acquirer announcement returns, suggesting that analyst stock 
recommendations are predictive for acquirer takeover performance. However, more 
reputable analysts do not provide more informative recommendations, and even 
underperform in terms of recommendation profitability. Specifically, no significant 
relationship is found between star pre-deal recommendations and acquirer announcement 
returns, whereas acquirers with more favourable non-star recommendations perform better 
around announcement. In other words, non-star recommendations have stronger predictive 
ability than star recommendations, which is consistent with the nature of a popularity 
contest.  
 
Overall, this thesis suggests that more reputable financial advisors can provide a higher 
quality M&A advisory service, improving acquirer performance and bargaining power. 
However, more reputable sell-side analysts do not provide more predictive 
recommendations for acquirer performance. 
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This thesis contributes to the M&A literature in the following aspects. First, this research 
adds new evidence on the inconclusive results regarding the reputation–quality mechanism 
for investment banking service. Unlike the previous literature, which has concentrated on 
the effects of investment banks’ effects on acquirer short-term performance, Chapter 2 
highlights that merger synergies identified and secured by top-tier banks should be 
materialised in the long term and finally perceived by the market. Therefore, the effects of 
top-tier advisors on acquirer performance should be observed in the long term rather than 
in the short term. In addition, Chapter 3 is also interested in the impact of top-tier advisors 
on bid premiums that have not been comprehensively discussed. Ultimately, this study 
suggests that top-tier advisors can help their acquirer clients improve their long-term 
performance and bargaining power, supporting the reliability of market share-based 
league tables. 
 
Second, the existing literature does not distinguish between the effects of multiple top-tier 
advisors and single top-tier advisor. Given the tendency for social loafing, it is necessary 
to investigate whether multiple top-tier advisors can effectively cooperate to improve 
M&A advisory service quality. This study suggests that multiple top-tier advisors care 
more about their reputational capital and therefore do not suffer from social loafing. 
Instead, they make concerted efforts to enhance their clients’ performance and bargaining 
power.  
 
Third, Chapters 2 and 3 also have important implications for practitioners. Based on the 
statistical evidence, these two chapters suggest that acquirers do not necessarily need to 
worry too much about the premium advisory fees charged by top-tier advisors. Although 
the market may consider such premium advisory fees as overpayment that will engender 
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negative market reactions in the short term, the retention of top-tier advisors improves 
acquirer long-term performance and bargaining power, and contributes to total cost 
reduction. The benefits of retaining top-tier advisors outweigh the disadvantages. Market 
share-based league tables are therefore shown to be an effective reference point when 
making advisor retention decisions. 
 
Fourth, this study examines the links between analyst stock recommendations and 
takeover performance. Unlike previous studies that explore whether analysts forecast 
takeovers, this study explores whether pre-deal stock recommendations are an effective 
predictor of acquirer performance. The previous literature suggests that stock price 
movements can be driven by analyst recommendation revisions (changes in 
recommendations) rather than recommendations themselves (Womack, 1996; Loh and 
Stulz, 2011). Therefore, this study can distinguish acquirer announcement effects from 
analyst revision effects, through analysing the level of recommendations. This study finds 
that analyst pre-deal recommendations have predictive ability for acquirer performance, 
whether analysts are able to predict acquisitions or not. 
 
Fifth, Chapter 4 provides new evidence regarding the sell-side analyst reputation–quality 
mechanism. This chapter finds non-star recommendations to be a strong predictor of 
acquirer performance, whereas star recommendations do not have predictive ability. The 
underperformance of star analysts reflects the nature of popularity contest.   
 
Sixth, Chapter 4 has practical implications for investors. Even though the existing 
literature suggests that star analyst revisions are more influential to drive stock price drift 
(Stickel, 1992; Loh and Stulz, 2011), investors would be better to follow non-star analysts’ 
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consensus recommendations to make predictions on acquirer announcement performance, 
and therefore make more profitable investment decisions.  
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the impacts of 
investment bank reputation on acquirer short- and long-term performance. Chapter 3 
explores the relationship between bank reputation and bid premiums. Chapter 4 examines 
the predictive ability of sell-side analyst stock recommendations for acquirer performance, 
and compares star and non-star recommendations. Chapter 5 draws the conclusions of the 
study, discussing the main findings, implications, limitations and future research.   
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Chapter 2 : Financial Advisor Reputation and M&A 
Returns 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates whether the retention of top-tier financial advisors, ranked by 
market share, leads to better merger and acquisition (M&A) performance of acquirers in 
both the short and long term. This chapter is also interested in whether multiple top-tier 
advisors can make concerted efforts to help their acquirer clients improve performance or 
suffer from social loafing.  
 
For US mergers and acquisitions where investment banks are involved, more than half of 
all deals are advised by the top 10 banks.2 Prestigious banks play a pivotal role in the 
investment banking industry. They charge much higher advisory fees and are supposed to 
provide their clients with a superior service (Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). 
However, the empirical evidence on this reputation–quality mechanism remains 
inconclusive. Incentive fees contingent on deal completion stimulate advisors to complete 
deals rather than chase performance (McLaughlin, 1990; Rau, 2000). Compared with 
non-top-tier advisors, top-tier advisors receive a larger portion of contingent fees (Rau, 
2000). Additionally, top-tier advisors have a stronger ability to complete deals, even if the 
deals are value-destroying (Rau, 2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003). Consequently, the 
majority of studies find that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors do not outperform 
acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors and may even obtain lower abnormal returns, 
challenging the effectiveness of the market share-based league table (Bowers and Miller, 
1990; Michel, Shaked and Lee, 1991; McLaughlin, 1992; Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Rau, 
                                                 
2 Data Source: Thomson One Banker. 
 12 
 
2000; Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003; da Silva Rosa et al., 2004; Walter, Yawson and Yeung, 
2008; Chahine and Ismail, 2009; Schiereck, Sigl-Grüb and Unverhau, 2009; Ismail, 2010).  
 
In contrast, other studies argue that top-tier advisors are capable of improving acquirer 
performance, since top-tier advisors have a superior ability to identify synergistic targets 
and secure a larger proportion of synergies for their clients (Kale, Kini and Ryan, 2003; 
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012). Additionally, a higher reputation is associated 
with a higher market share. To maintain this market share, top-tier advisors must therefore 
maintain their reputation, which is achieved by providing a superior service.  
 
Even though the investment bank reputation–quality mechanism has been discussed in detail, 
only a few studies investigate whether prestigious advisors create value for their clients in the 
long term. Most research (Bowers and Miller, 1990; Michel, Shaked and Lee, 1991; 
McLaughlin, 1992; Servaes and Zenner, 1996; Kale, Kini and Ryan, 2003; da Silva Rosa et al., 
2004; Chahine and Ismail, 2009; Schiereck, Sigl-Grüb and Unverhau, 2009; Ismail, 2010; Bao 
and Edmans, 2011; Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos, 2012) only focuses on the effect of 
financial advisors on acquirer performance around announcement. Indeed, some advisors 
provide their service until transactions are closed while others engage in post-deal integration 
(Marks et al., 2012: pp. 123-130). More importantly, deal completion is not the end but the new 
beginning for acquirers, since integration of the combined entities is of paramount importance 
to achieve synergies (Sudarsanam, 2010: pp. 695-764; Marks et al., 2012: pp. 123-130). If the 
synergies identified and secured by top-tier advisors exist, then it will take time to transfer a 
potential synergy into improved performance through post-deal integration, and 
eventually being perceived by the market. Therefore, it is essential to examine the relation 
between the choice of advisors and acquirers’ long-term performance. In the literature, 
Walter, Yawson and Yeung (2008) explore whether acquirer post-announcement 
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long-term abnormal returns are determined by advisors’ reputations. However, their 
research estimates long-term performance only over the [0, 270] event window after 
announcements. Generally, 270 days are not long enough for synergies to be materialised. 
Furthermore, momentum or momentum reversal are typical within 12-month periods 
(Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993), which could heavily affect stock returns. Two- or 
three-year returns are more common and reliable measures for long-term performance. 
Rau (2000) also investigates how bank reputations influence acquirers’ long-term 
abnormal returns; he does not find significant relations. However, Rau only controls for 
deal characteristics but does not control for acquirer characteristics. The literature shows 
that acquisition performance is determined by firm characteristics, such as size (Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004), market-to-book (Dong et al., 2006), leverage (Maloney, 
McCormick and Mitchell, 1993), free cash flows (Harford, 1999) and so forth. In addition, 
Ismail (2010) finds that the effects of top-tier advisors differ across “bull” and “bear” 
markets. In other words, market characteristics should also be controlled for.  
 
Furthermore, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no research that distinguishes 
between deals advised by a single top-tier advisor and multiple top-tier advisors. If 
multiple top-tier advisors can cooperate effectively, they can greatly improve their clients’ 
performance. In contrast, social loafing refers to the tendency of people to make less effort 
when they work collectively, leading to poor performance. In addition, top-tier advisors 
charge premium advisory fees. The retention of multiple top-tier advisors will increase 
concern about overpayment, leading to more negative market reactions. Therefore, 
whether the benefits of the retention of multiple top-tier advisors outweigh the 
disadvantages needs further research. Additionally, although Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) 
have examined whether increasing the total number of acquirer advisors affects acquirer 
gains. They find that a larger number of advisors retained associates with greater gains for 
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acquirers, although it is still unknown whether the result is driven by the number of 
top-tier advisors retained by acquirers.  
 
Motivated by the above-mentioned unresolved issues, this chapter examines the effect of 
top-tier financial advisors on acquirer performance in both the short and long term via 
analysing a sample of 3103 completed US M&A deals over the period 1990–2009. In this 
study, top-tier financial advisors are defined as the top 10 investment banks listed in the 
market share-based league table. Acquirer short- and long-term performances are 
measured by five-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns around announcement 
(CAR [-2, 2]) and post-announcement 36-month size-adjusted buy-and hold abnormal 
returns (BHAR36), respectively. In the regression analysis, firm, deal and market 
characteristics are controlled for. Consequently, this chapter finds that the retention of 
top-tier advisors does not have significant effects on acquirer short-term performance, 
regardless of whether a single or multiple top-tier advisors are retained. In private 
acquisitions, advisor reputation is even negatively related to acquirer announcement 
abnormal returns. Private acquisitions are much less complex that public acquisitions. The 
results indicate that investors regard the retention of top-tier advisors in private 
acquisitions as unnecessary and overpaid, leading to negative market reactions. In contrast, 
top-tier advisors significantly improve their acquirer clients’ performance in the long term. 
The positive effects of top-tier advisors on acquirer long-term performance hold for public 
and private acquisition sub-samples. On average, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
outperform other acquirers by 13.90%, after controlling for firm, deal, and market 
characteristics. More interestingly, an increase in the number of top-tier advisors retained 
by acquirers is positively related to acquirer long-term performance, whereas increasing 
the total number of advisors has negative effects on acquirer long-term performance. The 
direct comparison between the coefficients on the number of top-tier advisors and the total 
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number of advisors highlights top-tier advisors’ superior skills in improving their clients’ 
long-term performance. These empirical results strongly support the conjecture that top-tier 
advisors’ ability to identify synergistic targets and secure a larger proportion of synergy will be 
reflected in acquirer long-term performance rather than acquirer short-term performance.  
 
Finally, this chapter also addresses the issue of endogeneity by conducting instrumental 
variable (IV) regressions. Although the results are not qualitatively changed, endogeneity 
leads to undervaluation of top-tier advisors’ effects. Compared to acquirers advised by 
non-top-tier advisors, the retention of top-tier advisors improves acquirer long-term 
performance by 47.15%, after controlling for endogeneity. 
 
This research contributes to the M&A literature in the following aspects. First, this chapter 
sheds new light on puzzling empirical evidence on the financial advisor reputation–quality 
mechanism. Unlike most papers that only focus on financial advisors’ effects in the short 
term, this chapter argues that merger synergies identified and secured by prestigious advisors 
should be realized in the long term and eventually perceived by the market. By simultaneously 
examining acquirer performance in both the short and long term, this chapter provides novel 
evidence on the impact of top-tier advisors on acquirer performance. This study highlights that 
top-tier advisors’ effects on acquirer performance are shown in the long term rather than in 
the short term. The retention of top-tier advisors significantly improves acquirer long-term 
performance, suggesting that the market share-based league tables are reliable to reflect 
advisors’ skills. 
 
Second, the existing literature does not distinguish acquirers advised by multiple top-tier 
advisors from acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. By investigating the effects of 
multiple top-tier advisors, this chapter suggests that an increase in top-tier advisors 
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retained does not result in more severe conflicts of interest; whereas multiple top-tier 
advisors can effectively cooperate, thereby making concerted efforts to improve their 
clients’ performance. 
 
Third, this chapter also has important implications for practitioners. This chapter suggests 
that acquirers do not need to worry too much about overpayment of advisory fees. Such 
overpayment engenders a negative market reaction in the short term. However, top-tier 
advisors can help their clients outperform in the long term. The benefits of retaining 
top-tier advisors outweigh the disadvantages.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 constructs the main hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data selection procedure 
and methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and shows robustness tests. 
Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.2. Literature Review 
The role of financial advisors has been highlighted by an increasing number of researchers. 
This school of literature mainly concentrates in examining the reputation–quality 
mechanism. In general, advisors’ reputations are measured by market share-based league 
tables. The majority of existing studies question the effects of prestigious advisors on their 
acquirer clients’ performance to a greater or lesser extent. For example, Bowers and Miller 
(1990) examine whether top-tier advisors improve the combined acquirer and target 
announcement abnormal returns, and whether top-tier advisors can help their clients gain a 
larger proportion of total wealth, through analysing 114 US completed acquisitions during 
1981–1986. Their results show that deals with top-tier advisors retained by either 
 17 
 
acquirers or targets generate higher returns to combined firms than deals without top-tier 
advisor involvement. However, top-tier advisor involvement does not create a higher 
proportion of total returns to acquirers, but positively relates to targets’ proportion of total 
returns. In other words, top-tier advisors do not help acquirers gain bargaining advantage. 
Since acquirers aim to profit from acquisitions rather than transfer wealth to targets, the 
above results cannot demonstrate that acquirers that retain top-tier advisors make superior 
deals.  
 
McLaughlin (1990) explores advisory fee structure in 195 US tender offers from 1978 to 
1985 and show that more than 80% of the fees are contingent on the completion of deals. 
In other words, investment banks have a strong incentive to complete transactions. 
Through further research on an acquirer sample of 227 tender offers and a target sample of 
148 tender offers during 1978–1986, McLaughlin (1992) finds that completion rates do 
not differ across acquirers advised by high-, median- and low-reputation advisors; 
however, acquirers advised by high-reputation advisors gain significantly lower 
announcement returns and pay more bid premiums than acquirers advised by 
low-reputation advisors. Advisory fees are mainly determined by the transaction value. 
 
Michel, Shaked and Lee (1991) investigate the relation between advisor prestige and 
takeover performance via examining announcement abnormal returns for 81 acquirers and 
122 targets during 1981–1987. These acquirers were advised by six major investment 
banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, First Boston, Lehman Brothers, Salomon 
Brothers and Drexel Burnham Lambert) and a group of other banks. Lower target 
announcement abnormal returns imply lower bid premiums paid by acquirers. In terms of 
maximizing acquirer abnormal returns but minimizing target abnormal returns, Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, one of the less prestigious banks, obtains the best performance; 
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whereas First Boston, a Bulge Bracket member, underperforms all of the other advisors. 
These results suggest that bank reputations do not positively relate to acquirer 
performance.  
 
Servaes and Zenner (1996) evaluate the determinants of financial advisor choice and the 
effects of financial advisors on acquirer announcement performance, by analysing 99 
in-house deals and 198 deals advised by investment banks completed from 1981 to 1992. 
They find that acquirers tend to retain advisors rather than conduct in-house deals, and 
tend to retain top-tier advisors rather than non-top-tier advisors, when the complexity of 
deals is greater, when acquirers are less experienced, and when deals are takeovers rather 
than acquisitions of assets. In addition, acquirer announcement returns do not significantly 
differ across in-house deals and deals advised by investment banks. The difference in 
announcement returns between acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier banks is also 
insignificant.  
 
Rau (2000) examines the relations between financial advisor market share, contingent fee 
payments and acquirer performance via analysing 372 mergers advised by 125 banks and 
388 tender offers advised by 66 banks over the period 1980–1991. He finds that 
contingent fee structure differs across advisor groups classified by investment bank market 
shares. Specifically, first-tier banks charge a larger portion of contingent fees compared to 
second- and third-tier banks. Regardless of deal types – mergers or tender offers – 
investment bank market share is determined by the deal completion rates, but is not 
determined by the acquirers’ post-deal performance. Compared with second- and third-tier 
advisors, top-tier advisors have similar deal completion rates in mergers, but higher deal 
completion rates in tender offers. Compared with acquirers advised by non-top-tier 
investment banks, acquirers advised by top-tier banks obtain lower announcement 
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abnormal returns in mergers but higher announcement abnormal returns in tender offers. 
However, acquirers advised by top-tier banks do not make a greater percentage of 
value-increasing transactions than value-decreasing transactions either in mergers or 
tender offers. Compared to top-tier and second-tier advisors, third-tier advisors help their 
clients pay the lowest bid premiums in tender offers whereas acquirers advised by 
different groups of advisors pay similar premiums in mergers. The effects of advisor 
contingent fees on acquirer post-deal long-term performance are insignificant in mergers 
but significantly negative in tender offers. Overall, the results of Rau (2000) indicate that 
top-tier advisors have higher deal completion rates but do not help their clients improve 
acquisition performance.  
 
Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) investigate whether the choice of financial advisors affects 
M&A deal completion rates, the speed of completion and acquirer post-deal gains by 
analysing 5337 US mergers from 1995–2000. They find that the top-tier advisors increase 
the probability of deal completion and take less time to complete deals compared to 
non-top-tier advisors. Advisory fees are not related to the probability of deal completion, 
whereas total fees and the proportion of contingent fees are positively related to the speed 
of completion. By employing the difference between the transaction value at the 
announcement date and the effective date as the proxy of acquirer post-deal gains, they 
find that acquirer performance is negatively related to the retention of top-tier advisors but 
positively related to total advisory fees and the number of advisors retained by acquirers.  
 
Based on the research of 801 Australian acquisitions announced over the period 1989–
1998, da Silva Rosa et al. (2004) find that acquirers advised by second-tier advisors gain 
higher abnormal returns around announcement and obtain a larger portion of synergies 
than first- and third-tier advisors. Furthermore, second-tier advisors have lower deal 
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completion rates and also make fewer value-destroying deals than first-tier advisors. 
Advisor market share is determined by the last year market share but is not associated with 
advisor deal completion rates and takeover performance.  
 
Walter, Yawson and Yeung (2008) analyse US M&A deals from 1980–2003 and find that 
high quality investment banks measured by market share do not improve their clients’ 
acquisition performance, even though they charge significantly higher advisory fees. In 
addition, prestigious banks do not have higher deal completion rates; however, they can 
shorten the time to resolution.  
 
Based on the research of 635 US completed acquisitions during 1985–2004, Chahine and 
Ismail (2009) find that advisor reputations are positively related to advisory fees, and 
acquirer advisory fees are negatively related to bid premiums. However, there is no 
significant relation between advisor reputations and bid premiums. Furthermore, advisor 
reputations do not have significant effects on the probability that acquirers gain more than 
targets, where acquirer and target gains are measured by abnormal returns and bid 
premiums, respectively. 
 
By examining 285 European M&A deals over the period 1997–2002, Schiereck, 
Sigl-Grüb and Unverhau (2009) find that there is no significant relation between 
announcement returns to combined firms and the retention of top-tier advisors, whether 
top-tier advisors are retained by acquirers or targets. In addition, acquirers (targets) 
advised by top-tier advisors do not outperform acquirers (targets) advised by non-top-tier 
advisors, indicating that top-tier advisors do not bring bargaining advantage to their 
clients.  
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Based on the study of 6379 US acquisitions completed during 1985–2004, Ismail (2010) 
documents more than $42 billion of losses for acquirers advised by tier-one advisors and 
$13.5 billion of gains for acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors over the five-day 
period around announcement. In addition, Ismail (2010) finds that over the internet bubble 
period, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors also gain positive abnormal returns, and 
outperform acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. Furthermore, he points out that 
most value-destroying deals are made in “bear” markets. If deals made in “bear” markets 
were removed from the sample, top-tier advisors could help their acquirer clients gain 
more announcement returns compared to non-top-tier advisors. However, for the entire 
sample, less prestigious advisors will have a higher ranking if the ranking is based on the 
acquirer announcement performance.  
 
In contrast, some scholars hold the opposite point of view. Their results indicate that high 
quality banks improve their clients’ acquisition performance. For example, Kale, Kini and 
Ryan (2003) show a positive relation between advisors’ reputations and their acquirer 
clients’ performance through analysing 390 US acquisitions announced during 1981–1994. 
More specifically, in their research, the acquirer advisor market share relative to the target 
advisor market share is used as the proxy for the acquirer advisor relative reputation. They 
find that relative reputations for acquirer advisors are positively related to total returns to 
combined firms, acquirer returns and acquirer shares of total returns, but are negatively 
related to target returns. Furthermore, advisors with higher relative reputations are more 
capable of completing deals and preventing value-decreasing deals.  
 
By examining 308 takeovers, including 145 auction deals and 163 negotiation deals, 
during 1989–1999, Boone and Mulherin (2008) find that acquirer announcement returns 
are positively related to top-tier advisors retained by acquirers but negatively related to 
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top-tier advisors retained by targets. Therefore, top-tier advisors help their acquirer clients 
improve acquisition performance, and help their target clients gain high-premium offers. 
In other words, the retention of top-tier advisors is in the interest of employers. 
 
Based on the research of 15344 US acquisitions over the period 1980–2007, Bao and 
Edmans (2011) suggest that the investment bank fixed effects on announcement returns to 
acquirers are statistically significant, after controlling for acquirer characteristics. 
Furthermore, in terms of improving acquirer announcement returns, investment banks that 
gain better past performance will also achieve better performance in the future. In other 
words, investment banks’ performances of M&A advisory services are persistent. 
Therefore, bank quality is positively related to acquirer announcement performance, if the 
bank quality is measured by past performance instead of market shares. 
 
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) analyse 4803 attempted takeover transactions 
announced during 1996–2009 in the US, and find that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
outperform acquirers advised by non–top-tier advisors in public acquisitions. On average, the 
retention of top-tier advisors leads to $65.83 million of shareholder gains for acquirers in public 
acquisitions. In private and subsidiary acquisitions, top-tier advisors do not improve acquirer 
announcement performance. More importantly, their results suggest that the improvement in 
performance can be attributed to top-tier advisors’ skills in identifying synergistic targets and 
negotiating higher shares of synergies for acquirers. Furthermore, top-tier financial advisors 
tend to charge higher advisory fees. Top-tier advisors do not associate with higher deal 
completion rates. In other words, top-tier financial advisors are not simply retained to 
complete the transactions. However, they are able to complete the deals in a shorter period 
of time. Additionally, acquirers with in-house M&A expertise are less likely to employ 
advisors in acquisitions. 
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In addition to aforementioned studies that focus on the reputation–quality mechanism, 
some researchers investigate M&A financial advisors from different perspectives. For 
example, Allen et al. (2004) explore the effects of commercial banks that play the role of 
both lenders and merger advisors. They find that targets that retain their own commercial 
banks as merger advisors outperform targets that retain investment banks; whereas 
acquirers do not gain higher abnormal returns when their own commercial banks are 
retained as acquisition advisors. Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov (2009) examine the role 
of financial advisors as insiders of targets. They find that acquirer financial advisors may 
exploit the advantages of privileged information to hold a stake in the targets, thereby 
profiting from arbitrage strategy. Such an advisory stake is associated with a higher 
probability of deal completion and a higher target premium but hurts acquirer profitability. 
Kisgen, Qian and Song (2009) examine the effects of fairness opinions provided by 
investment banks on takeover performance, and find that acquirers that use fairness 
opinions underperform other acquirers around announcement. Their results suggest that 
investors question the profitability of these deals with fairness opinions. Song, Wei and 
Zhou (2013) compare boutique advisors and full-service banks. They find that boutique 
advisors tend to be retained in deals with greater complexity, and they can help acquirers 
pay lower bid premiums, showing their superior skills.  
 
2.3. Hypotheses 
Most studies show the negative relationship between acquirer announcement returns and 
the retention of top-tier financial advisors, since the high advisory fees paid will increase 
acquirers’ costs, leading to negative market reactions. Therefore, this chapter formulates 
the following hypothesis: 
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H1: The retention of top-tier advisors by acquirers is negatively related to acquirer 
short-term performance. 
 
Furthermore, since top-tier advisors charge premium advisory fees, the retention of 
multiple top-tier advisors will increase concern about overpayment, leading to more 
negative market reactions in the short term.  
H2: The number of top-tier advisors retained by acquirers is negatively related to acquirer 
short-term performance. 
 
However, top-tier advisors’ abilities to identify synergistic targets and gain barraging 
advantage in negotiations have been emphasized by Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012). 
This chapter argues that if the synergy identified by top-tier advisors does exist, then it 
will take time to transfer the potential synergy into improved performance through 
post-deal integration before eventually being perceived by the market. Furthermore, 
post-deal integration plays the pivotal role in value creation. Although some financial 
advisors will end their services after deal completion, others will continue to support their 
clients in the process of post-acquisition integration (Marks et al., 2012: pp. 123-130). 
Therefore, the positive effects of top-tier advisors on acquirer’s performance should be 
shown in the long term rather than in the short term. As a consequence, this chapter 
establishes the following hypothesis: 
H3: The retention of top-tier advisors by acquirers is positively related to acquirer 
long-term performance. 
 
Additionally, social loafing refers to the phenomenon that group members make less effort 
when they work collectively than when they work individually. However, Jackson and 
Williams (1985) argue that collective work on simple tasks results in social loafing, 
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whereas cooperation on complex tasks enhances performance. Additionally, Karau and 
Williams (1993) point out that social loafing can be alleviated by several factors, such as 
evaluation of individual work, participants’ expectations of co-workers’ efforts, intrinsic 
value of task, and culture. Mergers and acquisitions, as important investment projects for 
companies, are difficult tasks. Top-tier advisors have a higher cost of reputation. 
Specifically, a higher reputation is associated with a higher market share. To maintain this 
market share, top-tier advisors must therefore maintain their reputation, which is achieved 
by providing high-quality service. However, if multiple top-tier advisors exert less effort 
in deal advisory services, their reputation will be destroyed. Therefore, if top-tier advisors 
have superior skills and multiple top-tier advisors can cooperate effectively, they can 
greatly improve their clients’ performance. Consequently, this chapter formulates the 
following hypotheses: 
H4: The number of top-tier advisors retained by acquirers is positively related to acquirer 
long-term performance. 
 
2.4. Data and Methodology 
2.4.1. Sample Selection 
This chapter analyses a sample of US domestic M&As announced over the period 1st 
January 1990 to 31 December 2009 from Thomson One Banker. The original sample 
includes 178,861 deals. Since this research pays attention to both the short- and long-term 
performance of acquisitions, deal status is required to be completed or unconditional, 
which leads to a sample of 139,196 deals. Acquirers are required to be public and targets 
are required to be public, private, or subsidiaries. Using these criteria yields a sample of 
67,071 deals. Takeover transaction values are required to be greater than or equal to $1 
million, yielding a sample of 35,272 deals. Regulated industries such as financial and 
 26 
 
utility firms (Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4999, 
respectively) are excluded, yielding a sample of 25,095 deals. Bankruptcy acquisitions, 
going-private transactions, leveraged buyouts, liquidations, repurchases, restructurings, 
reverse takeovers, and privatizations are excluded from the sample, leaving a panel of 
22,692 observations. Since this chapter focuses on the effects of financial advisors, 
acquirers are required to have their advisor information recorded by Thomson One Banker, 
yielding 5826 deals. To control for deal characteristics, observations are required to report 
transaction value and payment method information to Thomson One Banker, which leaves 
a sample of 5076 deals. To calculate short- and long-term abnormal returns, acquirers are 
required to file sufficient stock price data with the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database, which leaves a sample of 4347 deals.3 To measure firm characteristics, 
acquirers are required to have sufficient accounting data in the Compustat database, 
yielding a final sample of 3103 deals. In the final sample, 3003 transactions are advised by 
investment banks, while 100 transactions are in-house deals (recorded as “no investment 
bank retained” by Thomson One Banker). 
 
2.4.2. Methodology 
2.4.2.1. Measure of Advisor Reputation 
Following the method of Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), this research uses a 
binary classification to distinguish between top-tier and non–top-tier advisors. Specifically, 
the top 10 banks measured by transaction value are classified as top-tier advisors and the 
others are classified as non-top-tier advisors.4 Since the eighth and tenth advisors are very 
                                                 
3 Calculating size-adjusted BHARs also requires data on the book value of equity from the Compustat 
database. 
4 Appendix 2.1 shows the top 25 investment banks ranked by transaction value. Financial advisor league 
tables were downloaded from Thomson One Banker. The ranking list for the 1990s and 2000s are presented 
in Panel A and B, respectively. 
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similar in transaction values and market shares, this chapter uses the top 10 as the cut-off 
point, unlike the top-eight classification used by Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012). 
The top-10 cut-off point is also used by Ismail (2010). 
 
To prevent misclassification, this chapter also pays attention to takeovers among 
investment banks. For instance, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in 2008 and was 
acquired by Barclays Capital the same year. Therefore, deals advised by Barclays Capital 
before the acquisition of Lehman Brothers are classified as being advised by a non-top-tier 
investment bank, whereas deals advised by Barclays Capital after the acquisition are 
classified as advised by a top-tier bank. Similarly, First Boston was acquired by Credit 
Suisse in 1990. Travelers Group acquired Salomon Brothers (top-tier) in 1998 and 
subsequently merged with Citicorp the same year, establishing Citigroup.  
 
2.4.2.2. Measure of Performance 
2.4.2.2.1 Short-Term Performance 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) argue that the presence of frequent acquirers in the sample 
will bias market model parameter estimations. In line with these authors, this chapter uses 
market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to measure acquirer short-term 
performance. Market-adjusted abnormal returns are defined as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
where Rit is the daily stock return for firm i on date t and Rmt is the daily return for the 
value-weighted CRSP index on date t. Subsequently, market-adjusted CARs are calculated over 
a [-2, 2] window around announcements (CAR [-2, 2]), as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
Conventional t-statistic (Gosset, 1908) is used and calculated as follows: 
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𝑡 =
𝐶𝐴𝑅 × √𝑛
𝜎(𝐶𝐴𝑅)
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅 is the sample mean, σ(CAR) is the sample standard deviation, and n is the 
sample size. 
 
2.4.2.2.2. Long-Term Performance 
Test statistics of long-term market-adjusted abnormal returns are misspecified due to 
rebalancing bias, new-listing bias, and skewness bias (Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon, 
Barber and Tsai, 1999). To address these problems, Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) use size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
(BHARs) to measure long-term stock performance and calculate bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic. Therefore, this chapter estimates long-term performance 
following Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) and Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). 
Specifically, post-announcement 36-month size-adjusted BHARs (BHAR36) are 
calculated as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
− ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑝𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
where Rit is the monthly stock return for firm i in month t and Rpt is the monthly return for 
reference portfolio in month t, calculated as  
𝑅𝑝𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑅𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
with Rjt the monthly stock return for firm j in month t and N the number of firms.  
 
In each year, this chapter constructs 50 reference portfolios in terms of size and 
market-to-book. The reference portfolios are created in two stages, following Bouwman, 
Fuller, and Nain (2009). First, from 1990 to 2009, all NYSE firms are sorted into deciles 
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on the basis of their market value, calculated as the stock price multiplied by the number 
of common shares outstanding in June of year t. Second, within each size decile, firms are 
sorted into quintiles based on their market-to-book ratios, calculated as the market value of 
equity in June of year t divided by the book value of equity in fiscal year t - 1. After all 
NYSE firms are categorized into 50 groups, AMEX and NASDAQ firms are placed in 
their proper reference portfolios based on market value and market-to-book ratios. 
Additionally, firms that conducted acquisitions in year t are excluded from the reference 
portfolios.  
 
Although size and market-to-book reference portfolios are used to adjust for the 
performance, long-term BHARs still tend to be positively skewed (Lyon, Barber and Tsai 
1999). Therefore, Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) develop the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic. It is measured following a two-step procedure. First, 
skewness-adjusted t-statistics is calculated based on Johnson (1978) as follows: 
𝑡 = √𝑛 (
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅
𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅)
+
1
3
∑ (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅)
3𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅)3
(
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅
𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅)
)2
+
1
6𝑛
∑ (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 − 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅)
3𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛𝜎(𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅)3
) 
where 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅 is the sample mean, σ(BHAR) is the sample standard deviation, and n is the 
sample size. The second step is bootstrapping the skewness-adjusted test statistic. This 
chapter draws 2000 bootstrapped resamples of BHARs and calculate the 
skewness-adjusted t-statistic. 
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2.4.2.3. Regression Analysis 
2.4.2.3.1. Short- and Long-Term Performance 
The variation in acquirer abnormal returns can be explained by multiple variables. Since 
univariate tests do not consider the interaction of alternative variables, the results may be 
unreliable. Therefore, multivariate regressions are necessary. Since Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2012) have emphasized that top-tier advisors’ effects on acquirer performance 
differ across public, private and subsidiary acquisitions, this chapter also divides the entire 
sample into sub-samples and conducts regressions for the entire sample and each 
sub-sample. The following ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions are conducted to 
examine the relation between acquirer abnormal returns and financial advisors: 
Short-term performance: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
Long-term Performance: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
where TopTieri and No. of TopTieri are the key explanatory variables in this research. 
TopTieri, a dummy variable, is used to examine the overall effects of top-tier advisors. In 
addition to existing literature, this chapter use No. of TopTieri, a count-data variable, to 
evaluate the effects of the retention of multiple top-tier advisors. TopTieri equals one if 
acquirer i retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal, and zero otherwise. No. of 
TopTieri equals the number of top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer i for the deal. 
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Furthermore, No. of Advisorsi equals the total number of advisors retained by the acquirer 
i for the deal. InHousei equals one if acquirer i does not retain any financial advisors for 
the deal, and zero otherwise. Additionally, this chapter includes a series of control 
variables that impact acquirer returns. Specifically, Firmi represents the firm 
characteristics of acquirer i at the end of fiscal year prior to the announcement, Deali 
represents the deal characteristics for acquirer i, and Marketi represents market 
characteristics for acquirer i. The explicit description of firm, deal and market 
characteristics will be shown later in this section. This research also controls for year fixed 
effects (ft) and industry fixed effects (find.). To minimize the influence of outliers, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.5 
 
2.4.2.3.2. Determinants of Decisions on Making In-House Deals or Retaining Top-Tier 
Advisors  
This chapter is also interested in exploring what kind of firms in what kind of situation are 
more likely to retain top-tier financial advisors or to conduct in-house deals. Since 
retaining top-tier advisors and conducting in-house deals are negatively correlated, it is 
appropriate to use a bivariate probit model to jointly estimate the probabilities of these two 
decisions.6 The bivariate probit model is shown as follows: 
{
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐼𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑 + 𝜖𝑖
 
 
2.4.2.3.3. Endogeneity 
The reliability of OLS regression is based on the fundamental assumption that the model 
error term does not correlate to the regressors. In other words, the explanatory variable 
                                                 
5 Results hold when the variables are winsorized at different levels, such as 2% and 98%, 3% and 97%, and 5% 
and 95%. 
6 For robustness check, this chapter also separately estimates the probability of retaining top-tier advisors and 
the probability of making in-house deals by conducting two individual probit models. 
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should be exogenously determined. However, as pointed out by Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2012), significant difference in firm and deal characteristics between acquirers 
advised by top-tier and non-top-tier investment banks indicate that an top-tier advisor 
dummy could be an endogenous regressor. Instrumental variable (IV) regression is a 
leading approach to address the issue of endogeneity (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010: p. 177). 
Therefore, this chapter applies two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) – a kind of IV 
regression. The two main explanatory variables, TopTier and Number of TopTier, are 
binary and count-data variables, respectively. When the dependent variable is a dummy, 
probit or logit tend to be used. When the dependent variable is a count-data variable, the 
Poisson model tends to be used. However, for 2SLS, using non-linear models like probit 
or logit in the first stage with a dummy endogenous variable is unnecessary. Even if the 
endogenous regressor is a binary or a count-data variable, using OLS for the first-stage 
regression creates consistent results for the IV model (Angrist and Krueger, 2001).  
 
An appropriate instrument variable should be correlated with the endogenous variable, but 
does not directly related to the dependent variable. Following Fang (2005) and Golubov, 
Petmezas and Travlos (2012), this chapter constructs the instrument variable Scope. Scope 
measures the scope of investment banking services provided by top-tier advisors that is 
used by an acquirer before the given M&A deal. This chapter constructs Scope based on 
M&A deals, equity issues and bond issues data from Thomson One Banker. Specifically, 
Scope equals three if an acquirer retained top-tier advisors for all the three types of 
transactions (M&A, equity issue and bond issue) during the five-year period prior to the 
acquisition. Scope equals two if an acquirer retained top-tier advisors for two of the three 
types of transactions during the five-year period prior to the acquisition. Scope equals one 
if an acquirer retained top-tier advisors for only one of the three types of transactions 
during the five-year period prior to the acquisition. Scope equals zero if an acquirer never 
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retains top-tier advisors during the five-year period prior to the acquisition. In addition, 
this study uses Stock and Yogo (2005) weak instrument tests to examine whether the 
instrument variable Scope is valid. The results suggest that the variable Scope is not a 
weak instrument. 
 
This chapter constructs following 2SLS regressions to examine the effects of top-tier 
advisors on acquirer short- and long-term performance: 
Short-term Performance: 
{
𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖̂ + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜖𝑖
 
 
{
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖̂ + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜖𝑖
 
 
Long-term performance: 
{
𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖̂ + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜖𝑖
 
 
{
𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖̂ + 𝛽2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜖𝑖
 
 
In the above 2SLS regressions, the first stage is the regression of TopTier or Number of 
TopTier on the instrument variable Scope, and firm, deal, and market characteristics. The 
second stage is the regression of acquirer performance (CAR or BHAR) on 
model-estimated 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟̂  or 𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟̂  from first stage, controlling for firm, 
deal and market characteristics. 
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2.4.2.3.4. Control Variables: Firm, Deal and Market Characteristics 
The control variables in this chapter include firm, deal and market characteristics.7 For 
firm characteristics (Firmi), this chapter controls for size (Ln(MV)), market-to-book ratio 
(M/B), leverage (Leverage), cash flow-to-equity ratio (Cash flows/Equity), pre-deal stock 
performance (RUNUP), and acquirer takeover experience (Past Experienced).  
 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) investigate size effects in M&A performance 
and find that acquirer announcement returns negatively associate with firm size. To 
control for size effects, this chapter calculates the logarithm of the acquirer market value 
(Ln(MV)) measured four weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT). 
 
Lang, Stulz and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) study the relation between Tobin’s Q and 
takeover returns. They find that takeovers by high Q acquirers for low Q targets generate the 
largest announcement returns to acquirers. In contrast, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) examine the 
post-merger long-run performance of glamour (high market-to-book) and value (low 
market-to-book) acquirers and find that glamour acquirers underperform in the long run. 
Additionally, Dong et al. (2006) find that high market-to-book acquirers gain lower 
announcement returns in general. This chapter calculates M/B as market value of equity four 
weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT) divided by book value of equity 
at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item CEQ). 
 
Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993) investigate the relation between capital structure 
and M&A returns. They find that acquirers with higher leverage gain higher announcement 
returns and argue that debt helps to alleviate agency problem and therefore improve the quality 
                                                 
7 All the control variables mentioned in this section are described in Appendix 2.2, where Panels A to C 
present firm characteristics, deal characteristics, and market characteristics, respectively. 
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of M&A decision-making. This chapter calculates Leverage as total debt over total capital at 
the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item 
(DTLL+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+SEQ)). 
 
Harford (1999) examines whether excess cash holdings stimulate top management to conduct 
takeover transactions, and whether these deals (made by cash-rich acquirers) tend to be 
value-destroying. They find that cash-richness is significantly positively related to the 
probability of being a acquirer, but is negatively related to acquirer announcement returns. 
Moreover, post-merger long-run abnormal operating performance for cash-rich acquirers is 
significantly negative. This chapter calculates Cash Flows/Equity as cash flows at the fiscal 
year end before the announcement (Compustat item IB+DP-DVP-DVC) divided by 
market value of equity four weeks before the announcement (CRSP item 
PRC×SHROUT). 
 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) use stock price runup as the measure of acquirer pre-deal 
performance and find that acquirer runup is positively related to acquirer announcement returns. 
In contrast, Rosen (2006) finds that acquirer runup is negatively related to both short- and 
long-term abnormal returns for acquirers. This chapter calculates RUNUP as acquirer 
market-adjusted CARs before announcement date over the [-365, -28] window. 
 
Ismail (2008) finds that multiple acquirers underperform and argues that acquirers who 
have successful experience tend to be overconfident in subsequent deals. This chapter 
defines Past Experience as the number of deals made by an acquirer over the five-year 
period before the acquisition in question. 
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For deal characteristics (Deali), this chapter controls for relative transaction values 
(Relative Size), acquirer public status (Public), payment method (Cash/Stock), deal 
attitude (Hostile), bid competition (Competing Bid), tender offers (Tender offer), and 
diversifying deals (Diversification).  
 
Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) find that acquisitions of larger targets generate 
higher returns to acquirers. This chapter calculates Relative Size as the transaction value 
(from Thomson One Banker) divided by the acquirer market value of equity four weeks 
before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT).  
 
Chang (1998) and Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) show that acquirers gain higher 
return in private acquisitions than in public acquisitions. This chapter uses the Public 
dummy to identify the listing status of the target. Public equals one if the target is a 
publicly listed firm. 
 
Overvalued acquirers tend to use stock as payment method (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that deals paid by cash generate more returns to acquirers 
in the long term than deals paid by stock. This chapter uses two dummies, Stock and Cash, 
to control for payment methods. Stock (Cash) equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock 
(cash). 
 
Schwert (2000) points out that hostile takeovers are strategically employed by acquirers or 
targets to maximize their gains. In addition, his study shows that hostility identified by pre-bid 
events is negatively related to acquirer returns, although most hostile deals covered by media do 
not significantly differ from friendly deals in terms of stock returns. In this chapter, the Hostile 
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dummy equals one if the deal attitude is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One 
Banker.  
 
De, Fedenia and Triantis (1996) examine competitive acquisitions and indicate negative effects 
of bid competition on acquirer returns. This chapter uses Competing Bid to control for takeover 
contest. Competing Bid equals one if there are more than one bidding firms reported by 
Thomson One Banker. 
 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that tender offer positively relates to acquirer long-term 
returns. In this chapter, the Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is identified as a 
tender offer by Thomson One Banker. 
 
Numerous studies show that diversification results in value reduction (Lang and Stulz, 
1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995), however a certain amount of research challenges this 
notion (Villalonga, 2004; Shahrur and Venkateswaran, 2009). In this chapter, the 
Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target do not share the same first 
two digits of primary SIC code. 
 
For market characteristics (Marketi), this chapter controls for M&A market heat (M&A 
Heat Degree) and stock market valuation (High/Low Valuation Market). 
 
In contrast to the literature on the driving force of merger waves, Duchin and Schmidt 
(2013) investigate whether deals in merger waves are value-enhancing. Their study shows 
that in-wave acquirers significantly underperform in the long term. To measure the 
intensity of M&A activities, this chapter creates the variable M&A Heat Degree following 
the method of Yung, Çolak and Wei (2008). Specifically, M&A Heat Degree is calculated 
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as the moving average8 of the number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the 
historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 
1985. 
 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) believe that stock 
market misvaluation drives merger activities and finally influences acquirer returns. 
Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) examine the difference in acquirer performance 
between acquisitions in “bull” and “bear” markets. They find that acquirers in 
high-valuation markets outperform in the short term but underperform in the long term 
compared to acquirers in low-valuation markets. To measure stock market valuation, this 
chapter follows the method of Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009). Specifically, this 
chapter initially detrends the monthly P/E ratio of the S&P 5009 from 1985 to 2009. 
Subsequently, each month is classified as below or above average base on whether the 
detrended P/E ratio of the month is lower or higher than the past five-year average. Finally, 
the lowest 50% of below average months are identified as Low Valuation Market, while 
the highest 50% of above average months are identified as High Valuation Market. 
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Summary Statistics and Univariate Test 
2.5.1.1. Entire Sample 
Table 2.1 exhibits summary statistics for the entire sample and the univariate comparison 
between deals advised by investment banks and in-house deals. In the sample, 96.78% of 
                                                 
8 Moving average MA(4) is calculated as the average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter and three 
previous quarters. 
9 The monthly P/E ratio of the S&P 500 is acquired from the Datastream. 
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deals are advised by investment banks, while in-house deals account for only 3.32% of the 
sample.  
[Insert Table 2.1 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2.1 shows both short- and long-term abnormal returns for acquirers. For 
the full sample, acquirers’ CAR [-2, 2] and BHAR36 average 1.28% (p=0.000) and -33.01% 
(p=0.000), respectively. The median value of acquirers’ CAR [-2, 2] and BHAR36 are 
0.68% (p=0.000) and -44.58% (p=0.000), respectively. The differences in acquirer short- 
and long-term performance between deals advised by banks and in-house deals are 
insignificant. It is not surprising that acquirers gain negative abnormal returns in the long 
term, since the results are consistent with the previous literature (e.g. Loughran and Vijh, 
1997; Rau and Vermaelen, 1998; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Conn et al., 2005; Cosh, 
Guest and Hughes, 2006; Bouwman, Fuller and Nain, 2009). Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
suggest that mergers and acquisitions are driven by market misvaluation. Overvalued 
companies are more likely to conduct takeovers to acquire undervalued companies. 
Overvalued companies tend to underperform over the long term, whereas acquisitions can 
create synergies. Therefore, acquirers’ long-term performance would be worse without 
takeovers (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
 
Panel B of Table 2.1 presents firm characteristics of acquirers. The mean (median) 
acquirer market value for the full sample is $9236.24 million ($1018.32 million). 
Acquirers who retain advisors are significantly smaller in size than acquirers who conduct 
in-house deals. The mean (median) market-to-book ratio for acquirers in the full sample is 
5.91 (3.06). Acquirers who retain advisors have a significantly lower market-to-book ratio 
than acquirers who conduct in-house deals. The mean (median) leverage for acquirers in 
the full sample is 0.26 (0.25). The difference in leverage between acquirers who retain 
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advisors and acquirers who conduct in-house deals is insignificant. The mean (median) 
cash flows-to-equity for acquirers in the full sample is 0.04 (0.05). In terms of cash 
flows-to-equity, the difference between acquirers who retain advisors and acquirers who 
conduct in-house deals is insignificant. The mean (median) stock price runup for acquirers 
in the full sample is 20.07% (12.67%). Acquirers who retain advisors and acquirers who 
conduct in-house deals have similar pre-deal stock performance. For the full sample, 
acquirers made 7.27 M&A deals over the five-year period prior to acquisition on average. 
Acquirers who retain advisors have significantly less acquisition experience than acquirers 
who conduct in-house deals.  
 
Panel C of Table 2.1 shows the deal characteristics. The mean (median) transaction value 
for the full sample is $880.92 million ($158.50 million). The value of deals advised by 
banks is significantly greater than the value of in-house deals. The difference in 
transaction value averages $470.92 million. The mean (median) relative size for the full 
sample is 0.34 (0.16). The relative size of deal advised by banks is significantly larger than 
the relative size of in-house deals. Public, private and subsidiary acquisitions account for 
46.79%, 31.71% and 21.50% of the sample, respectively. Acquirers advised by banks 
constitute a significantly less percentage of public acquisitions but a higher percentage of 
private and subsidiary acquisitions than acquirers who conduct in-house deals. All-stock 
deals, all-cash deals and mixed paid deals occupy 27.30%, 36.06% and 36.64% of the 
sample, respectively. Acquirers advised by banks make significantly less all-stock deals, 
but more all-cash and mixed paid deals than acquirers who conduct in-house deals. Only 
1.06% of the deals in the sample are hostile deals. Acquirers advised by banks make 
significantly more hostile deals than acquirers who conduct in-house deals. Competing 
bids only account for 2.06% of the sample. In terms of competing bids, the difference 
between acquirers advised by advisors and acquirers who conduct in-house deals is 
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insignificant. Tender offers occupy 15.98% of the sample. Acquirers advised by banks 
make significantly fewer tender offers than acquirers who conduct in-house deals.  
 
Panel D of Table 2.1 presents market characteristics. The mean (median) M&A heat 
degree for the full sample is 1.48 (1.44). The M&A heat degree is significantly negatively 
related to the retention of advisors, indicating that acquirers in a relatively cold M&A 
market tend to choose advisors. In the full sample, 27.94% (24.85%) of deals are made in 
a high (low) valuation market. 26.84% of deals advised by banks are conducted in a high 
valuation market, whereas 61.00% of in-house deals are conducted in a high valuation 
market. The difference between deals advised by banks and in-house deals is significant. 
Additionally, 25.57% of deals advised by banks are conducted in a high valuation market, 
whereas only 3.00% of in-house deals are conducted in a high valuation market. The 
difference between deals advised by banks and in-house deals is significant. These results 
indicate that acquirers tend to conduct in-house deals in a “bull” market rather than a “bear” 
market.  
 
Panel E of Table 2.1 shows financial advisor related information for deals advised by 
banks. Acquirers retain 1.14 advisors for a deal on average. The mean and median total 
advisory fees paid for one deal is $4.15 million and $1.58 million, respectively. 
 
Overall, Table 2.1 shows that acquirers who retain advisors and acquirers who conduct 
in-house deals gain similar performance in both the short and long term. In other words, 
in-house expertise does not outperform advisors. Additionally, larger acquirers, more 
glamour acquirers, and more experienced acquirers tend to conduct in-house deals. 
Furthermore, firms tend to conduct in-house deals, when the transaction value and relative 
size of the deal are smaller, when the M&A market is hot, and when the stock market 
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valuation is high. In-house deals are also associated with more public acquisitions and 
all-stock deals.  
 
2.5.1.2. Sub-Sample of Deals Advised by Advisors 
Table 2.2 exhibits summary statistics for the sub-sample of deals advised by investment 
banks and the univariate comparison between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier 
advisors. In deals with advisor involvement, 50.52% and 49.48% of deals are advised by 
top-tier and non-top-tier advisors, respectively. In other words, top-tier advisors control 
more than 50% of market share of the M&A advisory industry.  
 
[Insert Table 2.2 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows acquirer short- and long-term abnormal returns for the 
sub-sample of deals with advisor involvement. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for 
acquirers advised by top-tier advisors are 0.76% (p=0.004) and 0.53% (p=0.001), 
respectively; while the mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for acquirers advised by non-top-tier 
advisors are 1.78% (p=0.000) and 1.06% (p=0.000), respectively. Acquirers advised by 
top-tier advisors underperform acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors by 1.01% 
(p=0.012) on average. Furthermore, the mean and median BHAR36 for acquirers advised 
by top-tier advisors are -25.96% (p=0.000) and -37.31% (p=0.000), respectively; while the 
mean and median BHAR36 for acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors are -39.95% 
(p=0.048) and -53.25% (p=0.000), respectively. Acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
outperform acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors by 13.99% (p=0.000) on average.  
 
Panel B of Table 2.2 presents acquirer characteristics for the sub-sample of deals advised 
by banks. The mean (median) market value for acquirers advised by top-tier and 
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non-top-tier advisors are $13419.07 million ($2504.71 million) and $2773.46 million 
($399.57 million), respectively. Acquirers who retain top-tier advisors are significantly 
larger in size than acquirers who retain non-top-tier advisors. The mean (median) 
market-to-book for acquirers advised by top-tier advisors is 6.40 (3.15), while the mean 
(median) market-to-book for acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors is 5.22 (2.86). 
Acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have significantly larger market-to-book than 
acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. The mean and median leverage for acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors are 0.26 and 0.30, respectively; while the mean and median 
leverage for acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors are 0.26 and 0.17, respectively. 
Acquirers advised by top-tier advisors and acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors have 
similar leverage on average, although the difference in median leverage between them is 
statistically significant. The mean (median) cash flows-to-equity for acquirers advised by 
top-tier and non-top-tier advisors are 0.06 (0.06) and 0.02 (0.05), respectively. The 
difference in cash flows-to-equity between acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier 
advisors are significant. The mean (median) stock price runup for acquirers advised by 
top-tier advisors is 17.85% (11.86%), while the mean (median) runup for acquirers 
advised by non-top-tier advisors is 22.55% (13.62%). Acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors have significantly lower runup than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. 
Over the five-year period prior to acquisition, acquirers advised by top-tier and 
non-top-tier advisors made 8.64 and 5.22 deals on average, respectively; and the 
difference is significant.  
 
Panel C of Table 2.2 represents deal characteristics for the sub-sample of deals advised by 
banks. The mean (median) transaction value for deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier 
advisors are $1452.69 million ($339.50 million) and $327.89 million ($69.49 million), 
respectively. The value of deals advised by top-tier advisors is significantly larger than the 
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value of deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. In contrast, the mean (median) relative 
size for deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors are 0.33 (0.16) and 0.38 (0.18), 
respectively. The relative size of deals advised by top-tier advisors is significantly smaller 
than the relative size of deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. Although the value of deals 
advised by top-tier advisors is 4.43 times as large as the value of deals advised by 
non-top-tier advisors, firm size of acquirers advised by top-tier advisors is 4.84 times as 
large as firm size of acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. Therefore, it is reasonable 
that the relative size of deals advised by top-tier advisors is smaller. Public, private, and 
subsidiary acquisitions account for 53.59%, 23.27% and 23.14% of deals advised by 
top-tier advisors, respectively; whereas, public, private, and subsidiary acquisitions 
occupy 37.21%, 41.52% and 21.27% of deals advised by top-tier advisors, respectively. 
Top-tier banks advise a significantly higher percentage of public acquisitions, but a lower 
percentage of private acquisitions than non-top-tier advisors. In deals advised by top-tier 
advisors, 22.08%, 40.41% and 37.51% of deals are all-stock deals, all-cash deals and 
mixed deals, respectively. By contrast, in deals advised by non-top-tier advisors, 30.96%, 
31.97% and 37.07% of deals are all-stock deals, all-cash deals and mixed deals, 
respectively. Top-tier banks advise a significantly lower percentage of all-stock deals, but 
a higher percentage of all-cash deals than non-top-tier advisors. Hostile deals accounts for 
1.85% and 0.34% of deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors, respectively. The 
difference in deal attitude between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors is 
significant. Acquirers advised by top-tier advisors conduct a significantly higher 
percentage of competing bids than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors (2.83% 
versus 1.28%). Tender offers account for 19.51% and 12.18% of deals advised by top-tier 
and non-top-tier advisors, respectively. Acquirers advised by top-tier advisors make 
significantly more tender offers than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. Acquirers 
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advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors make a similar percentage of diversifying 
deals (34.81% versus 34.79%).  
 
Panel D of Table 2.2 presents market characteristics for the sub-sample of deals advised 
by advisors. The degree of M&A heat is significantly negatively related to the retention of 
top-tier advisors, indicating that top-tier advisors tend to be retained when the M&A 
market is relatively cold. Additionally, 28.48% and 28.35% of deals advised by top-tier 
advisors are conducted in high and low valuation markets, respectively; while 25.17% and 
22.75% of deals advised by non-top-tier advisors are conducted in high and low valuation 
markets, respectively. Both high and low valuation markets are significantly related to the 
retention of top-tier advisors. 
 
Panel E of Table 2.2 presents financial advisors related information for the sub-sample of 
deals advised by banks. On average, acquirers who choose top-tier advisors retain 1.44 
advisors for one deal, while acquirers who only choose non-top-tier advisors retain 1.06 
advisors. Acquirers who retain top-tier advisors tend to use more advisors for one deal 
than acquirers who retain non-top-tier advisors. Furthermore, the mean (median) total 
advisory fees paid by acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors are $6.37 
million ($3.48 million) and $2.06 million ($0.85 million), respectively. Acquirers advised 
by top-tier advisors paid 3.09 times higher total advisory fees than acquirers advised by 
non-top-tier advisors. 
 
Overall, Table 2.2 shows that deals advised by top-tier advisors generate significantly 
lower short-term returns but significantly higher long-term returns to acquirers than deals 
advised by non–top-tier advisors. Top-tier advisors charge much higher advisory fees, 
leading to negative market sentiment and finally result in poorer acquirer short-term 
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performance. However, this chapter argues that if the synergy identified by top-tier 
advisors does exist, then it will take time to transfer potential synergies into improved 
performance, eventually being perceived by markets. The long-term outperformance of 
acquirers advised by top-tier advisors indicates that top-tier advisors have superior skills. 
In addition, larger firms, more glamour firms, firms with more cash flows, and firms that 
have lower pre-deal stock performance tend to choose top-tier advisors. The existing 
literature suggests that firm size (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004) and 
cash-richness (Harford, 1999) are negatively related to acquirer announcement returns. 
Therefore, short-term underperformance of acquirers advised by top-tier banks can be 
partially explained by these firm characteristics. Furthermore, top-tier advisors tend to be 
retained when the deal is large, when the target is publicly listed, when the deal attitude is 
hostile, when multiple bidders compete, and when the deal is a tender offer. Large deals, 
public acquisitions, hostile deals, competing bids and tender offers are much more 
complex and difficult to conduct. In other words, top-tier advisors are more likely to be 
chosen when deals are complex. However, in more complex situations, top-tier advisors 
can still improve acquirer long-term performance, indicating that they have superior skills.  
 
2.5.1.3. Sub-Sample of Deals Advised by Top-Tier Advisors 
Table 2.3 exhibits summary statistics for the sub-sample of deals advised by top-tier 
investment banks and the univariate comparison between deals advised by a single top-tier 
advisor and multiple top-tier advisors. In deals advised by top-tier banks, acquirers in 
92.42% of deals retain only one top-tier advisor, while 7.58% of deals are advised by 
multiple top-tier advisors.  
 
[Insert Table 2.3 here] 
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Panel A of Table 2.3 shows acquirer short- and long-term abnormal returns for the 
sub-sample of deals advised by top-tier advisors. The mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for 
acquirers advised by single advisors are 0.69% (p=0.012) and 0.53% (p=0.003), 
respectively; while the mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for acquirers advised by non-top-tier 
advisors are 1.73% (p=0.107) and 0.51% (p=0.195), respectively. Furthermore, the mean 
and median BHAR36 for acquirers advised by top-tier advisors are -25.25% (p=0.000) 
and -36.79% (p=0.000), respectively; while the mean and median BHAR36 for acquirers 
advised by non-top-tier advisors are -34.63% and -41.11%, respectively. For both short- 
and long-term performance, the difference between acquirers advised by single top-tier 
advisor and multiple top-tier advisors are insignificant.  
 
Panel B of Table 2.3 presents acquirer characteristics for the sub-sample of deals advised 
by top-tier advisors. Acquirers advised by single top-tier advisors are significantly smaller 
in size than acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors. The median market-to-book 
for acquirers advised by single top-tier advisors is significantly higher than that for 
acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors, although the difference in mean 
market-to-book between the two acquirer-groups is insignificant. Furthermore, acquirers 
advised by a single top-tier advisor have significantly higher leverage and cash 
flows-to-equity than acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors. In terms of stock 
price, runup and past takeover experience, acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor 
and multiple top-tier advisors is insignificant.  
 
Panel C of Table 2.3 shows deal characteristics for the sub-sample of deals advised by 
top-tier advisors. Deals advised by a single top-tier advisor have significantly lower 
transaction value and relative size than deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors. 
Acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor conduct a lower percentage of public 
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acquisitions, but a higher percentage of private acquisitions than acquirers advised by 
multiple top-tier advisors. Acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor make a higher 
percentage of all-cash deals, but a lower percentage of mixed paid deals than acquirers 
advised by multiple top-tier advisors. Compared with acquirers advised by multiple 
top-tier advisors, acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor conduct a lower percentage 
of hostile deals, but a higher percentage of diversifying deals.  
 
Panel D of Table 2.3 presents market characteristics for the sub-sample of deals advised 
by top-tier advisors. A single top-tier advisor is positively related to the degree of M&A 
market heat, indicating that acquirers tend to retain a single top-tier advisor (multiple 
top-tier advisors) when the M&A market is relatively hot (cold). Furthermore, acquirers 
are more likely to retain a single top-tier advisor (multiple top-tier advisors) when the 
market valuation is high (low).  
 
Panel E of Table 2.3 shows financial advisor related information for the sub-sample of 
deals advised by top-tier advisors. Compared with acquirers advised by multiple top-tier 
advisors, acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor also retain a significantly smaller 
overall number of acquirers. Acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor pay 
significantly lower total advisory fees than acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors. 
 
Overall, acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor and multiple top-tier advisors have 
similar short- and long-term performance. Acquirers with a larger size, lower 
market-to-book, higher leverage, and higher cash flows-to-equity are more likely to retain 
multiple top-tier advisors. In addition, multiple top-tier advisors tend to be retained, when 
the transaction value and relative size of the deal are large, when the target is publicly 
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listed, when the deal is mixed paid, and when the deal attitude is hostile. These results 
indicate that multiple top-tier advisors are retained to conduct more complex deals.  
 
2.5.2. Regression Analysis 
Since univariate tests do not consider the interaction of alternative variables, the results 
could be unreliable. Therefore, multivariate regressions are necessary. Initially, this 
chapter investigates whether top-tier advisors improve acquirers’ short- and long-term 
performance. Furthermore, this chapter explores which acquirers tend to conduct in-house 
deals or retain top-tier advisors. Finally, this chapter will address the endogeneity issue.  
 
2.5.2.1. Acquirer Performance 
2.5.2.1.1. Short-Term Performance 
Table 2.4 shows the results of the short-term regression analysis. The dependent variable 
is CAR [-2, 2]. TopTier and No. of TopTier are the key explanatory variables of this 
research. Specifications 1, 3, 5 and 7 represent the regressions of CAR [-2, 2] on the 
TopTier dummy for all acquisitions, public acquisitions, private acquisitions and 
subsidiary acquisitions, respectively. Specifications 2, 4, 6 and 8 represent the regressions 
of CAR [-2, 2] on the variable No. of TopTier for all acquisitions, public acquisitions, 
private acquisitions and subsidiary acquisitions, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 2.4 here] 
 
The TopTier dummy is insignificant in the regressions for the full sample (Specification 1), 
the public acquisitions sub-sample (Specification 3) and the subsidiary acquisitions 
sub-sample (Specification 7) but is significantly negative in the regression for the private 
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acquisitions sub-sample (Specification 5). These results indicate that the retention of 
top-tier advisors do not lead to more positive market reactions compared to the retention 
of non-top-tier advisors during the announcement period. In private acquisitions, acquirers 
that retain top-tier advisors even underperform other acquirers. Private acquisitions are 
relatively easier to conduct than public acquisitions. However, the advisory fees of top-tier 
investment banks are too expansive. Therefore, investors may believe that the retention of 
top-tier advisors in private acquisitions is unnecessary and overpaid, leading to negative 
market sentiment. These results are inconsistent with Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos 
(2012). They find that the effects of top-tier advisors on announcement returns are positive 
in public acquisitions, but insignificant in private and subsidiary acquisitions. One possible 
explanation for these differences is that the sample of Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos 
(2012) include both completed and uncompleted deals, whereas this chapter only 
investigates completed deals. If top-tier advisors help acquirers refuse to make 
value-destroying deals, the market reactions will be positive. However, uncompleted deals 
are excluded in this research, since this chapter focuses on the effects of top-tier advisors 
on the long-term performance of acquirers that complete deals.  
 
Similarly, the variable No. of TopTier is insignificant in the regression for the full sample 
(Specification 2), and the subsidiary acquisitions sub-sample (Specification 8), but is 
significantly negative in the regression for the private acquisitions sub-sample 
(Specification 5). These results also indicate that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors or 
multiple top-tier advisors do not outperform other acquirers. In private acquisitions, the 
more top-tier advisors are retained, the lower returns an acquirer will gain. Unlike the 
TopTier dummy, the variable No. of TopTier is marginally significant (p=0.097) in the 
regression for the public acquisitions sub-sample (Specification 4). However, the 
magnitude of the coefficient on No. of TopTier is too small.  
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In addition, the variable No. of Advisors is insignificant in most of the specifications, but is 
marginally significantly negative in specification 8, indicating that increase in the number 
of advisors retained will not lead to better acquirer short-term performance. The InHouse 
dummy is significantly positive in the regressions for the full sample (Specifications 1 and 
2). This result is mainly drive by the private acquisitions sub-sample. Specifically, the 
InHouse dummy is significantly positive in the regressions for the private acquisitions 
(Specifications 5 and 6) but is insignificant in the regressions for the public acquisitions 
(Specifications 3 and 4). In the sample, there are no in-house acquisitions of subsidiary 
targets. These results indicate that the stock market rewards attempts to make in-house 
acquisitions of private targets. In private acquisitions, acquirers who make in-house deals 
outperform acquirers advised by investment banks by about 5%, after controlling for firm, 
deal and market characteristics. However, since public acquisitions are more complex, 
in-house expertise cannot improve acquirer announcement performance. 
 
Furthermore, the variable Ln(MV) is significantly negative in specifications 1 to 4, 
suggesting that larger acquirers tend to gain lower announcement returns. The variable 
Leverage is significantly positive in specifications 1 and 2, indicating that acquirers with 
higher leverage gain higher announcement returns. In other words, debts help alleviate 
conflicts of interest and therefore improve acquirer announcement performance. The 
variable Relative Size is significantly positive in specifications 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, 
indicating that relatively larger deals create more announcement returns for acquirers in 
general. However, the variable Relative Size is significantly negative in specifications 3 
and 4 – the regressions for public acquisitions sub-sample. In public acquisitions, 
acquirers tend to be large firms. Therefore, a larger relative size implies a larger target size. 
In other words, if the target size is too large, the market reaction will be negative. The 
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Cash dummy is significantly positive in specifications 1 to 4, suggesting that cash deals 
have better announcement performance. The Competing Bid dummy is significantly 
negative in all of the specifications, indicating that takeover contests have a detrimental 
influence on acquirer announcement returns. The Tender Offer dummy is significantly 
positive in specifications 1 to 4, but is significantly negative in specifications 5 and 6, 
implying that tender offers are associated with better short-term performance in public 
acquisitions, but poorer performance in private acquisitions. The Public dummy is 
significantly negative in specifications 1 and 2, implying that public acquisitions 
underperform private and subsidiary acquisitions around announcements. These results 
are consistent with the existing literature. 
 
2.5.2.1.2. Long-Term Performance 
Table 2.5 shows the results of the short-term regression analysis. Specifications 1, 3, 5 and 
7 represent the regressions of BHAR36 on the Top-Tier dummy for all acquisitions, public 
acquisitions, private acquisitions and subsidiary acquisitions, respectively. Specifications 2, 
4, 6 and 8 represent the regressions of BHAR36 on the variable No. of Top-Tier for all 
acquisitions, public acquisitions, private acquisitions and subsidiary acquisitions, 
respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 2.5 here] 
 
In contrast to the results of short-term performance analysis, the TopTier dummy is 
significantly positive in the regressions of BHAR36 for the entire sample (Specification 1), 
the public acquisitions sub-sample (Specification 3) and the private acquisitions 
sub-sample (Specification 5). The retention of top-tier advisors improves long-term 
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performance by 13.90%, 12.59% and 20.23% in the entire sample, public acquisitions 
sub-sample, and private acquisitions sub-sample, respectively, after firm, deal, and market 
characteristics are controlled for. These results indicate that top-tier advisors have a superior 
ability to help their clients outperform other acquirers. Since potential synergies need time 
to be materialized, positive effects of top-tier advisors are shown in the long term. 
 
Similarly, the variable No. of TopTier is also significantly positive in the regressions of 
BHAR36 for the entire sample (Specification 2), the public acquisitions sub-sample 
(Specification 4) and the private acquisitions sub-sample (Specification 6). This result 
indicates that the larger the number of top-tier advisors retained, the better the long-term 
performance gained by acquirers. In contrast, the variable No. of Advisors is significantly 
negative in the regressions for the entire sample (Specifications 1 and 2), the pubic 
acquisitions sub-sample (Specification 4), the private acquisitions sub-sample 
(Specification 6), and the subsidiary acquisitions sub-sample (Specification 7 and 8). This 
result is inconsistent with Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) – that the number of advisors 
retained is positively related to acquirer post-deal performance. Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) 
do not distinguish between number of advisors and number of top-tier advisors. After the 
variable No. of TopTier is added in the regression, this chapter finds that an increase in the 
number of top-tier advisors rather than an increase in the overall number of advisors leads 
to improvement in acquirer long-term performance, reflecting top-tier advisors’ superior 
skills. In addition, the InHouse dummy is insignificant in all of the specifications, 
indicating that in-house deals do not create more returns to acquirers in the long term than 
deals advised by investment banks.  
 
Furthermore, the variable M/B is significantly negative in specifications 1 and 2, 
suggesting that glamour acquirers underperform in the long term. The variable Cash 
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Flows/Equity is significantly positive in specifications 1, 2, 7 and 8, indicating that 
acquirers who have better pre-deal operating performance are more likely to gain higher 
long-term returns. The variable RUNUP is significantly negative in specifications 1, 2, 3, 
4, 7 and 8, indicating that firms with better stock performance prior to announcements 
underperform during the post-merger period. The variable Relative Size is significantly 
positive in specifications 1 and 2, suggesting that acquisitions of relatively larger targets 
generate higher long-term returns for acquirers. The variable Stock is significantly 
negative in specification 3, suggesting that acquirers that make all-stock deals 
underperform in the long-term. The variable Cash is significantly positive in 
specifications 1, 2, 5 and 6, indicating that acquirers that conduct all-cash deals gain better 
performance in the long term. The variable Hostile is significantly positive in 
specifications 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8, indicating that hostile deals are associated with better 
long-term performance. The Low Valuation Market dummy is significantly positive in 
specifications 7 and 8, suggesting that acquisitions conducted in a “bear market” gain 
higher long-term returns. Generally, these results are consistent with the existing literature. 
 
2.5.2.2. Determinants of Decisions on Making In-House Deals or Retaining 
Top-tier Advisors 
Table 2.6 shows the result of a bivariate probit model of the decisions on making in-house 
deals or retaining top-tier advisors. Specifications 1 and 2 show the probability of making 
in-house deals and the probability of retaining top-tier advisors, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 2.6 here] 
 
In specification 1, the variables Ln(MV), Relative Size, Hostile, and Tender Offer are 
significantly negative, while the variables M/B, Past Experience, Public, M&A Heat 
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Degree, and Low Valuation Market are significantly positive. These results suggest that 
smaller firms, glamour firms and firms with more past experience are more likely to make 
in-house deals. Furthermore, firms tend to make in-house deals when the relative size of 
deal is small, when the deal attitude is friendly, when the target is public listed, when the 
M&A market is hot, and when the stock market valuation is low. 
 
In specification 2, the variables Ln(MV), Cash Flows/Equity, Relative Size, and Hostile are 
significantly positive, while the variables M/B, Past Experience, RUNUP, Stock, and 
Diversification are significantly negative. These results indicate that large firms, value 
firms, cash-rich firms, firms that lack past experience, and firms with relatively poor stock 
performance are more likely to retain top-tier advisors. Furthermore, firms tend to retain 
top-tier advisors when the relative size of the deal is large or when the attitude of a deal is 
hostile. Additionally, this chapter suspects that the negative relations between the choice 
of top-tier advisors and diversification deals is supply-driven rather than demand-driven. 
In particular, this is true during the sample period as top-tier advisors are not willing to get 
involved in diversifying deals. 
 
Overall, large firms are more likely to retain top-tier advisors, but less likely to make 
in-house deals. When the deal is complex and difficult to conduct, firms are more likely to 
retain top-tier advisors, but less likely to make in-house deals. 
 
2.5.2.3. Discussion 
The aforementioned results show that both the variables TopTier and No. of TopTier are 
significantly related to BHAR36, but insignificantly related to CAR [-2, 2], indicating that 
the retention of top-tier advisors does not lead to positive market reaction in the short term, 
but improves acquirer performance in the long term. This chapter argues that if the 
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synergy identified by top-tier advisors does exist, then it will take time to transfer that 
potential synergy into improved performance before eventually being perceived by 
markets. Therefore, the above results suggest that top-tier advisors have a superior ability 
to help their clients outperform other acquirers. In addition, multiple top-tier advisors can 
cooperate well and make a concerted effort to deliver a value-increasing advisory service. 
 
Furthermore, according to the bivariate probit model, size and cash flows-to-equity ratio 
are the two most important acquirer firm characteristics that influence the choice of 
top-tier advisors, in terms of magnitude and significance. However, large firms tend to be 
hubristic (Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004), and hubris destroys value for acquirers 
(Roll, 1986). In addition, cash-rich firms are more likely to exhibit overconfidence and 
overconfident CEOs tend to conduct value-decreasing acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 
2008). Hubristic or overconfident acquirers overestimate their ability to create synergies 
and retain top-tier advisors mostly to complete their intended deals. As a consequence, 
even if top-tier advisors have superior skills, their effects will be offset by acquirer 
overconfidence. Therefore, this chapter divided the entire sample into sub-groups based 
on acquirer size and cash flows-to-equity ratio, thereby examining whether top-tier 
advisors’ effects on acquirer long-term performance differ across these sub-groups. 
 
Table 2.7 presents the results of regression analysis of acquirer long-term performance for 
sub-samples of acquirers with different size. Specifically, the entire sample is divided into 
small and large acquirer sub-samples based on acquirer market value of equity measured 
four weeks prior to the announcement. Specifications 1 and 2 represent the long-term 
performance for the sub-sample of small acquirers. Specifications 3 and 4 represent the 
long-term performance for the sub-sample of large acquirers.  
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[Insert Table 2.7 here] 
 
The coefficients on the TopTier dummy are significantly positive in the regressions of 
BHAR36 for the small acquirer sub-sample (Specification 1), and the large acquirer 
sub-sample (Specification 3). The retention of top-tier advisors improves acquirer long-term 
performance by 18.42%, and 14.55% in the small acquirer sub-sample, and the large acquirer 
sub-sample, respectively; after firm, deal, and market characteristics are controlled for. 
Similarly, the coefficients on the variable No. of TopTier are also significantly positive in 
the regressions of BHAR36 for the small acquirer sub-sample (Specification 2), and the 
large acquirer sub-sample (Specification 4). These results are consistent with the previous 
results that increase in the number of top-tier advisors retained associate with better 
acquirer long-term performance. However, the magnitude of the coefficients on the 
variable No. of TopTier is larger in the regression of BHAR36 for the small acquirer 
sub-sample (Specification 2) than in the regression of BHAR36 for the large acquirer 
sub-sample (Specification 4). These results suggest that top-tier advisors exercise more 
positive effects on small acquirers than on large acquirers. 
 
Table 2.8 presents the results of regression analysis of acquirer long-term performance for 
sub-samples of acquirers with different cash flows-to-equity ratio. Specifically, the entire 
sample is divided into low and high cash flows-to-equity acquirer sub-samples. 
Specifications 1 and 2 represent the long-term performance for the sub-sample of low cash 
flows-to-equity acquirers. Specifications 3 and 4 represent the long-term performance for 
the sub-sample of high cash flows-to-equity acquirers.  
 
[Insert Table 2.8 here] 
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The coefficients on the TopTier dummy are significantly positive in the regressions of 
BHAR36 for the low cash flows-to-equity acquirer sub-sample (Specification 1), and the 
high cash flows-to-equity acquirer sub-sample (Specification 3). The retention of top-tier 
advisors improves acquirer long-term performance by 14.53%, and 11.72% in the small 
acquirer sub-sample, and the large acquirer sub-sample, respectively, after controlling for firm, 
deal, and market characteristics. Additionally, the coefficients on the variable No. of 
TopTier are also significantly positive in the regressions of BHAR36 for the low cash 
flows-to-equity acquirer sub-sample (Specification 2), and the high cash flows-to-equity 
acquirer sub-sample (Specification 4). These results are consistent with the previous 
results that retaining more top-tier advisors retained produced better long-term 
performance gains. However, the magnitude of the coefficients on the variable No. of 
TopTier is larger in the regression of BHAR36 for the low cash flows-to-equity acquirer 
sub-sample (Specification 2) than in the regression of BHAR36 for the high cash 
flows-to-equity acquirer sub-sample (Specification 4). These results suggest that effects of 
top-tier advisors on long-term performance are stronger for low cash flows-to-equity 
acquirers than for high cash flows-to-equity acquirers. 
 
Overall, these results indicate that the effects of top-tier advisors differ across sub-samples 
of acquirers with different firm characteristics. Large acquirers and cash-rich acquirers 
tend to be overconfident. Top-tier advisors have superior skills to improve their clients’ 
performance; however, acquirer overconfidence could offset top-tier advisors’ positive 
effects to some extent. 
 
2.5.2.4. Endogeneity Issue 
In the methodology section, this chapter has discussed the possible endogeneity issue due 
to the decision to retain top-tier advisors. Additionally, the univariate comparison between 
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acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors shows the significant differences in 
firm, deal and market characteristics, which imply that the choice of top-tier advisors may 
be not determined exogenously but endogenously. In other words, the TopTier dummy 
and the term No. of TopTier may be two endogenous variables. As mentioned before, this 
chapter uses IV regression to address the issue.  
 
2.5.2.4.1. Short-Term Performance 
Table 2.9 shows the IV (2SLS) regression of the CAR [-2, 2]. Specifications 1 and 2 
present the IV (2SLS) regressions of the CAR [-2, 2] on the TopTier dummy and the 
variable No. of TopTier, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 2.9 here] 
 
In specification 1, the first stage regression shows the relation between the choice of 
top-tier advisors and the firm, deal and market characteristics. The term Scope, the 
instrument variable, is significantly positive (p=0.000), indicating that the choice of 
top-tier advisors is positively associated with the scope of services by top-tier investment 
banks used before the given M&A deal. In other words, acquirers that have the past 
experience in the retention of top-tier advisors are more likely to retain top-tier advisors in 
the future. This result is consistent with Fang (2005) and Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos 
(2012). The results of other variables do not qualitatively differ from the results of 
previous bivariate probit analysis. The second stage regression shows the relation between 
short-term performance and the choice of top-tier advisors. The coefficient on the TopTier 
is insignificant, which is consistent with the previous results of the OLS regression of 
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CAR [-2, 2]. Similarly, the results of other control variables do not differ qualitatively 
from the results of previous OLS regression of CAR [-2, 2]. 
 
In specification 2, the first stage regression shows the relation between the number of 
top-tier advisors retained and the firm, deal and market characteristics. The term Scope is 
also highly significant (p=0.000). The result once again implies that the preference for 
top-tier advisors is determined by previous experience retaining them. The results of other 
variables do not differ qualitatively from the results of previous bivariate probit analysis. 
The second stage regression shows the relation between short-term performance and the 
number of top-tier advisors retained. The variable No. of TopTier is insignificant, which is 
consistent with the previous results of OLS regression of CAR [-2, 2]. Similarly, the 
results of other control variables do not differ qualitatively from the results of previous 
OLS regression of CAR [-2, 2]. 
 
2.5.2.4.2. Long-Term Performance 
Table 2.10 shows the IV (2SLS) regression of the BHAR36. Specifications 1 and 2 
present the IV (2SLS) regressions of the BHAR36 on the TopTier dummy and the 
variable No. of TopTier, respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 2.10 here] 
 
In specification 1, the coefficient on the TopTier dummy is statistically significant, and its 
magnitude is also large. Compared with non-top-tier advisors, the retention of top-tier 
advisors improves acquirer post-deal long-term performance by 47.15%. In specification 2, 
the coefficient on the variable No. of TopTier is also significant, and its marginal effect 
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equals 42.95%. These results are not qualitatively different from the results of the OLS 
regression of BHAR36. However, the marginal effect of the TopTier dummy and the 
variable No. of TopTier largely increases, suggesting that the endogeneity issue renders 
the effects of top-tier advisors undervalued. Additionally, the results of other control 
variables do not qualitatively differ from the results of previous OLS regression of 
BHAR36. 
 
Overall, the endogeneity does not qualitatively impact the results, but leads to 
undervaluation of the top-tier advisors’ effects on acquirer long-term performance. 
 
2.5.3. Robustness Test 
This chapter addresses the robustness of results as follows. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 show the 
robustness tests of acquirer short-term performance and long-term performance, 
respectively. 
 
2.5.3.1. Short-Term Performance 
To examine whether the results are robust, this chapter uses alternative event windows and 
valuation models to measure acquirer short-term performance. Specifically, this chapter 
calculates CARs over the [-1, 1] and [-5, 5] windows. In addition, this chapter applies the 
market model, the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993), and the 
Fama-French-momentum four-factor model (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) to 
compute announcement abnormal returns.  
 
The market model is shown as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
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where Rit is the daily stock return for firm I on date t and Rmt is the daily return for the 
value-weighted CRSP index on date t. The market model parameters are estimated over the 
pre-event window [-365, -28]. Subsequently, market model CARs are calculated over a [T1, 
T2] window around announcements, as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1𝑇2 = ∑ [𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡)]
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
 
The Fama-French three-factor model is shown as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where Rit is the daily stock return for firm I on date t, Rmt is the daily return for the 
value-weighted CRSP index on date t, SMBt is the difference in the average return between 
the three small-size and the three big-size portfolios, and the HMLt is the difference in the 
average return between the two high market-to-book and the two low market-to-book 
portfolios. The Fama-French three-factor model parameters are estimated over the 
pre-event window [-365, -28]. Subsequently, Fama-French three-factor model CARs are 
calculated over a [T1, T2] window around announcements, as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1𝑇2 = ∑ [𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ̂𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡)]
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
 
The Fama-French-momentum four-factor model is shown as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where Rit is the daily stock return for firm I on date t, Rmt is the daily return for the 
value-weighted CRSP index on date t, SMBt is the difference in the average return between 
the three small size and the three big size portfolios, the HMLt is the difference in the 
average return between the two high market-to-book and the two low market-to-book 
portfolios, and the UMDt is the difference in average return between the two high prior 
 63 
 
return and the two low prior return portfolios. The Fama-French-momentum four-factor 
model parameters are estimated over the pre-event window [-365, -28]. Subsequently, 
Fama-French-momentum four-factor model CARs are calculated over a [T1, T2] window 
around announcements, as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1𝑇2 = ∑ [𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ̂𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡)]
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
 
The results are not sensitive to these variations. 
 
2.5.3.2. Long-Term Performance 
This chapter also uses alternative event windows and valuation models to measure 
acquirer long-term performance. Specifically, this chapter calculates BHARs over 
12-month and 24-month windows. In addition, this chapter calculates market-adjusted 
BHARs. The market-adjusted BHARs are calculated over a [T1, T2] post-announcement 
window, as follows:   
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
− ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑚𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
where Rit is the monthly stock return for firm I in month t and Rmt is the monthly return for the 
value-weighted CRSP market index in month t. 
 
For size-adjusted BHARs, this chapter also uses the following alternative formula: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
− 1 − 𝑅𝑝𝑡 
where Rit is the monthly stock return for firm I in month t and Rpt is the monthly 
buy-and-hold return for the reference portfolio in month t, calculated as  
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𝑅𝑝𝑡 = ∑
∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑗𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1 − 1
𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
with Rjt the monthly stock return for firm j in month t and n the number of firms.  
 
The results are robust to these variations.  
 
2.5.3.3. Financial Advisor Classification 
This chapter also evaluates whether the results are sensitive to different financial advisor 
classifications. Specifically, this chapter follows Rau’s (2000) method using the top-five 
cut-off point; Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos' (2012) method using the top-eight cut-off 
point; and Hunter and Jagtiani's (2003) method using the top-fifteen cut-off point. The 
results are robust to these classifications. 
 
2.5.3.4. Other Issues 
To control for the impact of outliers, this chapter also winsorizes all the continuous 
variables at different levels, such as 2% and 98%, 3% and 97%, and 5% and 95%. In 
terms of sample selection, this chapter removes the restriction on regulated industries. 
When the financial and utility firms (SIC codes 6000–6999 and 4900–4999, respectively) 
are added, the number of observations for the final sample increases to 4317. For the 
regressions of total advisory fees and time-to-completion, this chapter also applies OLS 
regressions, using the natural logarithm of total advisory fees and time-to-completion as 
the dependent variables. For the probability of making in-house deals and the retention of 
top-tier advisors, this chapter also separately runs two probit regressions rather than 
conducting the bivariate probit model. However, the results are not sensitive to the above 
variations.  
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2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter investigates whether top-tier financial advisors can help their acquirer clients 
gain superior acquisition performance. Unlike most previous studies that only focus on 
announcement effects, this chapter argues that merger synergies should be materialized in 
the long term and finally perceived by the market. Therefore, this chapter examines 
financial advisors’ effects on acquirer performance in both the short and long term. More 
importantly, this chapter distinguishes deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors from 
deals advised by single top-tier advisors and evaluates whether multiple top-tier advisors 
can make a concerted effort to add value to their clients. 
 
In the short term, the retention of top-tier advisors does not improve acquirer performance. 
Additionally, an increase in the number of top-tier advisors retained does not lead to 
higher announcement returns to acquirers. In private acquisitions, acquirers advised by 
either a single top-tier advisor or multiple top-tier advisors underperform other acquirers. 
This result is not difficult to interpret. Compared to public acquisitions, private 
acquisitions are relatively easier to conduct. Investors may think that the retention of 
top-tier advisors in private acquisitions is unnecessary and overpaid. As a consequence, 
the market reactions are negative around announcement.  
 
In the long term, acquirers that retain top-tier advisors outperform other acquirers by 13.90% 
on average, after controlling for firm, deal and market characteristics. The effects of 
top-tier advisors on acquirer long-term performance are also significantly positive in the 
public and private acquisitions. More importantly, the retention of multiple top-tier 
advisors leads to better long-term performance, whereas an increase in the total number of 
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advisors has negative effects on post-announcement buy-and-hold abnormal returns. This 
comparison highlights the superior skills of top-tier advisors.  
 
Since deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors have significant differences in 
firm, deal and market characteristics, the choice of top-tier advisors may be determined 
endogenously. Therefore, this chapter addresses the endogeneity issue by conducting IV 
regressions. The results show that the endogeneity does not qualitatively impact the results 
but renders top-tier advisors’ effects on acquirer long-term performance undervalued. 
After endogeneity is controlled for, the retention of top-tier advisors improves acquirer 
long-term performance by 47.15%.  
 
This chapter is also interested in in-house deals. In terms of wealth creation, in-house 
acquirers do not outperform acquirers advised by financial advisors. Additionally, 
acquirers that make in-house deals pay much higher bid premiums and take longer to 
complete deals. These results suggest that financial advisors have professional skills in 
making M&A deals. Furthermore, this chapter finds that experienced firms, glamour firms, 
and small firms are more likely to make in-house deals, whereas large firms, and cash-rich 
firms are more likely to retain top-tier advisors. Top-tier advisors also tend to be retained 
when deals are more complex. 
 
Overall, although top-tier advisors are retained in complex deals, they help their acquirer 
clients make superior deals that realise synergies in the long term. The retention of 
multiple top-tier advisors does not aggravate conflicts of interest. Multiple top-tier 
advisors are capable of cooperating well and making concerted efforts, thereby creating 
values to their clients. 
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics for the entire sample 
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample and univariate comparison between deals advised by investment banks and in-house deals. Panel A 
reports acquirer short- and long-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns around announcement. BHAR36 
is the post-merger 36-month size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. MV is market value of equity measured 
4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal 
year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is 
measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is 
measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an 
acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. Panel C reports deal characteristics. Transaction Value is the value of the deal. Relative 
Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target 
is publicly listed. Private dummy equals one if the target is a private firm. Subsidiary dummy equals one if the target is a subsidiary firm. Stock dummy equals 
one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Mixed dummy equals one if the deal is mixed paid by both stock 
and cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number 
of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target 
have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. Time-to-completion is measured as the number of days between announcement and effective date. Bid 
premium, obtained from Thomson One Banker, is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement. Panel D reports market characteristics. M&A Heat Degree is measured as 
the moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going 
back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if 
a deal is conducted during the period of low valuation market. Panel E reports financial advisor related information. No. of advisors is the number of financial 
advisors retained by an acquirer. Acquirer total advisory fees, obtained from Thomson One Banker, is the total advisory fees paid by an acquirer to all the 
financial advisors retained. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the mean and median CAR [-2, 2], respectively; 
the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the mean and median BHAR36, respectively; the t-test and the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians, respectively). Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and 
* respectively. 
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All Deals 
 
Advisor 
(A) 
In-House 
(I) 
Difference (A) – (I) 
Mean Median 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR[-2,2] 1.28%*** 0.68%*** 3103 1.27%*** 0.68%*** 3003 1.78%*** 0.69%* 100 -0.51% (0.511) -0.02% (0.635) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.020) 0.056      
BHAR36 -33.01%*** -44.58%*** 3103 -32.88%*** -44.58%*** 3003 -36.89%*** -44.49%*** 100 4.00% (0.635) -0.09% (0.998) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)      
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
MV ($ mil.) 9236.24 1018.32 3103 8151.21 1004.32 3003 41819.53 1952.53 100 -33668.32*** (0.000) -948.21*** (0.000) 
M/B 5.91 3.06 3103 5.81 3.01 3003 8.97 4.82 100 -3.16* (0.052) -1.81*** (0.000) 
Leverage 0.26 0.25 3103 0.26 0.25 3003 0.25 0.27 100 0.01 (0.767) -0.03 (0.828) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.04 0.05 3103 0.04 0.05 3003 0.04 0.05 100 0.00 (0.849) 0.00 (0.440) 
RUNUP 20.07% 12.67% 3103 20.18% 12.63% 3003 16.93% 13.73% 100 3.25% (0.543) -1.10% (0.881) 
Past Experience 7.27 4.00 3103 6.95 4.00 3003 16.94 9.00 100 -9.99*** (0.000) -5.00*** (0.000) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value ($ mil.) 880.92 158.50 3103 896.10 160.40 3003 425.18 101.60 100 470.92*** (0.000) 58.80*** (0.010) 
Relative Size 0.34 0.16 3103 0.35 0.17 3003 0.08 0.05 100 0.27*** (0.000) 0.12*** (0.000) 
Public 46.79% – 3103 45.49% – 3003 86.00% – 100 -40.51%*** (0.000) – – 
Private 31.71% – 3103 32.30% – 3003 14.00% – 100 18.30%*** (0.000) – – 
Subsidiary 21.50% – 3103 22.21% – 3003 0.00% – 100 22.21%*** (0.000) – – 
All-Stock Deals 27.30% – 3103 26.47% – 3003 52.00% – 100 -25.53%*** (0.000) – – 
All-Cash Deals 36.06% – 3103 36.23% – 3003 31.00% – 100 5.23%*** (0.271) – – 
Mixed Deals 36.64% – 3103 37.30% – 3003 17.00% – 100 20.30%*** (0.000) – – 
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Hostile 1.06% – 3103 1.10% – 3003 0.00% – 100 1.10%*** (0.000) – – 
Competing Bid 2.06% – 3103 2.06% – 3003 2.00% – 100 0.06% (0.964) – – 
Tender Offer 15.98% – 3103 15.88% – 3003 19.00% – 100 -3.12% (0.438) – – 
Diversification 35.00% – 3103 34.80% – 3003 41.00% – 100 -6.20% (0.219) – – 
Panel D: Market Characteristics 
M&A Heat Degree 1.48 1.44 3103 1.47 1.43 3003 1.82 1.85 100 -0.35*** (0.000) -0.42*** (0.000) 
High Valuation Market 27.94% – 3103 26.84% – 3003 61.00% – 100 -34.16%*** (0.000) – – 
Low Valuation Market 24.85% – 3103 25.57% – 3003 3.00% – 100 22.57%*** (0.000) – – 
Panel E: Financial Advisors  
No. of Advisors 1.14 1.00 3003 1.14 1.00 3003 – – – – – – – 
Total Advisory Fees ($ mil.) 4.15 1.58 523 4.15 1.58 523 – – – – – – – 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics for the sample of deals advised by investment banks 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of deals advised by investment banks and univariate comparison between deals advised by top-tier and 
non-top-tier advisors. Panel A reports acquirer short- and long-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
around announcement. BHAR36 is the post-merger 36-month size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. 
MV is market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement 
divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 
4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is 
measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. Panel C reports deal characteristics. 
Transaction Value is the value of the deal. Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Private dummy equals one if the target is a private firm. Subsidiary dummy 
equals one if the target is a subsidiary firm. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by 
cash. Mixed dummy equals one if the deal is mixed paid by both stock and cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited 
by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal 
is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. Time-to-completion is 
measured as the number of days between announcement and effective date. Bid premium, obtained from Thomson One Banker, is calculated as the 
difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement. Panel D reports market characteristics. M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter 
divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a 
deal is conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of low valuation 
market. Panel E reports financial advisor related information. No. of advisors is the number of financial advisors retained by an acquirer. Acquirer total 
advisory fees, obtained from Thomson One Banker, is the total advisory fees paid by an acquirer to all the financial advisors retained. P-Values are shown 
in parentheses (the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the mean and median CAR [-2, 2], respectively; the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted 
t-statistic and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the mean and median BHAR36, respectively; the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the differences 
in means and medians, respectively). Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Advisor 
 
Top-Tier 
(T) 
Non-Top-Tier 
(N) 
Difference (T) – (N) 
Mean Median 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR[-2,2] 1.27%*** 0.68%*** 3003 0.76%*** 0.53%*** 1517 1.78%*** 1.06%*** 1486 -1.01%** (0.012)  -0.54%** (0.018)  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.004)  (0.001)   (0.000)  (0.000)       
BHAR36 -32.88%*** -44.58%*** 3003 -25.96%*** -37.31%*** 1517 -39.95%** -53.25%*** 1486 13.99%*** (0.000)  15.94%*** (0.000)  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.048)  (0.000)       
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
MV ($ mil.) 8151.21  1004.32  3003 13419.07  2504.71  1517 2773.46  399.57  1486 10645.61***  (0.000)  2105.14***  (0.000)  
M/B 5.81  3.01  3003 6.40  3.15  1517 5.22  2.86  1486 1.18  (0.554)  0.30***  (0.001)  
Leverage 0.26  0.25  3003 0.26  0.30  1517 0.26  0.17  1486 0.00  (0.991)  0.13***  (0.000)  
Cash Flows/Equity 0.04  0.05  3003 0.06  0.06  1517 0.02  0.05  1486 0.04***  (0.001)  0.01***  (0.000)  
RUNUP 20.18% 12.63% 3003 17.85% 11.86% 1517 22.55% 13.62% 1486 -4.70%** (0.018)  -1.77%* (0.061)  
Past Experience 6.95  4.00  3003 8.64  6.00  1517 5.22  3.00  1486 3.42***  (0.000)  3.00***  (0.000)  
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value ($ mil.) 896.10  160.40  3003 1452.69  339.50  1517 327.89  69.49  1486 1124.80***  (0.000)  270.01***  (0.000)  
Relative Size 0.35  0.17  3003 0.33  0.16  1517 0.38  0.18  1486 -0.05*  (0.058)  -0.02***  (0.001)  
Public 45.49% – 3003 53.59% – 1517 37.21% – 1486 16.38%*** (0.000)  – – 
Private 32.30% – 3003 23.27% – 1517 41.52% – 1486 -18.25%*** (0.000)  – – 
Subsidiary 22.21% – 3003 23.14% – 1517 21.27% – 1486 1.87% (0.217)  – – 
All Stock Deals 26.47% – 3003 22.08% – 1517 30.96% – 1486 -8.87%*** (0.000)  – – 
All Cash Deals 36.23% – 3003 40.41% – 1517 31.97% – 1486 8.44%*** (0.000)  – – 
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Mixed Deals 37.30% – 3003 37.51% – 1517 37.08% – 1486 0.43% (0.808)  – – 
Hostile 1.10% – 3003 1.85% – 1517 0.34% – 1486 1.51%*** (0.000)  – – 
Competing Bid 2.06% – 3003 2.83% – 1517 1.28% – 1486 1.56%*** (0.003)  – – 
Tender Offer 15.88% – 3003 19.51% – 1517 12.18% – 1486 7.33%*** (0.000)  – – 
Diversification 34.80% – 3003 34.81% – 1517 34.79% – 1486 0.01% (0.994)  – – 
Panel D: Market Characteristics 
M&A Heat Degree 1.47  1.43  3003 1.44  1.39  1517 1.50  1.50  1486 -0.06***  (0.000)  -0.11***  (0.000)  
High Valuation Market 26.84% – 3003 28.48% – 1517 25.17% – 1486 3.31%** (0.041)  – – 
Low Valuation Market 25.57% – 3003 28.35% – 1517 22.75% – 1486 5.60%*** (0.000)  – – 
Panel E: Financial Advisors 
Number of Advisors 1.14  1.00  3003 1.22  1.00  1517 1.06  1.00  1486 0.16***  (0.000)  0.00***  (0.000)  
Total Advisory Fees ($ mil.) 4.15  1.58  523 6.37  3.48  254 2.06  0.85  269 4.31***  (0.000)  2.63***  (0.000)  
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Table 2.3 Summary statistics for the sample of deals advised by top-tier investment banks  
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of deals advised by top-tier investment banks and univariate comparison between deals advised by single top-tier 
and multiple top-tier advisors. Panel A reports acquirer short- and long-term abnormal returns. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns 
around announcement. BHAR36 is the post-merger 36-month size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. MV is market 
value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at 
the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured 
as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted 
CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to 
the acquisition in question. Panel C reports deal characteristics. Transaction Value is the value of the deal. Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the 
acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Private dummy equals one if the target is a private 
firm. Subsidiary dummy equals one if the target is a subsidiary firm. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid 
by cash. Mixed dummy equals one if the deal is mixed paid by both stock and cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One 
Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy 
equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. Time-to-completion is measured as the number of days between announcement and 
effective date. Bid premium, obtained from Thomson One Banker, is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement. Panel D reports market characteristics. M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving 
average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation 
Market dummy equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of low 
valuation market. Panel E reports financial advisor related information. No. of advisors is the number of financial advisors retained by an acquirer. Acquirer total advisory fees, 
obtained from Thomson One Banker, is the total advisory fees paid by an acquirer to all the financial advisors retained. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the t-test and the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the mean and median CAR [-2, 2], respectively; the bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the mean 
and median BHAR36, respectively; the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians, respectively). Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% 
level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Top-Tier Single Top-Tier Multiple Top-Tier 
Difference 
Mean Median 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns 
CAR[-2,2] 0.76%*** 0.53%*** 1517 0.69%** 0.53%*** 1402 1.73% 0.51% 115 -1.04% (0.344) 0.01% (0.623) 
 (0.004) (0.001)  (0.012) (0.003)  0.107 0.195      
BHAR36 -25.96%*** -37.31%*** 1517 -25.25%*** -36.79%*** 1402 -34.63%** -41.11%*** 115 9.37% (0.148) 4.32% (0.824) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.025) (0.000)      
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
MV ($ mil.) 13419.07 2504.71 1517 12498.22 2372.46 1402 24645.40 6657.23 115 -12147.18*** (0.002) -4284.77*** (0.000) 
M/B 6.40 3.15 1517 6.57 3.21 1402 4.30 2.63 115 2.27 (0.178) 0.57** (0.030) 
Leverage 0.26 0.30 1517 0.25 0.29 1402 0.41 0.39 115 -0.16*** (0.008) -0.10*** (0.000) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.06 0.06 1517 0.06 0.05 1402 0.08 0.07 115 -0.03** (0.0460 -0.02*** (0.005) 
RUNUP 17.85% 11.86% 1517 17.98% 11.33% 1402 16.30% 16.99% 115 1.68% (0.646) -5.66% (0.527) 
Past Experience 8.64 6.00 1517 8.50 6.00 1402 10.44 6.00 115 -1.95* (0.091) 0.00 (0.170) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value ($ mil.) 1452.69 339.50 1517 1065.08 303.98 1402 6178.18 1500.00 115 -5113.10*** (0.000) -1196.02*** (0.000) 
Relative Size 0.33 0.16 1517 0.31 0.15 1402 0.60 0.31 115 -0.29*** (0.000) -0.17*** (0.000) 
Public 53.59% – 1517 52.85% – 1402 62.61% – 115 -9.76%** (0.041) – – 
Private 23.27% – 1517 24.04% – 1402 13.91% – 115 10.12%*** (0.004) – – 
Subsidiary 23.14% – 1517 23.11% – 1402 23.48% – 115 -0.37% (0.929) – – 
All Stock Deals 22.08% – 1517 23.04% – 1402 10.43% – 115 12.60%*** (0.000) – – 
All Cash Deals 40.41% – 1517 40.66% – 1402 37.39% – 115 3.26% (0.493) – – 
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Mixed Deals 37.51% – 1517 36.31% – 1402 52.17% – 115 -15.87%*** (0.001) – – 
Hostile 1.85% – 1517 1.64% – 1402 4.35% – 115 -2.71%** (0.038) – – 
Competing Bid 2.83% – 1517 2.57% – 1402 6.09% – 115 -3.52% (0.125) – – 
Tender Offer 19.51% – 1517 19.19% – 1402 23.48% – 115 -4.29% (0.298) – – 
Diversification 34.81% – 1517 35.95% – 1402 20.87% – 115 15.08%*** (0.000) – – 
Panel D: Market Characteristics 
M&A Heat Degree 1.44 1.39 1517 1.45 1.41 1402 1.33 1.31 115 0.12*** (0.000) 0.09*** (0.000) 
High Valuation Market 28.48% – 1517 29.10% – 1402 20.87% – 115 8.23%** (0.041) – – 
Low Valuation Market 28.35% – 1517 26.53% – 1402 50.43% – 115 -23.90%*** (0.000) – – 
Panel E: Financial Advisors 
Number of Advisors 1.22 1.00 1517 1.13 1.00 1402 2.35 2.00 115 -1.22*** (0.000) -1.00*** (0.000) 
Total Advisory Fees ($ mil.) 6.37 3.48 254 5.14 3.00 237 23.62 18.50 17 -18.49*** (0.000) -15.50*** (0.000) 
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Table 2.4 OLS regressions of acquirer short-term performance 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of the acquirer short-term performance for the 
entire sample (Specifications 1 and 2), the sub-sample of public acquisitions (Specifications 3 
and 4), the sub-sample of private acquisitions (Specifications 5 and 6), and the sub-sample of 
subsidiary acquisitions (Specifications 7 and 8). In these models this chapter regresses 
acquirer CAR [-2, 2] against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variables 
are the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if an 
acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier equals the number of 
top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors equals the number of 
advisors retained by the acquirer. In-House dummy equals one if an acquirer does not retain 
any advisors for the deal. Other control variables include firm, deal and market characteristics. 
For firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 
weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before 
the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. 
RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer 
over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative 
Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 
weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Stock 
dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% 
paid by cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by 
Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is 
more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification 
dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC 
code. For market characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the 
number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A 
deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if 
a deal is conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals 
one if a deal is conducted during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 All Public Private Subsidiary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Top-Tier 0.0029  0.0063  -0.0141*  0.0044  
 (0.478)  (0.258)  (0.078)  (0.609)  
Number of Top-Tier  0.0050  0.0083*  -0.0126*  0.0073 
  (0.178)  (0.097)  (0.087)  (0.344) 
Number of Advisors -0.0029 -0.0052 -0.0022 -0.0063 0.0109 0.0133 -0.0163 -0.0195* 
 (0.479) (0.264) (0.646) (0.256) (0.325) (0.247) (0.124) (0.082) 
In-House 0.0247** 0.0234** 0.0143 0.0110 0.0499** 0.0527**   
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.238) (0.346) (0.045) (0.033)   
Ln(MV) -0.0058*** -0.0061*** -0.0078*** -0.0082*** -0.0008 -0.0011 -0.0030 -0.0034 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.803) (0.740) (0.345) (0.269) 
M/B 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0002 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.237) (0.227) (0.747) (0.724) (0.385) (0.376) (0.789) (0.804) 
Leverage 0.0135* 0.0134* 0.0124 0.0125 0.0118 0.0120 0.0085 0.0081 
 (0.066) (0.068) (0.259) (0.256) (0.410) (0.404) (0.504) (0.528) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.0059 0.0058 0.0149 0.0149 0.0136 0.0138 0.0113 0.0114 
 (0.731) (0.735) (0.512) (0.513) (0.645) (0.640) (0.787) (0.786) 
RUNUP 0.0010 0.0011 -0.0041 -0.0040 0.0027 0.0026 0.0092 0.0092 
 (0.834) (0.820) (0.568) (0.570) (0.722) (0.738) (0.413) (0.413) 
Past Experience 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0005 
 (0.576) (0.550) (0.794) (0.756) (0.781) (0.727) (0.276) (0.286) 
Relative Size 0.0149** 0.0146** -0.0272*** -0.0272*** 0.0792*** 0.0784*** 0.0423*** 0.0419*** 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock -0.0034 -0.0034 -0.0104 -0.0102 0.0067 0.0069 -0.0285 -0.0281 
 (0.514) (0.525) (0.142) (0.149) (0.483) (0.471) (0.131) (0.137) 
Cash 0.0134*** 0.0135*** 0.0194*** 0.0193*** 0.0101 0.0100 -0.0003 0.0000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.210) (0.214) (0.967) (0.999) 
Hostile -0.0151 -0.0156 -0.0056 -0.0065 -0.1871*** -0.1859*** -0.0272 -0.0295 
 (0.225) (0.207) (0.671) (0.619) (0.000) (0.000) (0.305) (0.264) 
Competing Bid -0.0274*** -0.0275*** -0.0192* -0.0193* -0.1049*** -0.1053*** -0.0425* -0.0425* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.057) (0.056) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.066) 
Tender Offer 0.0345*** 0.0345*** 0.0206*** 0.0206*** -0.0861*** -0.0867*** 0.0091 0.0079 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.654) (0.692) 
Diversification -0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0093* -0.0090* -0.0065 -0.0066 0.0124* 0.0122* 
 (0.337) (0.355) (0.071) (0.082) (0.367) (0.359) (0.086) (0.089) 
Public -0.0392*** -0.0392***       
 (0.000) (0.000)       
M&A Heat Degree -0.0468 -0.0472 -0.0224 -0.0235 -0.0865 -0.0885 -0.0062 -0.0072 
 (0.160) (0.156) (0.630) (0.614) (0.183) (0.173) (0.928) (0.916) 
High Valuation Market -0.0073 -0.0073 -0.0092 -0.0092 -0.0179 -0.0177 0.0266* 0.0265* 
 (0.350) (0.349) (0.332) (0.337) (0.310) (0.314) (0.097) (0.097) 
Low Valuation Market 0.0047 0.0046 0.0189 0.0189 -0.0093 -0.0092 0.0015 0.0014 
 (0.609) (0.612) (0.158) (0.159) (0.531) (0.536) (0.947) (0.949) 
Constant 0.0953** 0.0990*** 0.0692 0.0751 0.0542 0.0552 0.0659 0.0715 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.193) (0.158) (0.441) (0.433) (0.417) (0.380) 
N 3103 3103 1452 1452 984 984 667 667 
R2 0.090 0.091 0.144 0.145 0.107 0.107 0.125 0.126 
adj. R2 0.075 0.076 0.114 0.115 0.061 0.061 0.057 0.058 
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Table 2.5 OLS regressions of acquirer long-term performance 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of the acquirer long-term performance for the 
entire sample (Specifications 1 and 2), the sub-sample of public acquisitions (Specifications 3 
and 4), the sub-sample of private acquisitions (Specifications 5 and 6), and the sub-sample of 
subsidiary acquisitions (Specifications 7 and 8). In these models this chapter regresses 
acquirer BHAR36 against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variables are 
the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if an acquirer 
retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier equals the number of top-tier 
advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors equals the number of advisors 
retained by the acquirer. In-House dummy equals one if an acquirer does not retain any 
advisors for the deal. Other control variables include firm, deal and market characteristics. For 
firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 
weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is 
measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past 
Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year 
period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured 
as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Stock dummy equals 
one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. 
Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One 
Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. 
Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one 
if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. For market 
characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the number of M&A 
deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all 
previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is 
conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a 
deal is conducted during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 All Public Private Subsidiary 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
TopTier 0.1390***  0.1259**  0.2023**  0.0356  
 (0.001)  (0.040)  (0.014)  (0.625)  
No. of TopTier  0.1271***  0.1259**  0.1981***  0.0249 
  (0.001)  (0.019)  (0.009)  (0.711) 
No. of Advisors -0.0841** -0.1369*** -0.0467 -0.1071* -0.1189 -0.1569** -0.1785* -0.1858* 
 (0.025) (0.001) (0.299) (0.051) (0.120) (0.049) (0.063) (0.058) 
InHouse 0.0605 0.0004 0.1264 0.0634 -0.0739 -0.1092   
 (0.538) (0.997) (0.261) (0.565) (0.680) (0.539)   
Ln(MV) -0.0251 -0.0250 -0.0303 -0.0320 -0.0168 -0.0161 -0.0174 -0.0162 
 (0.102) (0.104) (0.124) (0.103) (0.622) (0.634) (0.569) (0.593) 
M/B -0.0078** -0.0077** -0.0054 -0.0052 -0.0068 -0.0069 -0.0104 -0.0104 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.227) (0.245) (0.156) (0.148) (0.159) (0.160) 
Leverage 0.1044 0.1034 0.0151 0.0164 0.1813 0.1802 0.0708 0.0706 
 (0.182) (0.186) (0.898) (0.889) (0.160) (0.163) (0.608) (0.611) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.4083** 0.4144** 0.3845 0.3921 -0.0387 -0.0436 1.1153*** 1.1145*** 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.151) (0.143) (0.889) (0.875) (0.000) (0.000) 
RUNUP -0.1163** -0.1176** -0.1695*** -0.1719*** -0.0071 -0.0044 -0.2281** -0.2291** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.007) (0.006) (0.936) (0.961) (0.014) (0.013) 
Past Experience 0.0018 0.0017 0.0008 0.0008 0.0059 0.0054 0.0027 0.0026 
 (0.365) (0.385) (0.717) (0.698) (0.231) (0.269) (0.679) (0.686) 
Relative Size 0.1043** 0.1056** 0.0700 0.0714 0.1843 0.1903 0.0843 0.0844 
 (0.046) (0.044) (0.363) (0.353) (0.146) (0.132) (0.342) (0.341) 
Stock -0.0581 -0.0577 -0.1237* -0.1217 -0.0402 -0.0423 0.0332 0.0319 
 (0.252) (0.255) (0.098) (0.104) (0.637) (0.617) (0.814) (0.821) 
Cash 0.0783** 0.0789** 0.0247 0.0245 0.1906*** 0.1923*** -0.0143 -0.0152 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.673) (0.676) (0.008) (0.007) (0.847) (0.838) 
Hostile 0.3009* 0.2949* 0.2840* 0.2749* -0.1581 -0.1692 0.8585*** 0.8644*** 
 (0.055) (0.062) (0.086) (0.098) (0.444) (0.409) (0.000) (0.000) 
Competing Bid -0.0947 -0.0990 -0.0703 -0.0720 -0.4211 -0.4231 -0.7435 -0.7431 
 (0.400) (0.375) (0.537) (0.525) (0.169) (0.166) (0.403) (0.400) 
Tender Offer 0.0231 0.0233 0.0213 0.0212 -0.0631 -0.0525 -0.0793 -0.0754 
 (0.637) (0.634) (0.693) (0.695) (0.738) (0.783) (0.911) (0.916) 
Diversification -0.0066 -0.0051 -0.0033 0.0005 0.0314 0.0334 -0.0157 -0.0162 
 (0.859) (0.891) (0.949) (0.993) (0.625) (0.603) (0.821) (0.815) 
Public 0.0576 0.0602       
 (0.158) (0.139)       
M&A Heat Degree 0.0859 0.0804 0.1191 0.1027 -0.0339 -0.0010 -0.0676 -0.0647 
 (0.755) (0.770) (0.741) (0.775) (0.949) (0.998) (0.918) (0.921) 
High Valuation Market 0.0494 0.0495 0.0445 0.0446 0.1405 0.1371 -0.0603 -0.0596 
 (0.462) (0.461) (0.635) (0.634) (0.218) (0.230) (0.705) (0.709) 
Low Valuation Market 0.0388 0.0370 0.0127 0.0120 -0.1148 -0.1160 0.3902* 0.3902* 
 (0.664) (0.678) (0.928) (0.931) (0.349) (0.342) (0.061) (0.061) 
Constant -0.3122 -0.2614 -0.2382 -0.1611 -0.5518 -0.5540 0.2294 0.2269 
 (0.325) (0.409) (0.562) (0.697) (0.355) (0.352) (0.778) (0.780) 
N 3103 3103 1452 1452 984 984 667 667 
R2 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 0.102 0.103 0.149 0.149 
adj. R2 0.059 0.059 0.042 0.043 0.056 0.057 0.083 0.082 
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Table 2.6 Bivariate probit model of making in-house deals and the retention of top-tier 
advisors 
This table presents results of bivariate probit model of making in-house deals and the 
retention of top-tier advisors. In the model this chapter regresses the decisions on making 
in-house deals and the retention of top-tier advisors against firm, deal and market 
characteristics. For firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 
4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before 
the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. 
RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer 
over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative 
Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 
weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Stock 
dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% 
paid by cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by 
Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is 
more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification 
dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC 
code. For market characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the 
number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A 
deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if 
a deal is conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals 
one if a deal is conducted during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 (1) (2) 
 In-House Top-Tier 
Ln(MV) -0.2403*** 0.4139*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B 0.0183** -0.0088* 
 (0.036) (0.058) 
Leverage -0.2654 -0.0787 
 (0.326) (0.460) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.3557 0.5408** 
 (0.587) (0.018) 
Past Experience 0.0242*** -0.0191*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
RUNUP -0.1460 -0.1443** 
 (0.384) (0.014) 
Relative Size -3.8353*** 0.5597*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock 0.1479 -0.1315* 
 (0.371) (0.071) 
Cash -0.0473 -0.0811 
 (0.817) (0.204) 
Hostile -4.5719*** 0.6236** 
 (0.000) (0.037) 
Competing Bid 0.5420 -0.0419 
 (0.258) (0.838) 
Tender Offer -0.4991** 0.1277 
 (0.017) (0.162) 
Diversification -0.0344 -0.1036* 
 (0.787) (0.055) 
Public 1.1349*** 0.0017 
 (0.000) (0.978) 
M&A Heat Degree 1.2947* -0.0144 
 (0.064) (0.974) 
High Valuation Market -0.1786 -0.0146 
 (0.364) (0.880) 
Low Valuation Market 1.0497*** -0.0663 
 (0.009) (0.629) 
Scope 0.0028 0.1953*** 
 (0.969) (0.000) 
Constant -2.0454** -3.0591*** 
 (0.013) (0.000) 
N 3103 3103 
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Table 2.7 OLS regressions of acquirer long-term performance – large acquirers versus 
small acquirers 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of the acquirer long-term performance for the 
sub-sample of small acquirers (Specifications 1 and 2), and the sub-sample of large acquirers 
(Specifications 3 and 4). In these models this chapter regresses acquirer BHAR36 against a 
vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variables are the TopTier dummy and 
the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if an acquirer retains at least one top-tier 
advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier equals the number of top-tier advisors retained by the 
acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. 
In-House dummy equals one if an acquirer does not retain any advisors for the deal. Other 
control variables include firm, deal and market characteristics. For firm characteristics, 
Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the 
announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement 
divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is 
measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash 
Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided 
by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is 
measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to 
the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured as the 
transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Stock dummy equals 
one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. 
Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One 
Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. 
Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one 
if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. For market 
characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the number of M&A 
deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all 
previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is 
conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a 
deal is conducted during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 Small Acquirer Large Acquirer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TopTier 0.1842***  0.1455***  
 (0.007)  (0.003)  
No. of TopTier  0.1699**  0.1125*** 
  (0.013)  (0.007) 
No. of Advisors -0.2120** -0.2245*** -0.0189 -0.0770* 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.609) (0.092) 
InHouse -0.1188 -0.1371 0.1403 0.0591 
 (0.544) (0.485) (0.191) (0.586) 
Ln(MV) -0.1473*** -0.1463*** 0.0416* 0.0424* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.057) 
M/B -0.0072 -0.0072 -0.0095** -0.0094** 
 (0.233) (0.239) (0.013) (0.013) 
Leverage 0.1869* 0.1844 -0.0156 -0.0175 
 (0.099) (0.104) (0.873) (0.857) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.4616** 0.4644** 0.7382** 0.7565** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.016) (0.014) 
RUNUP -0.0825 -0.0829 -0.1357** -0.1398** 
 (0.211) (0.208) (0.023) (0.019) 
Past Experience 0.0053 0.0053 -0.0028 -0.0029 
 (0.392) (0.393) (0.160) (0.142) 
Relative Size 0.0784 0.0752 0.0262 0.0318 
 (0.249) (0.273) (0.726) (0.672) 
Stock -0.0554 -0.0573 -0.0947 -0.0918 
 (0.431) (0.415) (0.196) (0.207) 
Cash 0.1355** 0.1337** -0.0144 -0.0133 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.760) (0.779) 
Hostile 0.6607 0.6631 0.1939 0.1927 
 (0.146) (0.147) (0.252) (0.260) 
Competing Bid -0.2041 -0.2023 -0.0125 -0.0172 
 (0.346) (0.350) (0.918) (0.887) 
Tender Offer 0.0728 0.0739 -0.0268 -0.0282 
 (0.458) (0.452) (0.609) (0.589) 
Diversification -0.0440 -0.0457 0.0302 0.0333 
 (0.408) (0.390) (0.532) (0.495) 
Public 0.1100* 0.1129* -0.0222 -0.0186 
 (0.099) (0.090) (0.649) (0.701) 
M&A Heat Degree 0.1117 0.1140 0.1797 0.1654 
 (0.812) (0.808) (0.566) (0.598) 
High Valuation Market 0.0611 0.0594 0.0503 0.0515 
 (0.595) (0.605) (0.526) (0.517) 
Low Valuation Market 0.0697 0.0670 -0.0001 -0.0013 
 (0.615) (0.628) (1.000) (0.991) 
Constant 0.4434 0.4589 -1.0212*** -0.9456** 
 (0.423) (0.406) (0.007) (0.012) 
N 1551 1551 1552 1552 
R2 0.097 0.097 0.107 0.105 
adj. R2 0.067 0.067 0.077 0.075 
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Table 2.8 OLS regressions of acquirer long-term performance – low cash flows-to-equity 
acquirers versus high cash flows-to-equity acquirers  
 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of the acquirer long-term performance for the 
sub-sample of low cash flows-to-equity acquirers (Specifications 1 and 2), and the sub-sample 
of high cash flows-to-equity acquirers (Specifications 3 and 4). In these models this chapter 
regresses acquirer BHAR36 against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory 
variables are the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if 
an acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier equals the number 
of top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors equals the number 
of advisors retained by the acquirer. In-House dummy equals one if an acquirer does not 
retain any advisors for the deal. Other control variables include firm, deal and market 
characteristics. For firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 
4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before 
the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. 
RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer 
over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative 
Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 
weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Stock 
dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% 
paid by cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by 
Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is 
more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification 
dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC 
code. For market characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the 
number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A 
deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if 
a deal is conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals 
one if a deal is conducted during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects 
and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 Low  
Cash Flows/Equity 
Large  
Cash Flows/Equity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
TopTier 0.1453**  0.1172**  
 (0.017)  (0.040)  
No. of TopTier  0.1393**  0.1015** 
  (0.011)  (0.044) 
No. of Advisors -0.1678*** -0.2232*** -0.0310 -0.0739 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.534) (0.192) 
InHouse -0.1104 -0.1713 0.2144 0.1633 
 (0.398) (0.190) (0.172) (0.296) 
Ln(MV) 0.0143 0.0131 -0.0370* -0.0358* 
 (0.531) (0.570) (0.078) (0.082) 
M/B -0.0058* -0.0058* -0.0120 -0.0117 
 (0.085) (0.087) (0.122) (0.127) 
Leverage 0.0950 0.0918 0.0212 0.0223 
 (0.367) (0.385) (0.850) (0.842) 
Cash Flows/Equity -0.4739** -0.4672* 1.3848*** 1.3855*** 
 (0.048) (0.052) (0.001) (0.001) 
RUNUP -0.0569 -0.0563 -0.0372 -0.0412 
 (0.358) (0.364) (0.622) (0.584) 
Past Experience 0.0011 0.0011 0.0026 0.0024 
 (0.719) (0.716) (0.296) (0.325) 
Relative Size 0.0335 0.0299 0.0849 0.0880 
 (0.657) (0.694) (0.204) (0.189) 
Stock -0.0303 -0.0290 -0.0723 -0.0731 
 (0.666) (0.679) (0.331) (0.325) 
Cash 0.1045* 0.1068* 0.0533 0.0526 
 (0.059) (0.054) (0.277) (0.284) 
Hostile 0.8164** 0.8156** 0.1515 0.1460 
 (0.048) (0.049) (0.356) (0.378) 
Competing Bid -0.3324** -0.3367** -0.0694 -0.0733 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.617) (0.595) 
Tender Offer 0.0055 0.0063 0.0004 0.0002 
 (0.941) (0.933) (0.995) (0.997) 
Diversification -0.0226 -0.0208 0.0112 0.0122 
 (0.673) (0.697) (0.814) (0.799) 
Public 0.0664 0.0690 0.0480 0.0507 
 (0.231) (0.212) (0.396) (0.369) 
M&A Heat Degree -0.0414 -0.0541 0.0807 0.0820 
 (0.915) (0.889) (0.848) (0.846) 
High Valuation Market 0.1058 0.1113 -0.0099 -0.0141 
 (0.252) (0.228) (0.919) (0.886) 
Low Valuation Market -0.0966 -0.1012 0.1279 0.1291 
 (0.409) (0.383) (0.333) (0.330) 
Constant -0.3844 -0.3264 -0.3704 -0.3347 
 (0.388) (0.464) (0.460) (0.505) 
N 1551 1551 1552 1552 
R2 0.098 0.098 0.083 0.082 
adj. R2 0.069 0.069 0.052 0.052 
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Table 2.9 IV (2SLS) regressions of short-term performance  
This table presents results of IV (2SLS) regressions of the acquirer short-term performance 
for deals advised by investment banks. In these models this chapter regresses acquirer CAR 
[-2, 2] against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variables are the 
TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if an acquirer 
retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier equals the number of top-tier 
advisors retained by the acquirer. The instrument variable is the Scope. Scope equals three if 
an acquirer retained top-tier advisors for all the three types of transactions (M&A, equity 
issue and bond issue) during 5-year period prior to the acquisition. Scope equals two if an 
acquirer retained top-tier advisors for two of the three types of transactions during 5-year 
period prior to the acquisition. Scope equals one if an acquirer retained top-tier advisors for 
only one of the three types of transactions during 5-year period prior to the acquisition. Scope 
equals zero if an acquirer never retain top-tier advisors during 5-year period prior to the 
acquisition. Other control variables include No. of Advisors, firm, deal and market 
characteristics. No. of Advisors equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. For 
firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 
weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is 
measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past 
Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year 
period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured 
as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Stock dummy equals 
one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. 
Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One 
Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. 
Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one 
if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. For market 
characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the number of M&A 
deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all 
previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is 
conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a 
deal is conducted during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 (1) (2) 
 First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
TopTier  0.0027   
  (0.932)   
No. of TopTier    0.0024 
    (0.932) 
No. of Advisors 0.0878*** -0.0030 0.5110*** -0.0040 
 (0.000) (0.555) (0.000) (0.796) 
Ln(MV) 0.1270*** -0.0056 0.1376*** -0.0056 
 (0.000) (0.222) (0.000) (0.217) 
M/B -0.0015 0.0005 -0.0025 0.0005 
 (0.329) (0.231) (0.149) (0.235) 
Leverage -0.0374 0.0134* -0.0330 0.0133* 
 (0.308) (0.073) (0.422) (0.075) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.1574** 0.0054 0.1228 0.0055 
 (0.013) (0.761) (0.108) (0.752) 
RUNUP -0.0507*** 0.0004 -0.0441** 0.0003 
 (0.005) (0.942) (0.027) (0.945) 
Past Experience -0.0038*** 0.0001 -0.0034** 0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.575) (0.011) (0.567) 
Relative Size 0.1428*** 0.0153** 0.1464*** 0.0153** 
 (0.000) (0.041) (0.000) (0.037) 
Stock -0.0312 -0.0051 -0.0369 -0.0051 
 (0.173) (0.349) (0.142) (0.351) 
Cash -0.0176 0.0131*** -0.0244 0.0131*** 
 (0.405) (0.002) (0.300) (0.002) 
Hostile 0.1151* -0.0160 0.1725** -0.0161 
 (0.069) (0.219) (0.017) (0.232) 
Competing Bid -0.0481 -0.0300*** -0.0170 -0.0301*** 
 (0.372) (0.005) (0.801) (0.004) 
Tender Offer 0.0326 0.0361*** 0.0350 0.0361*** 
 (0.253) (0.000) (0.271) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0291* -0.0038 -0.0442** -0.0038 
 (0.096) (0.322) (0.021) (0.336) 
Public 0.0152 -0.0395*** -0.0041 -0.0395*** 
 (0.464) (0.000) (0.857) (0.000) 
M&A Heat Degree 0.0038 -0.0444 0.0464 -0.0445 
 (0.978) (0.201) (0.772) (0.200) 
High Valuation Market 0.0015 -0.0079 0.0001 -0.0079 
 (0.961) (0.324) (0.997) (0.324) 
Low Valuation Market -0.0106 0.0047 0.0026 0.0046 
 (0.809) (0.610) (0.957) (0.612) 
Scope 0.0649***  0.0712***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant -0.5985*** 0.0908** -1.0501*** 0.0918* 
 (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) (0.068) 
N 3003 3003 3003 3003 
R2 0.300 0.093 0.432 0.094 
adj. R2 0.289 0.078 0.423 0.079 
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Table 2.10 IV (2SLS) regressions of long-term performance 
This table presents results of IV (2SLS) regressions of the acquirer long-term performance for 
deals advised by investment banks. In these models this chapter regresses acquirer BHAR36 
against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variables are the TopTier 
dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if an acquirer retains at least 
one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier equals the number of top-tier advisors 
retained by the acquirer. The instrument variable is the Scope. Scope equals three if an 
acquirer retained top-tier advisors for all the three types of transactions (M&A, equity issue 
and bond issue) during 5-year period prior to the acquisition. Scope equals two if an acquirer 
retained top-tier advisors for two of the three types of transactions during 5-year period prior 
to the acquisition. Scope equals one if an acquirer retained top-tier advisors for only one of 
the three types of transactions during 5-year period prior to the acquisition. Scope equals zero 
if an acquirer never retain top-tier advisors during 5-year period prior to the acquisition. Other 
control variables include No. of Advisors, firm, deal and market characteristics. No. of 
Advisors equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. For firm characteristics, 
Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the 
announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement 
divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is 
measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash 
Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided 
by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is 
measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to 
the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured as the 
transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Stock dummy equals 
one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. 
Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One 
Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. 
Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one 
if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. For market 
characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the number of M&A 
deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all 
previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is 
conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a 
deal is conducted during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and 
year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in 
parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 (1) (2) 
 First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage 
Top-Tier  0.4715*   
  (0.082)   
Number of Top-Tier    0.4295* 
    (0.082) 
Number of Advisors 0.0878*** -0.1126** 0.5110*** -0.2907** 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.025) 
Ln(MV) 0.1270*** -0.0736* 0.1376*** -0.0729* 
 (0.000) (0.070) (0.000) (0.071) 
M/B -0.0015 -0.0065* -0.0025 -0.0062* 
 (0.329) (0.051) (0.149) (0.065) 
Leverage -0.0374 0.1017 -0.0330 0.0983 
 (0.308) (0.200) (0.422) (0.216) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.1574** 0.3582** 0.1228 0.3796** 
 (0.013) (0.044) (0.108) (0.032) 
RUNUP -0.0507*** -0.0991* -0.0441** -0.1041** 
 (0.005) (0.050) (0.027) (0.037) 
Past Experience -0.0038*** 0.0039 -0.0034** 0.0035 
 (0.000) (0.103) (0.011) (0.128) 
Relative Size 0.1428*** 0.0586 0.1464*** 0.0630 
 (0.000) (0.386) (0.000) (0.345) 
Stock -0.0312 -0.0505 -0.0369 -0.0493 
 (0.173) (0.348) (0.142) (0.358) 
Cash -0.0176 0.0799** -0.0244 0.0821** 
 (0.405) (0.039) (0.300) (0.036) 
Hostile 0.1151* 0.2591* 0.1725** 0.2392 
 (0.069) (0.088) (0.017) (0.131) 
Competing Bid -0.0481 -0.1147 -0.0170 -0.1301 
 (0.372) (0.314) (0.801) (0.244) 
Tender Offer 0.0326 0.0188 0.0350 0.0192 
 (0.253) (0.718) (0.271) (0.710) 
Diversification -0.0291* 0.0023 -0.0442** 0.0075 
 (0.096) (0.953) (0.021) (0.847) 
Public 0.0152 0.0490 -0.0041 0.0579 
 (0.464) (0.247) (0.857) (0.163) 
M&A Heat Degree 0.0038 0.0252 0.0464 0.0070 
 (0.978) (0.932) (0.772) (0.981) 
High Valuation Market 0.0015 0.0698 0.0001 0.0704 
 (0.961) (0.316) (0.997) (0.314) 
Low Valuation Market -0.0106 0.0548 0.0026 0.0487 
 (0.809) (0.547) (0.957) (0.593) 
Scope 0.0649***  0.0712***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
Constant -0.5985*** -0.0330 -1.0501*** 0.1357 
 (0.000) (0.929) (0.000) (0.747) 
N 3003 3003 3003 3003 
R2 0.300 0.047 0.432 0.047 
adj. R2 0.289 0.031 0.423 0.032 
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Table 2.11 Robustness tests – acquirer short-term performance 
This table presents results of robustness tests of the acquirer short-term performance for the entire sample. In these models this chapter regresses acquirer short-term 
performance against a vector of explanatory variables. Specifications 1 and 2 show the regressions of market-adjusted CAR [-1, 1]. Specifications 3 and 4 show the 
regressions of market-adjusted CAR [-5, 5]. Specifications 5 and 6 show the regressions of CAR [-2, 2] estimated by the market model. Specifications 7 and 8 show 
the regressions of CAR [-2, 2] estimated by the Fama-French three-factor model. Specification 9 and 10 show the regressions of CAR [-2, 2] estimated by the 
Fama-French-momentum four-factor model. The key explanatory variables are the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if an 
acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier equals the number of top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors 
equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. In-House dummy equals one if an acquirer does not retain any advisors for the deal. Other control variables 
include firm, deal and market characteristics. For firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the 
announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at 
the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs 
over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to 
the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if 
the deal is 100% paid by cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals 
one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer 
and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. For market characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the number of 
M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market 
dummy equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of 
low valuation market. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Market-adjusted 
CAR [-1, 1] 
Market-adjusted 
CAR [-5, 5] 
Market Model 
CAR [-2, 2] 
Fama-French 
CAR [-2, 2] 
Fama-French-momentum 
CAR [-2, 2] 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Top-Tier 0.0014 
 
0.0028 
 
0.0034 
 
0.0036 
 
0.0031 
 
 
(0.705) 
 
(0.569) 
 
(0.406) 
 
(0.376) 
 
(0.446) 
 
Number of Top-Tier 
 
0.0032 
 
0.0057 
 
0.0054 
 
0.0057 
 
0.0049 
  
(0.344) 
 
(0.198) 
 
(0.139) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.198) 
Number of Advisors -0.0025 -0.0040 -0.0020 -0.0047 -0.0036 -0.0061 -0.0039 -0.0065 -0.0043 -0.0065 
 
(0.534) (0.366) (0.662) (0.378) (0.386) (0.192) (0.366) (0.172) (0.332) (0.180) 
In-House 0.0178* 0.0171* 0.0427*** 0.0414*** 0.0230** 0.0215** 0.0243** 0.0227** 0.0231** 0.0217** 
 
(0.059) (0.063) (0.002) (0.002) (0.026) (0.033) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.034) 
Ln(MV) -0.0069*** -0.0072*** -0.0057*** -0.0061*** -0.0059*** -0.0062*** -0.0062*** -0.0065*** -0.0060*** -0.0063*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B 0.0005 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 
 
(0.165) (0.158) (0.561) (0.542) (0.405) (0.390) (0.245) (0.233) (0.267) (0.257) 
Leverage 0.0095 0.0094 0.0131 0.0130 0.0118* 0.0117* 0.0137* 0.0136* 0.0144** 0.0143** 
 
(0.159) (0.161) (0.142) (0.146) (0.097) (0.099) (0.055) (0.057) (0.046) (0.047) 
Cash Flows/Equity -0.0074 -0.0075 0.0191 0.0190 0.0035 0.0035 0.0059 0.0059 0.0043 0.0043 
 
(0.649) (0.645) (0.394) (0.397) (0.838) (0.841) (0.730) (0.732) (0.807) (0.809) 
RUNUP 0.0034 0.0035 0.0023 0.0024 -0.0201*** -0.0200*** -0.0167*** -0.0167*** -0.0155*** -0.0154*** 
 
(0.410) (0.398) (0.709) (0.694) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Past Experience 0.0004** 0.0004** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.581) (0.611) (0.338) (0.319) (0.208) (0.193) (0.293) (0.278) 
Relative Size 0.0131** 0.0128** 0.0209*** 0.0205*** 0.0148** 0.0146** 0.0137** 0.0134** 0.0147** 0.0145** 
 
(0.021) (0.023) (0.002) (0.003) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.014) (0.015) 
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Stock -0.0079* -0.0078* -0.0026 -0.0025 -0.0038 -0.0037 -0.0051 -0.0050 -0.0043 -0.0042 
 
(0.091) (0.094) (0.690) (0.703) (0.469) (0.479) (0.342) (0.351) (0.432) (0.440) 
Cash 0.0148*** 0.0149*** 0.0100** 0.0101** 0.0135*** 0.0136*** 0.0136*** 0.0137*** 0.0145*** 0.0145*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.049) (0.047) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hostile -0.0100 -0.0104 -0.0178 -0.0184 -0.0173 -0.0179 -0.0215* -0.0221* -0.0186 -0.0191 
 
(0.372) (0.351) (0.193) (0.177) (0.159) (0.144) (0.075) (0.066) (0.135) (0.124) 
Competing Bid -0.0176* -0.0176* -0.0311** -0.0312** -0.0246** -0.0247** -0.0285*** -0.0287*** -0.0277*** -0.0278*** 
 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.031) (0.030) (0.017) (0.016) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Tender Offer 0.0323*** 0.0323*** 0.0371*** 0.0370*** 0.0348*** 0.0347*** 0.0344*** 0.0343*** 0.0354*** 0.0353*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0055* -0.0054 -0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0021 -0.0019 -0.0013 -0.0012 
 
(0.099) (0.105) (0.457) (0.479) (0.413) (0.434) (0.566) (0.592) (0.731) (0.755) 
Public -0.0333*** -0.0333*** -0.0368*** -0.0368*** -0.0387*** -0.0386*** -0.0386*** -0.0386*** -0.0383*** -0.0382*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
M&A Heat Degree -0.0304 -0.0307 -0.0698* -0.0702* -0.0341 -0.0344 -0.0409 -0.0413 -0.0445 -0.0448 
 
(0.315) (0.311) (0.085) (0.083) (0.308) (0.302) (0.213) (0.209) (0.182) (0.179) 
High Valuation Market -0.0050 -0.0050 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0087 -0.0087 -0.0030 -0.0030 -0.0039 -0.0039 
 
(0.474) (0.473) (0.568) (0.567) (0.249) (0.249) (0.694) (0.693) (0.616) (0.615) 
Low Valuation Market 0.0033 0.0033 0.0180 0.0180 0.0053 0.0053 0.0010 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0003 
 
(0.685) (0.687) (0.101) (0.102) (0.551) (0.555) (0.909) (0.914) (0.979) (0.976) 
Constant 0.0903*** 0.0929*** 0.1186*** 0.1231*** 0.0893** 0.0932** 0.0934** 0.0974*** 0.0965** 0.0999*** 
 
(0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
N 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 
R2 0.103 0.103 0.071 0.071 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.105 0.105 
adj. R2 0.088 0.088 0.056 0.056 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.094 0.090 0.091 
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Table 2.12 Robustness tests – acquirer long-term performance 
This table presents results of robustness tests of the acquirer long-term performance for the entire sample. In these models this chapter regresses acquirer long-term 
performance against a vector of explanatory variables. Specifications 1 and 2 show the regressions of size-adjusted BHAR12. Specifications 3 and 4 show the 
regressions of size-adjuested BHAR24. Specifications 5 and 6 show the regressions of market-adjusted BHAR36. Specifications 7 and 8 show the regressions of 
size-adjusted BHAR36 estimated by the alternative equation (𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
− 1 − 𝑅𝑝𝑡 , where 𝑅𝑝𝑡 = ∑
∏ (1+𝑅𝑗𝑡)
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
−1
𝑛
𝑛
𝑗=1 ). The key explanatory 
variables are the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if an acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of 
TopTier equals the number of top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. 
In-House dummy equals one if an acquirer does not retain any advisors for the deal. Other control variables include firm, deal and market characteristics. For firm 
characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of 
equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over 
total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by 
market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past 
Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the 
target is publicly listed. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Hostile dummy equals 
one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. 
Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary 
SIC code. For market characteristics, M&A Heat Degree is measured as the moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical 
average of the number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. High Valuation Market dummy equals one if a deal is conducted during the period 
of high valuation market. Low Valuation Market equals one if a deal is conducted during the period of low valuation market. All continuous variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values 
shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Size-adjusted 
BHAR12 
Size-adjusted 
BHAR24 
Market-adjusted 
BHAR36 
Size-adjusted (alternative 
equation) BHAR36 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Top-Tier 0.0416* 
 
0.0810*** 
 
0.1581*** 
 
0.1498*** 
 
 
(0.051) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
Number of Top-Tier 
 
0.0440** 
 
0.0887*** 
 
0.1386*** 
 
0.1308*** 
  
(0.022) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.001) 
Number of Advisors -0.0330* -0.0519** -0.0735** -0.1118*** -0.0889** -0.1459*** -0.0708* -0.1245*** 
 
(0.090) (0.016) (0.013) (0.000) (0.030) (0.002) (0.074) (0.006) 
In-House 0.0294 0.0113 0.1053 0.0701 0.0277 -0.0407 0.0654 0.0006 
 
(0.728) (0.893) (0.258) (0.449) (0.810) (0.724) (0.563) (0.996) 
Ln(MV) -0.0116 -0.0125 -0.0147 -0.0168 -0.0191 -0.0180 -0.0034 -0.0023 
 
(0.134) (0.109) (0.201) (0.143) (0.247) (0.272) (0.836) (0.887) 
M/B -0.0044** -0.0044** -0.0099*** -0.0098*** -0.0030 -0.0029 0.0000 0.0001 
 
(0.031) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.339) (0.354) (0.996) (0.975) 
Leverage 0.1401*** 0.1396*** 0.1187* 0.1176* 0.0907 0.0897 0.0995 0.0986 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.069) (0.071) (0.283) (0.289) (0.249) (0.253) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.1282 0.1295 0.3160** 0.3183** 0.3831** 0.3905** 0.3956** 0.4027** 
 
(0.235) (0.230) (0.017) (0.016) (0.034) (0.031) (0.027) (0.024) 
RUNUP -0.0509* -0.0510* -0.0851** -0.0852** -0.1313*** -0.1332*** -0.1036** -0.1054** 
 
(0.056) (0.055) (0.021) (0.020) (0.009) (0.008) (0.042) (0.039) 
Past Experience -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0008 
 
(0.890) (0.889) (0.841) (0.845) (0.561) (0.520) (0.748) (0.706) 
Relative Size 0.0197 0.0193 0.0478 0.0466 0.0507 0.0530 0.0441 0.0463 
 
(0.478) (0.487) (0.230) (0.243) (0.383) (0.363) (0.433) (0.411) 
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Stock -0.0184 -0.0181 -0.0408 -0.0401 -0.0293 -0.0291 -0.0270 -0.0268 
 
(0.518) (0.525) (0.284) (0.292) (0.604) (0.606) (0.615) (0.617) 
Cash 0.0697*** 0.0700*** 0.0838*** 0.0845*** 0.0822** 0.0827** 0.0923** 0.0928** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.045) (0.044) (0.023) (0.023) 
Hostile 0.0363 0.0334 0.2182** 0.2120* 0.2380 0.2323 0.1786 0.1733 
 
(0.604) (0.632) (0.048) (0.055) (0.142) (0.156) (0.323) (0.341) 
Competing Bid -0.0509 -0.0522 -0.0200 -0.0225 -0.0168 -0.0217 -0.0338 -0.0385 
 
(0.364) (0.349) (0.818) (0.794) (0.895) (0.863) (0.788) (0.758) 
Tender Offer -0.0162 -0.0164 0.0004 0.0000 0.0411 0.0415 0.0124 0.0127 
 
(0.573) (0.570) (0.992) (1.000) (0.452) (0.448) (0.821) (0.816) 
Diversification -0.0292 -0.0285 -0.0279 -0.0264 -0.0099 -0.0084 -0.0199 -0.0186 
 
(0.138) (0.148) (0.309) (0.337) (0.813) (0.841) (0.624) (0.649) 
Public 0.0550** 0.0557** 0.0612** 0.0627** 0.0529 0.0558 0.0381 0.0409 
 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.049) (0.043) (0.238) (0.211) (0.384) (0.348) 
M&A Heat Degree 0.0878 0.0855 0.0145 0.0098 0.2286 0.2228 0.0917 0.0863 
 
(0.654) (0.663) (0.948) (0.964) (0.421) (0.432) (0.744) (0.759) 
High Valuation Market -0.0315 -0.0315 0.0228 0.0228 -0.0792 -0.0790 -0.0185 -0.0183 
 
(0.470) (0.470) (0.695) (0.696) (0.275) (0.276) (0.791) (0.794) 
Low Valuation Market -0.0396 -0.0402 -0.0674 -0.0685 0.0404 0.0383 0.0173 0.0153 
 
(0.389) (0.381) (0.311) (0.303) (0.681) (0.697) (0.861) (0.877) 
Constant -0.0806 -0.0587 -0.0739 -0.0281 -0.1048 -0.0537 -0.3512 -0.3034 
 
(0.702) (0.781) (0.772) (0.912) (0.756) (0.873) (0.279) (0.351) 
N 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 3103 
R2 0.054 0.054 0.082 0.083 0.070 0.070 0.047 0.046 
adj. R2 0.038 0.039 0.066 0.068 0.055 0.055 0.031 0.031 
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Appendix 2.1: Top 25 U.S. financial advisor ranking based on transaction value 
 
The table presents the ranking of the top-25 financial advisors based on the transaction value 
for acquisitions of U.S. targets over the period January 1990 to December 31, 2009 obtained 
from the Thomson One Banker. Panel A and Panel B present the financial advisor ranking in 
the two decades – 1990s and 2000s, respectively. Transaction value is shown in U.S. million 
dollars.  
 
Rank Financial Advisor Transaction Value Number of Deals 
Panel A: 1990 – 1999 
 
Top-Tier 
  
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 2,108,483.06 1,601 
2 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 1,756,874.86 2,153 
3 Morgan Stanley 1,669,074.77 1,338 
4 JP Morgan 1,366,348.57 1,691 
5 Credit Suisse 1,342,830.48 2,010 
6 Citi (Salomon Brother/Salomon Smith Barney) 1,192,974.73 1,676 
7 Barclays Capital (Lehman Brothers) 698,713.29 874 
8 Lazard 613,378.80 568 
9 UBS 435,536.00 1,018 
10 Deutsche Bank AG 369,381.67 969 
 
Non-Top-Tier 
  
11 Sagent Advisors Inc 240,950.63 183 
12 Commerzbank AG 233,242.03 326 
13 Allen & Co Inc 121,159.69 50 
14 Houlihan Lokey 111,308.94 390 
15 Gleacher & Co Inc 92,671.86 78 
16 Blackstone Group LP 69,979.81 142 
17 RBC Capital Markets 65,626.50 495 
18 Evercore Partners 63,025.41 11 
19 Societe Generale 59,085.45 103 
20 Greenhill & Co, LLC 59,037.24 30 
21 Rothschild 57,591.51 88 
22 RBS 49,244.64 341 
23 Keefe Bruyette & Woods Inc 43,877.64 233 
24 CIBC World Markets Inc 43,771.35 205 
25 Jefferies & Co Inc 42,621.50 544 
Panel B: 2000 – 2009 
 
Top-Tier 
  
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 4,130,646.38 1,653 
2 Morgan Stanley 3,069,775.38 1,299 
3 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 3,025,483.53 1,931 
4 JP Morgan 2,978,195.31 1,810 
5 Citi (Salomon Smith Barney) 2,511,363.84 1,490 
6 Credit Suisse 1,940,924.74 1,697 
7 Barclays Capital (Lehman Brothers) 1,869,741.79 1,008 
8 UBS 1,178,542.38 924 
9 Lazard 1,002,150.94 843 
10 Deutsche Bank AG 938,850.17 634 
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Non-Top-Tier 
11 Evercore Partners 681,438.52 173 
12 Wells Fargo & Co 381,847.10 477 
13 Commerzbank AG 356,887.07 138 
14 Houlihan Lokey 354,513.98 1,375 
15 Blackstone Group LP 304,486.73 127 
16 Greenhill & Co, LLC 242,046.54 117 
17 Sagent Advisors Inc 206,566.20 230 
18 Jefferies & Co Inc 193,171.26 858 
19 Rothschild 188,233.09 239 
20 Duff and Phelps 184,790.02 457 
21 BNP Paribas SA 174,201.15 42 
22 Centerview Partners LLC 169,952.29 29 
23 Moelis & Co 135,365.04 76 
24 Keefe Bruyette & Woods Inc 134,706.73 443 
25 Sandler O'Neill Partners 125,961.47 403 
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Appendix 2.2: Definitions of control variables 
 
This table describes control variables in the regressions of this chapter. The definition for each variable is shown in the table. Panel A, B and C present firm 
characteristics, deal characteristics and market characteristics, respectively. 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Ln(MV) 
 
The logarithm of the acquirer market value measured 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item 
PRC×SHROUT). 
M/B 
 
Market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT) divided by book value 
of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item CEQ). 
Leverage 
 
Total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item 
(DTLL+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+SEQ)). 
Cash Flows/Equity 
 
Cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item IB+DP-DVP-DVC) divided by 
market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT). 
RUNUP Acquirer market-adjusted CARs before announcement date over the [-365, -28] window. 
Past Experience The number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics 
Relative Size 
 
Transaction value (from Thomson One Banker) divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT).  
Public Dummy variable equals one if the target is a publicly listed firm. 
Stock Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. 
Cash Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. 
Hostile Dummy variable equals one if the deal attitude is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. 
Competing Bid Dummy variable equals one if there are more than one bidding firms reported by Thomson One Banker. 
Tender Offer Dummy variable equals one if the deal is identified as a tender offer by Thomson One Banker. 
Diversification Dummy variable equals one if the acquirer and the target have the different first two-digit of primary SIC code. 
Panel C: Market Characteristics 
M&A Heat Degree 
 
The moving average of the number of M&A deals in each quarter divided by the historical average of the 
number of M&A deals in all previous quarters going back to 1985. 
High Valuation Market10 Dummy equals one if a deal is conducted in high valuation month. 
Low Valuation Market Dummy equals one if a deal is conducted in low valuation month. 
                                                 
10 To measure stock market valuation, this chapter follows the method of Bouwman, Fuller, and Nain (2009). Specifically, this chapter initially detrend the monthly P/E ratio of the S&P 50010 from 1985 to 2009. 
Subsequently, each month is classified as below or above average base on whether the detrended P/E ratio of the month is lower or higher than the past five-year average. Finally, the lowest 50% of below average 
months are identified as “Low Valuation Market”, while the highest 50% of above average months are identified as “High Valuation Market”. 
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Chapter 3 : Financial Advisor Reputation and 
Takeover Premiums 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines whether top-tier financial advisors can help their acquirer clients to 
minimize takeover premiums. In addition, this chapter also pays attention to whether 
multiple top-tier advisors can cooperate effectively to improve acquirer bargaining power.  
 
Financial advisors play a pivotal role in the deal negotiation process. On one hand, it is 
possible that top-tier financial advisors have advised their acquirer clients to pay high 
takeover premiums to reach agreement on a deal, since the contingent fee structure 
encourages financial advisors to complete deals (McLaughlin, 1990; Rau, 2000). On the 
other hand, if top-tier financial advisors have superior skills, they should help their 
acquirer clients to enhance their bargaining power to minimize takeover premiums. 
Although the literature has examined the financial advisor reputation–quality mechanism, 
only a minority of these studies explores the relations between advisor reputation and takeover 
premiums. Additionally, existing empirical evidence suggest that top-tier advisors do not help 
their acquirer clients to minimize takeover premiums, and even lead to overpayment (Michel, 
Shaked and Lee, 1991; McLaughlin, 1992; Rau, 2000; Chahine and Ismail, 2009; Schiereck, 
Sigl-Grüb and Unverhau, 2009). However, the most recent study by Golubov, Petmezas and 
Travlos (2012) show that top-tier advisors have superior abilities to identify synergistic targets, 
and secure more shares of synergies in negotiation. In other words, top-tier advisors can 
improve their clients’ bargaining power. Therefore, the results of top-tier advisors’ effects on 
acquirer bargaining power remain inconclusive.  
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Furthermore, some acquirers retain multiple advisors or even multiple top-tier advisors for 
one deal. However, there is no research that has examined the effects of multiple top-tier 
advisors on takeover premiums. Social loafing refers to the tendency of group members to 
make less effort when they work collectively, compared to when they work individually. 
Even if top-tier advisors have superior skills to improve their clients’ bargaining power, it 
is still unknown whether multiple top-tier advisors suffer from social loafing or if they can 
cooperate effectively to help acquirers lower their takeover premiums. 
 
Motivated by the aforementioned issues, this chapter investigates the effects of top-tier 
advisors on takeover premiums by examining a sample of 3430 completed US M&A 
deals during 1990–2012. In line with the last chapter, top-tier financial advisors are 
defined as the top 10 investment banks listed in the market share-based league table. Bid 
premium is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 
four weeks prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price four weeks prior 
to the announcement. To ensure that the results are not sensitive to the measures of 
takeover premiums, this chapter also calculates the premium of offer price to target price 
one week prior to the announcement and premium of offer price to target price one day 
prior to the announcement. In the vein of Schwert (1996), Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov 
(2009), and Fich, Cai and Tran (2011), this chapter also uses target cumulative abnormal 
returns around announcement as the proxy of target premium. Eventually, this chapter 
finds that top-tier financial advisors can help their acquirer clients minimize takeover 
premiums. Specifically, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay 4.09% lower bid 
premiums (premiums of offer price to target price four weeks prior to the announcement) 
than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors, after controlling for firm and deal 
characteristics. Additionally, the number of top-tier advisors retained by acquirer is 
significantly positively related to bid premiums. In contrast, the total number of advisors 
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retained by an acquirer loses its significance when both the number of top-tier advisors 
and the total number of advisors are present in the regression. The result suggests that an 
increase in the number of top-tier advisors rather than an increase in the total number of 
advisors leads to a decrease in bid premiums. This empirical evidence indicates that 
multiple top-tier advisors do not suffer from social loafing. Instead, multiple top-tier 
advisors can effectively cooperate to enhance their acquirer clients’ bargaining power. 
 
It is reasonable that top-tier advisors can use less time to help their clients to complete 
deals, since top-tier advisors have superior skills. Additionally, it is possible that top-tier 
advisors rush to complete deals, due to the fee structure incentive. However, further 
research on time-to-completion indicates that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors do not 
take less time to complete deals than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. Therefore, 
the result suggests that top-tier advisors work diligently during deal negotiation process.  
 
However, this chapter also finds that top-tier advisors charge much higher advisory fees. 
Acquirer total advisory fees for deals with top-tier advisor involvement are 4.18 times as 
high as acquirer total advisory fees for deals advised by non-top-tier advisors, while total 
advisory fees for acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors are 3.43 times higher than 
total advisory fees for acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. Therefore, there is 
concern about whether the benefits of minimising bid premiums outweigh the 
disadvantages of overpayment of advisory fees. This chapter addresses this issue by 
calculating cost reduction, where cost reduction is defined as the sum of the reduction in 
the cost of bid premiums and acquirer total advisory fees. Since bid premiums and 
advisory fees differ across deals with different deal and firm characteristics, the estimation 
of cost reduction will be biased. Therefore, this chapter constructs five reference portfolios 
based on transaction value, relative size, acquirer market value, acquirer industry and 
 102 
 
target industry. Based on different reference portfolios, acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors reduce cost by $122.74 million to $199.23 million on average compared to 
acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors, while acquirers advised by multiple top-tier 
advisors reduce cost by $371.78 million to $567.52 million on average compared to 
acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor.  
 
This research contributes to the M&A literature in the following respects. First, the 
literature on the effects of advisor reputation on takeover premiums is rare and the 
evidence is puzzling. This chapter employs the latest and comprehensive data in the 
research and finds that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have lower bid premiums. In 
other words, the retention of top-tier advisors enhances acquirers’ bargaining power, 
supporting the reputation–quality mechanism. 
 
Second, the existing literature does not distinguish the effects of multiple top-tier advisors 
from the effects of a single top-tier advisor. This chapter suggests that multiple top-tier 
advisors do not suffer from social loafing. Instead, multiple top-tier advisors can 
effectively cooperate to enhance their clients’ bargaining power in the negotiation process. 
 
Third, this chapter also has important implications for practitioners. This chapter suggests 
that acquirers do not need to worry too much about overpayment of advisory fees. Indeed, 
top-tier advisors can help their clients reduce their total cost to a larger extent. The benefits 
of retaining top-tier advisors outweigh the disadvantages. 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 constructs main hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data selection procedure and 
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methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and shows robustness tests. Section 
6 concludes. 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
Takeover premium can be used by acquirers to encourage targets to accept deals, or to 
deter competing bids (Jennings and Mazzeo, 1993). However, overpayments lead to 
negative market reactions (Varaiya and Ferris, 1987). On the other hand, takeover 
premium is also an indicator of bargaining power for merger participants. Specifically, 
with strong bargaining power, acquirers (targets) can minimise (maximise) takeover 
premiums, thereby negotiating favourable deals (Walkling and Edmister, 1985).  
 
The existing literature has examined the determinants of takeover premiums. For example, 
Hirshleifer and Png (1989) suggest that bid competition increases target premiums. 
Comment and Schwert (1995) find that anti-takeover measures, such as poison pills, 
enhance target bargaining power and therefore increase takeover premiums. In addition, 
Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) argue that targets with independent outside directors 
tend to employ anti-takeover strategies and gain higher bid premiums in tender offers. 
Hayward and Hambrick (1997) find that hubristic CEOs pay higher takeover premiums, 
and lack of board vigilance renders overpayment more severe. Betton and Eckbo (2000) 
show that acquirers with higher pre-deal ownership of target shares pay lower bid 
premiums, and acquirer toehold helps to alleviate bid contests and target resistance. In line 
with Betton and Eckbo (2000), Bris (2002) and Ismail (2008) also suggest that acquirer 
toehold size is negatively related to bid premiums. Datta, Iskandar-Datta and Raman 
(2001) find that acquirer CEOs who have high equity-based compensation tend to pay 
lower takeover premiums. Bates and Lemmon (2003) and Officer (2003) find that target 
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shareholders earn higher bid premiums in deals that contain termination fee clauses. 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) show that larger acquirers pay higher takeover 
premiums, but gain lower returns around announcement. Bargeron et al. (2008) find that 
public acquirers pay higher takeover premiums compared to private acquirer. Aktas, de 
Bodt and Roll (2010) argue that latent competition is positively related to takeover 
premiums, while anticipated auction cost is negatively related to takeover premiums. Fich, 
Cai and Tran (2011) find that targets that grant unscheduled stock options to CEOs during 
negotiations tend to gain lower takeover premiums. Bargeron (2012) shows that 
shareholder tender agreements lead to lower takeover premiums.  
 
The above literature reveals that any factors that affect the bargaining position of the 
merger participants will finally impact takeover premiums (Eckbo, 2009). Indeed, 
financial advisors play a pivotal role in bidding strategy development and deal negotiation 
process and therefore exert influence on the bargaining power of the merger participants. 
However, there is only a little literature that pays attention to the relations between 
investment bank reputation and takeover premiums. For instance, Michel, Shaked and Lee 
(1991) compare the performance of major investment banks over the period 1981–1998, 
and find that Drexel Burnham Lambert, a relatively less prestigious bank, helped its 
acquirer clients generate the lowest target premiums measured by target announcement 
abnormal returns compared to more prestigious banks, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan 
Stanley, First Boston, Lehman Brothers and Salomon Brothers. In other words, top-tier 
banks did not minimize the takeover premiums for their acquirer clients. 
 
By examining a sample of tender offers during 1978–1986, McLaughlin (1992) finds that 
reputations for target advisors have no effect on bid premiums, whereas reputations for 
acquirer advisors have significant effects on bid premiums. Specifically, acquirers advised 
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by low-reputation banks pay significantly lower bid premiums. McLaughlin (1992) 
provides two possible explanations for the results: 1) high-reputation banks advise their 
acquirer clients to pay higher premiums to accomplish the agreement; and 2) 
high-reputation banks are retained in complex acquisitions where higher bid premiums are 
necessary to complete deals. In addition, deals with multiple bidders require higher bid 
premiums, indicating that multiple-bidder contests result in overbidding. In other words, 
competitive auctions are in the interest of targets, but are detrimental to acquirers. 
Furthermore, compared to approved offers, resisted offers are associated with higher bid 
premiums, which suggest that acquirers need to raise their bid price to overcome 
management resistance by targets. 
 
Rau (2000) investigates whether higher reputation banks advise acquirers to pay higher 
bid premiums to ensure deal completion, through analysing a sample of tender offers and 
mergers over the period 1980–1991. Rau (2000) shows that in tender offers the median 
bid premiums paid by acquirers advised by first-tier, second-tier and third-tier banks are 
56.4%, 58.1% and 38.1%, respectively. In other words, acquirers advised by higher-tier 
banks pay significantly higher bid premiums than acquirers advised by third-tier banks. 
Rau (2000) argues that this result is consistent with the deal completion hypothesis that 
incentive fee structure stimulates top-tier advisors to complete deals rather than chase 
performance. In contrast, the difference in premiums across mergers advised by different 
tier banks is statistically insignificant. In addition, bank reputations are not significantly 
related to bid premiums in multivariate regression analysis for both tender offers and 
mergers. 
 
Chahine and Ismail (2009) explore the relations among bank reputations, bid premiums 
and advisory fees by analysing a sample of 635 acquisitions during 1985–2004. Chahine 
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and Ismail (2009) find that more prestigious banks charge higher advisory fees; however, 
neither acquirer bank reputation nor target bank reputation have significant effects on bid 
premiums. In addition, they show that acquirer advisory fees are negatively related to bid 
premiums, whereas target advisory fees are positively related to bid premiums. 
Interestingly, the research also suggests that acquirers pay lower bid premiums, when 
relative advisory fees (acquirer advisor fees over target advisory fees) are higher.  
 
Schiereck, Sigl-Grüb and Unverhau (2009) find that bank reputation has little effect on bid 
premium, by examining 285 European acquisitions during 1997–2002. Specifically, their 
research shows that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors do not minimise bid premium 
while targets advised by top-tier advisors do not maximise bid premium. In other words, 
the results suggest that top-tier advisors do not improve their clients’ bargaining power. 
 
In addition to the above five studies that examine the effects of bank reputation on bid 
premiums, Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov (2009), Kisgen, Qian and Song (2009), and 
Song, Wei and Zhou (2013) also examine the relations between financial advisors and 
takeover premiums, but from different angles. Specifically, Bodnaruk, Massa and 
Simonov (2009) examine how advisory stakes influence target premiums. They use target 
cumulative abnormal returns around announcement as the proxy of target premiums, and 
find that deals in which acquirer advisors own target stakes generate higher target 
premiums. The results suggest that investment banks that own target shares exploit private 
information to profit from acquisitions.  
 
Kisgen, Qian and Song (2009) explore how fairness opinions provided by investment 
banks impact bid premiums. They find that fairness opinions for targets do not have 
significant effects on premiums. In contrast, acquirers that apply fairness opinions pay 
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significantly lower bid premiums. Additionally, the effects of acquirer-side fairness 
opinions are stronger, when the fairness opinions are provided by high-reputation banks or 
multiple banks.  
 
Song, Wei and Zhou (2013) investigate the influence of the choice between boutique 
advisors and full-service advisors on the deal outcomes measured by bid premiums. They 
define boutique advisors as those small but specialised banks that do not provide full 
spectrum services, and find that boutique advisors can help their acquirer clients pay lower 
bid premiums compared to full-service advisors. 
 
3.3. Hypotheses 
There is little literature that focuses on the relations between takeover premiums and 
advisor reputation. There is no evidence that top-tier advisors can help their acquirer 
clients to minimize premiums. Similarly, the last chapter of this dissertation has reviewed 
the relations between acquirer returns and advisor reputation, and find that most studies do 
not support that top-tier advisors can improve acquirer performance. However, the most 
recent research by Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012) suggest that top-tier advisors 
have superior skills to identify synergistic targets and secure a higher share of synergies 
for their clients. The last chapter of this dissertation also highlights the superior abilities of 
top-tier advisors to help their acquirer clients outperform in the long term. Therefore, this 
chapter assumes that top-tier advisors have superior abilities to help their clients gain 
higher bargaining power in the negotiation process, thereby paying lower takeover 
premiums. Consequently, this chapter formulates the following hypothesis: 
H1: The retention of top-tier advisors by acquirers is negatively related to takeover 
premiums.  
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In addition, if banks care less about their reputational capital, they will suffer from social 
loafing, which will have a negative effect on the quality of the advisory service. However, 
top-tier advisors should care more about their reputational capital, since the market share 
is determined by the bank reputation. To defend their leading position in the M&A market, 
top-tier advisors have to provide M&A advisory service with the utmost seriousness, and 
cooperate effectively. Therefore, this chapter expects that top-tier advisors will not suffer 
from social loafing, and that the cooperation of multiple top-tier advisors improves their 
clients’ bargaining power in negotiation process. As a result, this chapter establishes the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: The number of top-tier advisors retained by acquirers is negatively related to takeover 
premiums. 
 
3.4. Data and Methodology 
3.4.1. Sample Selection 
This chapter analyses a sample of US domestic M&As announced over the period 1st 
January 1990 to 31st December 2012.The M&As deal information is acquired from 
Thomson One Banker. The original sample includes 203,005 deals. Deal status is required 
to be completed or unconditional, leading to a sample of 158,507 deals. Acquirer public 
status is required to be public, which leaves 73,932 deals. To calculate bid premium, 
targets are required to be publicly listed firms, yielding a sample of 11,294 deals. This 
chapter excludes acquisitions with transaction values lower than $1 million, which yields a 
sample of 9803 deals. Bankruptcy acquisitions, going-private transactions, leveraged 
buyouts, liquidations, repurchases, restructurings, reverse takeovers, and privatizations are 
excluded from the sample, leaving a panel of 6778 observations. Since this chapter 
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focuses on the effects of financial advisors, acquirers are required to have their advisor 
information recorded by Thomson One Banker, yielding 4119 deals. This chapter 
excludes deals that do not have sufficient data to calculate bid premium, leaving 3681 
observations. To control for deal characteristics and firm characteristics, observations are 
required to report transaction value, payment method information, and pre-deal ownership 
to Thomson One Banker; and have sufficient accounting data in the Compustat and stock 
price information in the CRSP. These requirements yield a final sample of 3430 deals. In 
the final sample, 3188 transactions are advised by investment banks, while 242 
transactions are in-house deals (recorded as ‘no investment bank retained’ by Thomson 
One Banker). 
 
3.4.2. Methodology 
3.4.2.1. Measure of Advisor Reputation 
Chapter 1 has explained the binary classification of advisor reputation. This chapter uses 
the same methodology to distinguish between top-tier (top 10) and non-top-tier advisors. 
Since the rankings gradually changed and some banks merged over the sample period, 
advisor reputation is measured over the two periods 1990–1999 and 2000–2012, 
respectively.11 Although the ranking of investment banks over the two periods are 
different, the top 10 investment banks are the same. Specifically, top-tier investment banks 
include Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America Merrill Lynch12, JP Morgan, 
Citi13, Credit Suisse14, Barclays15, Lazard, UBS and Deutsche Bank. 
                                                 
11 Appendix 3.1 shows the top 25 investment banks ranked by transaction value. Financial advisor league 
tables were downloaded from Thomson One Banker. The ranking list for the 1990s and 2000s are presented 
in Panel A and B, respectively. 
12 Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch and began rebranding under the name of Bank of America 
Merrill Lynch in 2009. 
13 Travelers Group acquired Salomon Brothers (top-tier) in 1998 and subsequently merged with Citicorp the 
same year, establishing Citigroup. 
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3.4.2.2. Measure of Takeover Premium 
Premium acquired from Thomson One Banker is calculated as the percentage difference 
between offer price and target stock price prior to announcement, where the pre-deal target 
price is taken four weeks, one week and one day prior to the acquisition announcement 
date. Specifically, ‘Bid Premium (four weeks prior to announcement)’ is calculated as the 
difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price four weeks prior to the 
announcement divided by the target’s stock price four weeks prior to the announcement, 
expressed as the following equation: 
𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 (4 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
=
𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 4 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 4 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
 
‘Bid Premium (one week prior to announcement)’ is calculated as the difference between 
the deal price and the target’s stock price one week prior to the announcement divided by 
the target’s stock price 1 week prior to the announcement, expressed as the following 
equation: 
𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 (𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
=
𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 1 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 1 𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
 
‘Bid Premium (one day prior to announcement)’ is calculated as the difference between the 
deal price and the target’s stock price one day prior to the announcement divided by the 
target’s stock price one day prior to the announcement, expressed as the following 
equation: 
                                                                                                                                            
14 First Boston was acquired by Credit Suisse in 1990. 
15 Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy in 2008 and was acquired by Barclays Capital the same year. 
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 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 (1 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
=
𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 1 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 1 𝑑𝑎𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 
 
If Thomson One Banker reports the premium, this chapter will use the value recorded by 
the database. If the premium is missing in the database, this chapter will calculate the ratio 
based on above formulas, when the data is adequate. To avoid the influence of information 
leakage, the literature (Officer, 2003; Chahine and Ismail, 2009; Fich, Cai and Tran, 2011) 
tends to use premium of offer price to target price four weeks prior to the announcement. 
This chapter focuses on the bid premium four weeks prior to the announcement, and uses 
bid premium one week/one day prior to announcement as the robustness check. 
 
In the vein of Schwert (1996), Bodnaruk, Massa and Simonov (2009) and Fich, Cai and 
Tran (2011), this chapter also uses target cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement as the proxy of target premium. Specifically, target announcement CARs 
are calculated by using a market model. The market model is shown as follows: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
where Rit is the daily stock return for firm I on date t and Rmt is the daily return for the 
value-weighted CRSP index on date t. The market model parameters are estimated over the 
pre-event window [-365, -28]. Subsequently, market model CARs are calculated over a [T1, 
T2] window around announcements, as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1𝑇2 = ∑ [𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡)]
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
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3.4.2.3. Measure of Cost Reduction 
If top-tier financial advisors have superior skills and therefore can help their clients gain 
stronger bargaining power in negotiation processes, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
will pay a lower bid premium than other acquirers. However, deals with top-tier advisor 
involvement require significantly higher total advisory fees. Hence, there is a concern that 
overpayment of advisory fees could offset cost saving in bid premiums. Therefore, this 
chapter calculates cost reduction to examine whether cost saving in bid premiums can 
cover advisory fees. 
 
In this chapter, cost reduction is defined as the sum of the reduction in the costs of bid 
premium and acquirer total advisory fees. Cost Reduction is calculated by the following 
equation: 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡
= −𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 
where Abnormal Dollar Premiumit is the abnormal dollar premium paid by acquirer I on date t; 
and Abnormal Advisory Feesit is the abnormal advisory fees paid by acquirer I on date t. 
 
Abnormal Dollar Premium is calculated as: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡
= 𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 × 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 
where Target Market Valueit is the market value for target I on date t;16 and Abnormal Bid 
Premiumit is the abnormal bid premium paid by acquirer I on date t. 
 
Abnormal Premium is calculated as: 
                                                 
16 Target Market Value is the market value of target firm measured four weeks before the announcement 
(CRSP item PRC×SHROUT).  
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𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑗𝑡 
where Bid Premiumit is the bid premium paid by acquirer I on date t; and Bid Premiumpt is 
the mean bid premium for the reference portfolio p at year t.17  
 
Abnormal total advisory fees is calculated as: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
= 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑡 
where Total Advisory Feesit is the total advisory fees paid by acquirer I on date t; and Total 
advisory Feespt is the mean acquirer total advisory fees for the reference portfolio p at year 
t.  
 
To minimize the influence of extreme outliers, the variables used in the above formulas, 
including Bid Premiumit, Total Advisory Feesit, and Target Market Valueit, are winsorized 
at the 2% and 98% levels, when Cost Reductionit is calculated. 
 
Reference portfolios are constructed in each year based on transaction value, relative size, 
acquirer firm size, acquirer industry and target industry. More specifically, this chapter 
constructs five reference portfolios – TV_Quintile, RS_Quintile, AMV_Quintile, A_Ind, 
and T_Ind. TV_Quintile refers to a reference portfolio that is constructed based on 
transaction value quintile. RS_Quintile refers to a reference portfolio that is constructed 
based on relative size quintile. AMV_Quintile refers to a reference portfolio that is 
constructed based on acquirer market value quintile. A_Ind refers to a reference portfolio 
that is constructed based on acquirer industry. T_Ind refers to a reference portfolio that is 
constructed based on target industry. 
                                                 
17 Bid premium is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks 
prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement. 
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3.4.2.4. Regression Analysis 
To interpret the source of outperformance of acquirers advised by top-tier advisors, this 
chapter investigates whether top-tier advisors can help acquirers pay lower bid premium, 
whether top-tier advisors charge premium fees, and whether top-tier advisors spend a 
shorter time completing deals. In this chapter, the key explanatory variables are the same 
as the last chapter. Specifically, TopTieri equals one if acquirer i retains at least one top-tier 
advisor for the deal, and zero otherwise. No. of TopTieri equals the number of top-tier 
advisors retained by the acquirer i for the deal. In addition to these two key explanatory 
variables, No. of Advisorsi equals the total number of advisors retained by the acquirer i for 
the deal. InHousei equals one if acquirer i does not retain any advisors for the deal, and 
zero otherwise. This chapter also includes a series of control variables that influence bid 
premiums, advisory fees and time-to-completion. Specifically, Firmi represents the firm 
characteristics of acquirer i at the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement, and 
Deali represents the deal characteristics of acquirer i. Firm and deal characteristics that are 
used in this chapter will be shown later in this section. This research also controls for year 
fixed effects (ft) and industry fixed effects (find.). To minimize the influence of outliers, all 
continuous variables are winsorized at 2% and 98%.18 
 
3.4.2.4.1. Takeover Premiums 
If top-tier financial advisors have superior skills, they can help their clients gain greater 
bargaining power in negotiations processes, thereby paying a lower bid premium. If 
acquirers pay lower bid premiums, they will gain more shares of synergies. Intuitively, 
different acquirers in different situations have different bargaining positions. It is 
                                                 
18 Results hold when the variables are winsorized at different levels, such as 1% and 99%, 3% and 97%, and 
5% and 95%. 
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necessary to control for firm and deal characteristics. Therefore, this chapter examines the 
effects of top-tier advisors on bid premium by following OLS regression: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛼5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
Furthermore, if multiple top-tier advisors can work collectively to improve performance, 
acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors will pay lower bid premiums than acquirers 
advised by single top-tier advisors. In other words, the number of top-tier advisors 
retained by acquirers will be negatively related to bid premium. In contrast, if multiple 
top-tier advisors suffer from social loafing, the effects of multiple top-tier advisors on bid 
premium will be insignificant. 
Therefore, this chapter examines the relations between the number of top-tier advisors 
retained and the bid premium by following OLS regression: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
 
3.4.2.4.2. Advisory Fees 
If top-tier advisors have superior skills and provide a superior service, it is reasonable that 
they charge premium fees. Otherwise, overpayment leads to negative market reactions. 
Furthermore, advisory fees are deal-specific. In other words, deal complexity determines 
the advisory fees (McLaughlin, 1990). Since advisory fees are censored data, a Tobit 
model should be used. Therefore, this chapter examines whether top-tier advisors charge 
much higher advisory fees; and whether an increase in the number of top-tier advisors 
retained results in overpayment by following Tobit regressions: 
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𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖
+ 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1N𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛼4𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
 
3.4.2.4.3. Time to Completion 
Contingent fees stimulate advisors to complete deals rather than chase performance. It is 
necessary to examine whether top-tier advisors rush to complete deals. If top-tier advisors 
have superior skills, it is reasonable that they use less time to complete deals than 
non-top-tier advisors. If top-tier advisors spend more time on takeover advisory services, it 
suggests that top-tier advisors work diligently. The speed of deal completion could be 
affected by the complexity of deals and acquirer skills. This chapter expect that acquirers 
who have more past M&A experience will be more skilful, and therefore use acquirer past 
experience as the proxy of acquirer M&A skills. Past experience is measured as the number 
of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in 
question. Since the time to completion is a non-negative integer, Poisson regression or negative 
binomial regression should be used. Poisson regression will not be reliable if the variance of 
the dependent variable is much larger than its expected value. Given the presence of 
overdispersion in the time to completion, the negative binomial regression should be used. This 
chapter examine whether top-tier advisors use less time to complete deals by following 
negative binomial regression: 
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𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
In addition, if multiple top-tier advisors suffer from social loafing, they will use more time 
to complete deals. Therefore, this chapter examines the relations between number of 
top-tier advisors and time-to-completion by following negative binomial regression: 
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝑇𝑜𝑝𝑇𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑁𝑜. 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐼𝑛𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑖
+ 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
 
3.4.2.4.4. Control Variables: Firm and Deal Characteristics 
The control variables in this chapter include firm and deal characteristics.19 For firm 
characteristics (Firmi), this chapter controls for size (Ln(MV)), market-to-book ratio (M/B), 
leverage (Leverage), cash flow-to-equity ratio (Cash flows/Equity), pre-deal stock 
performance (RUNUP), pre-deal percentage ownership (Pre-deal Ownership), and 
acquirer takeover experience (Past Experienced).  
 
For deal characteristics (Deali), this chapter controls for deal size (Ln(TV)), relative 
transaction values (Relative Size), acquirer public status (Public), payment method 
(Cash/Stock), deal attitude (Hostile), bid competition (Competing Bid), tender offers 
(Tender offer) and diversifying deals (Diversification).  
 
                                                 
19 All the control variables mentioned in this section are described in Appendix 3.2, where Panels A and B 
present firm characteristics and deal characteristics, respectively. 
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3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Summary Statistics and Univariate Test 
3.5.1.1. Entire Sample 
Table 3.1 exhibits summary statistics for the entire sample and the univariate comparison 
between deals advised by investment banks and in-house deals. The sample is made up of 
US public acquisitions during 1990–2012. In the sample, in-house deals and deals with 
advisor involvement account for 7.06% and 92.94% of the sample, respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 3.1 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows the deal characteristics. For the entire sample, the mean and 
median bid premiums (4w)20 are 46.32% and 33.29%, respectively. These results are 
consistent with the existing studies. For example, Officer (2003) showed that the mean 
(median) premium calculated based on final offer price is 48.65% (41.96%), and the mean 
(median) premium calculated based on initial offer price is 47.83% (40.49%). For 
Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), the mean and median premiums are 42.38% and 
34.36%, respectively. The difference in mean premium between deals advised by banks 
and in-house deals is insignificant. This result is influenced by outliers. If the variable is 
winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels, the difference in mean premium between deals 
advised by banks and in-house deals will become significant. Specifically, acquirers 
advised by banks will pay 4.46% (p=0.098) lower bid premium on average, compared to 
in-house acquirers. In addition, the median bid premiums (4w) for deals advised by banks 
and in-house deals are 33.15% and 35.65%, respectively; the difference is also significant 
(p=0.068). These results show that acquirers advised by banks pay lower bid premium 
                                                 
20 Bid premium (4w) is premium of offer price to target stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement.  
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than in-house acquirers, suggesting that advisors can help their clients gain bargaining 
advantage in negotiation processes. For the entire sample, the mean (median) Premium 
(1w)21 is 40.58% (28.84%), and the mean (median) Premium (1d)22 is 35.77% (25.01%). 
In other words, the mean (median) bid premium (4w) is higher than the mean (median) 
bid premium (1w), and the mean (median) bid premium (1w) is higher than the mean 
(median) bid premium (1d), which indicate that target stock price steadily increase over 
the four weeks prior to takeover announcement, reflecting the influence of information 
leakage.  
 
This chapter uses target announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as the proxy of 
target premium. The mean (median) target CAR for deals advised by banks over the 
three-day event window is 19.08% (14.49%); whereas the mean (median) target CAR for 
in-house deals over the three-day event window is 23.75% (18.09%). The differences in 
mean (median) target CARs are significant. These results indicate that deals advised by 
banks generate lower target premiums than in-house deals generate. Lower target 
premiums suggest that advisors help acquirers gain bargaining advantage and secure more 
shares of synergies. These results concur with the results of bid premiums. 
 
The mean (median) time-to-completion for deals advised by banks and in-house deals are 
135.21 (118.00), and 143.36 (134.00), respectively. The difference in median 
time-to-completion is significant. These results indicate that acquirers advised by banks 
use less time to complete deals compared to in-house acquirers.  
 
                                                 
21 Bid premium (1w) is premium of offer price to target stock price 1 week prior to the announcement. 
22 Bid premium (1d) is premium of offer price to target stock price 1 day prior to the announcement. 
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The mean (median) transaction value for deals advised by banks and in-house deals are 
$1724.65 million ($287.33 million) and $410.68 million ($93.01 million), respectively; 
and the differences are statistically significant. The transaction value is much greater for 
deals advised by banks than for in-house deals. Similarly, the relative size of deals advised 
by banks is also significantly larger than the relative size of in-house deals. All-stock deals, 
all-cash deals and mixed paid deals account for 41.11%, 28.89% and 30.00% of the entire 
sample, respectively. Compared to in-house acquirers, acquirers advised by banks make 
significantly fewer all-stock deals but more mixed paid deals. In addition, acquirers 
advised by banks conduct a higher percentage of hostile deals and tender offers, and are 
involved in a higher percentage of competing bids compared to in-house acquirers. For the 
entire sample, 29.36% of deals are diversifying deals. In terms of diversification, the 
difference between acquirers advised by banks and in-house acquirers is insignificant. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents firm characteristics of acquirers. For the entire sample, the 
mean (median) acquirer market value is $11341.11 million ($1473.85 million). The mean 
(median) market-to-book ratio is 6.61 (2.38). The mean (median) leverage ratio is 0.38 
(0.37). The mean and median cash flows-to-equity ratio is 0.06 (0.05). The mean (median) 
stock price runup is 13.09% (8.01%), respectively. Compared to in-house acquirers, 
acquirers advised by banks have significantly smaller firm size, lower market-to-book 
ratio, lower leverage ratio, higher cash flows-to-equity ratio, and higher stock-price run-up. 
These results suggest that in-house deals tend to be conducted by large firms, value firms, 
low-debt firms, and firms with better operating and stock performance. Pre-deal 
ownership of target shares average 2.79%. In terms of pre-deal ownership, the difference 
between acquirers advised by banks and in-house acquirers is insignificant. On average, 
acquirers advised by banks and in-house acquirers conducted 7.89 and 15.12 deals 
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respectively over the five-year period prior to the acquisition announcement. The 
difference is significant. In other words, the in-house acquirers are more experienced. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.1 shows financial advisor related information for deals advised by 
banks. The mean and median acquirer total advisory fees are $4.75 million and $1.70 
million, respectively. Acquirers advised by banks retain 1.20 advisors on average. 
 
Overall, Table 3.1 shows that in-house acquirers spend more time completing deals and 
pay higher bid premiums than acquirers advised by banks. In-house deals also create more 
target premiums. These results suggest that advisors are able to complete deals in a shorter 
length of time, help their acquirer clients gain greater bargaining power in negotiation 
processes, and therefore secure more shares of synergies. In other words, investment 
banks have stronger professional skills than in-house experts.  
 
3.5.1.2. Sub-Sample of Deals Advised by Advisors 
Table 3.2 shows summary statistics for the sub-sample of deals advised by investment 
banks and the univariate comparison between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier 
advisors. In acquisitions advised by banks, 53.86% and 46.14% of deals are advised by 
top-tier and non-top-tier advisors, respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 3.2 here] 
 
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents deal characteristics for the sub-sample of deals advised by 
banks. In terms of mean bid premium, the differences between deals advised by top-tier 
and non-top-tier advisors are insignificant. Outliers influence the results. After 
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winsorization,23 acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay lower bid premiums (4w), 
lower bid premiums (1w), and lower bid premiums (1d) than acquirers advised by 
non-top-tier advisors by 3.54% (p=0.0114), 3.08% (p=0.0118), and 2.89% (p=0.0118) 
respectively, on average. In addition, median bid premium (4w), bid premium (1w) and 
bid premium (1d) for deals advised by top-tier advisors are 32.50%, 27.91%, and 23.90%, 
respectively; whereas median bid premium (4w), bid premium (1w) and bid premium (1d) 
for deals advised by non-top-tier advisors are 34.14%%, 29.47% and 25.97%, respectively. 
The differences in median bid premiums between deals advised by top-tier and 
non-top-tier advisors are statistically significant. Therefore, the above results suggest that 
top-tier advisors can help their clients pay lower bid premiums.  
 
Although the median time-to-completion is significantly longer for deals advised by 
non-top-tier advisors than for deals advised by top-tier advisors, acquirers advised by 
top-tier advisors do not use shorter time to complete deals on average.  
 
The mean and median transaction values for deals advised by top-tier advisors are 
$2692.27 million and $627.47 million, respectively; whereas the mean and median 
transaction value for deals advised by non-top-tier advisors are $595.21 million and 
$106.88 million, respectively. Acquirers advised by top-tier advisors make significantly 
larger deals than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. However, the relative size is 
significantly smaller for deals advised by top-tier advisors than non-top-tier advisors. In 
deals advised by top-tier advisors, all-stock deals, all-cash deals and mixed paid deals 
account for 33.61%, 32.03%, and 34.36%, respectively. In contrast, 46.84%, 25.63%, and 
27.53% of deals are all-stock deals, all-cash deals and mixed deals, respectively. Acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors conduct a lower percentage of all-stock deals but a higher 
                                                 
23 Variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. 
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percentage of all-cash deals and mixed paid deals, compared to acquirers advised by 
non-top-tier advisors. Acquirers advised by top-tier advisors make a significantly higher 
percentage of hostile deals than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors (2.10% versus 
0.82%). Competing bid accounts for 4.19% and 2.86% of deals advised by top-tier and 
non-top-tier advisors, respectively; the difference is statistically significant. 26.38% of 
deals advised by top-tier advisors are tender offers, whereas 20.19% of deals advised by 
non-top-tier advisors are tender offers. Diversifying deals occupy 31.33% and 27.19% of 
deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors, respectively; the difference is 
significant. Therefore, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors make larger transactions, 
more hostile deals, more tender offers, and more diversifying deals compared to acquirers 
advised by non-top-tier advisors. In other words, top-tier advisors are more likely to 
involve deals with greater complexity. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.2 presents acquirer firm characteristics for the sub-sample of deals 
advised by banks. In terms of market value, the acquirers advised by top-tier advisors are 
$11979.33 million (p=0.000) larger than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors on 
average, while the median acquirer advised by top-tier advisors is $3000.26 million 
(p=0.000) larger than the median acquirer advised by non-top-tier advisors. The median 
market-to-book ratio for acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors are 2.54 
and 2.07, respectively; the difference is significant. The median cash flows-to-equity ratio 
for acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors are 0.06 and 0.05, respectively; 
the difference is significant. On average, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors make 4.15 
(p=0.000) more deals than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors over the five-year 
period prior to the acquisition announcement. In other words, more experienced acquirers 
tend to retain top-tier advisors. The differences in leverage ratio, stock price run-up, and 
pre-deal ownership between acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors are 
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insignificant. Therefore, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors tend to be larger firms, 
more glamour firms, firms with higher cash flows, and more experienced acquirers. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.2 presents financial advisors related information for the sub-sample of 
deals advised by banks. On average, acquirers that retain top-tier advisors employ 1.30 
advisors, while acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors employ 1.08 advisors for one 
deal. In other words, the financial advisory team are larger for acquirers advised by 
top-tier advisors than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. Furthermore, the mean 
(median) total advisory fees paid by acquirers advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors 
are $7.90 million ($4.00 million) and $1.89 million ($0.75 million), respectively. On 
average, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors paid 4.18 times higher total advisory fees 
than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors in public acquisition. 
 
Overall, Table 3.2 shows that top-tier financial advisors can help their clients pay lower 
bid premiums, indicating that top-tier advisors play a pivotal role in the negotiation 
process to help their clients secure a higher proportion of synergies, even though top-tier 
advisors are retained for more complex deals.  
 
3.5.1.3. Sub-Sample of Deals Advised by Top-Tier Advisors 
Table 3.3 shows summary statistics for the sub-sample of deals advised by top-tier 
investment banks and the univariate comparison between deals advised by a single top-tier 
advisor and multiple top-tier advisors. In deals advised by top-tier advisors, 11.01% of 
acquirers retain more than one top-tier bank in one deal.  
 
[Insert Table 3.3 here] 
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Panel A of Table 3.3 presents deal characteristics for the sub-sample of deals advised by 
top-tier advisors. The mean (median) bid premium (4w), bid premium (1w), and bid 
premium (1d) for deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors are 27.65% (27.47%), 24.80% 
(22.63%) and 22.57% (19.63%), respectively. In contrast, the mean (median) bid premium 
(4w), bid premium (1w), and bid premium (1d) for deals advised by a single top-tier 
advisor are 47.13% (33.33%), 42.03% (28.53%) and 36.92% (24.47%), respectively. The 
differences in bid premiums between deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors and a 
single top-tier advisor are highly significant. These results show that acquirers advised by 
multiple top-tier advisors pay significantly lower bid premiums than acquirers advised by 
a single top-tier advisor.  
 
In addition, the mean and median target CARs [-1, 1] for deals advised by multiple 
top-tier advisors are 13.97% and 9.87%, respectively; while the mean and median target 
CARs [-1, 1] for deals advised by a single top-tier advisor are 20.14% and 15.45%, 
respectively. The differences in target CARs between deals advised by multiple top-tier 
advisors and a single top-tier advisor are highly significant. These results show that deals 
advised by multiple top-tier advisors generate significantly lower target premiums than 
deals advised by a single top-tier advisor. 
 
On average, acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors use 26.94 more days to 
complete deals than acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. The median acquirers 
advised by multiple top-tier advisors spend 24 more days to complete deals than the 
median acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor.  
 
The mean and median transaction values for deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors 
are $7917.70 million and $3130.88 million, respectively; whereas the mean and median 
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transaction values for deals advised by a single top-tier advisors are $2045.93 million and 
$512.67 million, respectively. The difference in transaction value between deals advised 
by multiple top-tier advisors and a single top-tier advisor are statistically significant. On 
average, the transaction values for deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors are 3.87 
times as high as transaction value for deals advised by a single top-tier advisor. In addition, 
the mean (median) relative size for deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors is also 
significantly higher than the mean (median) relative size for deals advised by a single 
top-tier advisor. Acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors conduct a lower 
percentage (14.57%, p=0.000) of all-stock deals, and a higher percentage (19.65%, 
p=0.000) of mixed paid deals, compared to acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. 
Diversifying deals account for 23.28% and 32.33% of deals advised by multiple top-tier 
advisors and a single top-tier advisor, respectively. In other words, acquirers advised by 
multiple top-tier advisors make significantly less percentage (9.05%, p=0.007) of 
diversifying deals than acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. In terms of deal 
attitude, bid competition, and tender offer, the difference is insignificant between deals 
advised by multiple top-tier advisors and a single top-tier advisor. 
 
Panel B of Table 3.3 presents acquirer firm characteristics for the sub-sample of deals 
advised by top-tier advisors. The mean (median) market value for acquirers advised by 
multiple top-tier advisors is $22432.74 million ($8828.10 million), while the mean 
(median) market value for acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor is $15188.02 
million ($3120.94 million). Firm size is significantly larger for acquirers advised by 
multiple top-tier advisors than acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. Additionally, 
acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors have a significantly lower market-to-book 
ratio, higher leverage ratio, and a higher cash flows-to-equity ratio. In terms of stock price 
runup, pre-deal ownership and past M&A experience, the differences between acquirers 
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advised by multiple top-tier advisors and a single top-tier advisor are statistically 
insignificant. These results indicate that acquirers that retain multiple top-tier advisors tend 
to be large firms, value firms, firms with higher debt ratio, and firms with better operating 
performance. 
 
Panel C of Table 3.3 presents financial advisor related information for the sub-sample of 
deals advised by top-tier advisors. Predictably, acquirers advised by multiple top-tier 
advisors retain significantly more financial advisors for a deal, compared to acquirers 
advised by a single top-tier advisor. In addition, mean (median) total advisory fees for 
acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors and a single top-tier advisor are $20.97 
million ($15.00 million) and $6.11 million ($3.50 million), respectively. Acquirers 
advised by multiple top-tier advisors pay 3.43 times higher total advisory fees than 
acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor on average.  
 
Overall, multiple top-tier advisors are retained by large firms in large deals. Multiple 
top-tier advisors spend more time than a single top-tier advisor to help their clients 
complete deals. This result is not difficult to interpret, since the interaction between 
advisors increase the deal complexity (Hunter and Jagtiani, 2003), and large deals are 
more complex to conduct. Importantly, multiple top-tier advisors help their clients pay 
lower bid premiums than a single top-tier advisor would. Additionally, deals advised by 
multiple top-tier advisors generate significantly lower target premiums, compared to deals 
advised by a single top-tier advisor. These results suggest that multiple top-tier advisors 
can cooperate effectively to improve acquirer bargaining power and secure more shares of 
synergy for their clients.  
 
 128 
 
3.5.2. Regression Analysis 
Since univariate tests do not take the interaction of alternative variables into consideration, 
the results could be unreliable. To examine the net effects of the two key explanatory 
variables, TopTier and No. of TopTier, multivariate regressions are conducted. 
Subsequently, this chapter examines how top-tier advisors influence takeover premiums, 
advisory fees and time-to-completion. 
 
3.5.2.1. Takeover Premiums 
3.5.2.1.1. Bid Premium 
Table 3.4 presents the results of regression analysis of bid premium (4w). Specifications 1 
and 2 represent the regressions of bid premium on the TopTier dummy. Specifications 3 
and 4 represent the regressions of bid premium on the variable No. of TopTier. 
Specifications 5 and 6 represent the regressions of bid premium on the InHouse dummy. 
In specifications 1, 3, and 5, deal characteristics are controlled for. In specifications 2, 4, 
and 6, in addition to deal characteristics, acquirer firm characteristics are controlled for. 
 
[Insert Table 3.4 here] 
 
In specifications 1 and 2, the coefficients on the TopTier dummy are significantly negative, 
indicating that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay lower bid premiums to targets. 
Lower premiums suggest that acquirers can gain higher portions of synergies. After firm 
and deal characteristics are controlled for, top-tier advisors help acquirers lower bid 
premiums by 4.09%.  
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In specifications 3 and 4, the coefficients on the variable No. of TopTier are also 
significantly negative, indicating that an increase in the number of top-tier advisors 
retained is associated with a decrease in bid premium paid. These results are consistent 
with the previous results of a univariate test that acquirers advised by multiple top-tier 
advisors pay lower bid premium than acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. The 
empirical evidence suggests that multiple top-tier advisors can work collectively to 
enhance their clients’ barraging power. In other words, multiple top-tier advisors do not 
suffer from social loafing, but cooperate effectively, thereby improving performance. 
 
In specifications 5 and 6, the InHouse dummy is insignificant, indicating that acquirers 
who conduct in-house deals do not pay lower bid premiums. In other words, in-house 
acquirers cannot gain bargaining advantage in the negotiation process. 
 
Interestingly, the coefficients on the variable No. of Advisors are significantly negative in 
specifications 1, 2, 5, and 6, but insignificant in specifications 3 and 4. In other words, the 
variable No. of Advisors loses its significance in the presence of the variable No. of 
TopTier, indicating that the significant results of the variable No. of Advisors in 
specifications 1, 2, 5 and 6 are driven by the effects of the variable No. of TopTier. The 
empirical evidence suggests that the retention of more advisors does not contribute to the 
reduction of bid premium, whereas top-tier advisors play the pivotal role in helping their 
clients gain stronger bargaining power in negotiation processes, thereby paying a lower 
premium. The direct comparison between the variable No. of Advisors and the variable No. 
of TopTier reflects that top-tier advisors rather than non-top-tier advisors have superior 
skills and can cooperate effectively. 
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Furthermore, the variable Ln(TV) is significantly negative in specifications 2, 4, 5 and 6, 
indicating that bid premiums are lower when the transaction value is large in absolute 
terms. By comparison, the variable Relative Size is significantly positive in specifications 
2, 4 and 6, indicating that target firms have stronger bargaining power when the relative 
size of deal is large, and therefore charge higher bid premiums. The Cash dummy and the 
Stock dummy are significantly negative in all of the specifications, indicating that 
acquirers in all-cash and all-stock deals pay lower bid premiums compared to acquirers in 
mixed paid deals. One possible explanation is that targets prefer all-cash or all-stock 
payments to mix payments, and therefore allow for a lower bid premium. The Hostile 
dummy is significantly positive in all the specifications, indicating that acquirers pay a 
higher bid premium in hostile deals. To complete hostile deals, acquirers pay about 10.89% 
to 12.38% higher bid premiums than acquirers in friendly deals. The Competing Bid 
dummy is significantly positive in all the specifications, indicating that acquirers need to 
pay higher premiums when multiple bidders are competing to win the bidding. Bid 
competition lowers the bargaining power of acquirers, but enhances the bargaining power 
of targets. To win the bidding, acquirers have to pay about 14.05% to 14.96% higher 
premiums, compared to acquirers of the mergers where there is a sole bidder. The 
Diversification dummy is significantly positive, indicating that acquirers pay higher bid 
premiums in diversifying deals. Diversification implies that acquirers expand their 
business in a new area that they are unfamiliar with. In such a situation, targets are more 
likely to charge higher premiums. Acquirers pay about 4.08% to 5.50% higher bid 
premiums in diversifying deals. The Tender Offer dummy is insignificant, suggesting that 
there is no significant difference in bid premiums between tender offers and mergers. 
Officer (2003) suggests that acquirers pay higher bid premiums in tender offers. However, 
Officer (2003) examines deals over the period 1988 to 2000, whereas this research 
analyses deals with the period from 1990 to 2012. In other words, the inconsistent results 
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may be driven by differences in the sample periods. The results also suggest that acquirers 
did not pay higher premiums during the 2000s. 
 
In addition, the variable Ln(MV) is significantly positive in all the specifications, 
indicating that large acquirers pay higher bid premiums. The result suggests that large 
firms are willing to acquire targets at a premium to achieve deal success. Initially, this 
chapter predicts that more experienced acquirers are more professional and are more likely 
to gain an advantage in negotiations, thereby paying lower bid premiums. However, the 
variable Past Experience is insignificant, indicating that experienced acquirers do not gain 
bargaining advantage. The variable Pre-deal Ownership is significantly negative in 
specification 6, indicating that acquirers that own a greater proportion of target stocks 
prior to acquisition pay lower bid premiums. It is reasonable that acquirers with higher 
pre-deal ownership have greater bargaining power.  
 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present the results of regression analysis of bid premium (1w) and bid 
premium (1d), respectively. In both tables, the coefficients on the TopTier dummy are 
significantly negative, which suggests that the retention of top-tier advisors can help 
acquirers minimize bid premiums. More specifically, acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors pay a 3.16% lower bid premium (1w) and a 3.63% lower bid premium (1d) than 
acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors, after controlling for deal and firm 
characteristics. Furthermore, the coefficients on the variable No. of TopTier are also 
significantly positive, suggesting that the more top-tier advisors are retained, the lower the 
bid premiums paid are. These results reflect the superior skills of top-tier financial 
advisors and effective cooperation of multiple top-tier advisors.  
 
[Insert Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 here] 
 132 
 
 
In addition to the two key explanatory variables – TopTier and No. of TopTier – the results 
of other independent variables in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are consistent with their results in 
Table 3.4. Overall, these results are not sensitive to the different measures of bid 
premiums.  
 
3.5.2.1.2. Target Premium 
This chapter uses target cumulative abnormal returns around announcement as the proxy 
of target premium. Higher target premiums imply lower proportions of synergies gained 
by acquirers. Table 3.7 presents the results of the regression analysis of target CAR [-1, 1]. 
Specifications 1 and 2 represent the regressions of target CAR on the TopTier dummy. 
Specifications 3 and 4 represent the regressions of target CAR on the variable No. of 
TopTier. Specifications 5 and 6 represent the regressions of target CAR on the InHouse 
dummy. In specifications 1, 3, and 5, deal characteristics are controlled for. In 
specifications 2, 4, and 6, deal characteristics and acquirer firm characteristics are 
controlled for. 
 
[Insert Table 3.7 here] 
 
In specifications 1 and 2, the TopTier dummy is significantly negative, indicating that 
deals advised by top-tier advisors (acquirer side) generate lower target announcement 
returns. Specifically, the retention of top-tier advisors lowers target three-day 
announcement abnormal returns by 1.86%, after deal and firm characteristics are 
controlled for. Therefore, the results suggest that top-tier advisors can help their acquirer 
clients minimize target premium. 
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In specifications 3 and 4, the coefficients on the variable No. of TopTier are significantly 
negative, which suggest that an increase in the number of top-tier advisors retained by 
acquirers leads to a decrease in target announcement returns. In other words, multiple 
top-tier advisors effectively lower target premium, which is in the interest of acquirers. 
 
In specifications 5 and 6, the insignificant coefficients on the InHouse dummy suggest that 
deals with in-house expertise do not generate lower target premiums. 
 
In addition, the variable Relative Size is significantly negative in all the specifications, 
indicating that large deals generate lower target premium. The Stock dummy is 
significantly negative, which suggest that all-stock deal generate lower target premium 
than all-cash deals. The hostile dummy is significantly positive in all the specifications, 
indicating that hostile deals generate lower target premiums than friendly deals. The 
variable Diversification is significantly positive in all the specifications, suggesting that 
diversifying deals generate higher premiums than acquisitions of targets in the same 
industry. The variable Ln(MV) is significantly positive in specifications 1 and 3, which 
indicate that deals made by large firms generate higher target premiums. The variable 
pre-deal ownership is significantly negative in all the specifications, suggesting that the 
higher the proportion of target shares owned by acquirers prior to acquisition, the lower 
the target premium generated. 
 
Overall, the results of target CARs are consistent with the results of bid premiums, 
suggesting that top-tier advisors can help their clients secure more shares of synergies and 
multiple top-tier advisors can cooperate effectively to improve performance. 
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3.5.2.2. Acquirer Total Advisory Fees 
Table 3.8 presents the results of regression analysis of acquirer total advisory fees. 
Specifications 1 and 2 represent the regressions of acquirer total advisory fees on the 
Top-Tier dummy, and Specifications 3 and 4 represent the regressions of acquirer total 
advisory fees on the variable No. of TopTier. In specifications 1 and 3, deal characteristics 
are controlled for. In specifications 2 and 4, both deal characteristics and acquirer firm 
characteristics are controlled for. 
 
[Insert Table 3.8 here] 
 
In specifications 1 and 2, the coefficients on the TopTier dummy are significantly positive, 
suggesting acquirers that retain top-tier advisors will pay higher total advisory fees. In 
specifications 3 and 4, the coefficients on the variable No. of TopTier is significantly 
positive, indicating that the more top-tier advisors are retained by acquirers, the more total 
advisory fees are paid by acquirers. It is reasonable that prestigious investment banks 
charge higher advisory fees. In addition, the variable No. of Advisors is significantly 
positive in all of the specifications, suggesting that an increase in the number of advisors 
retained leads to greater total advisory fees to pay. 
 
Furthermore, both the variable Ln(TV) and the variable Relative Size are significantly 
positive in all of the specifications, indicating that acquirers pay higher advisory fees when 
deals are large. Additionally, the Hostile dummy is significantly positive in all of the 
specifications, which suggests that acquirers pay higher advisory fees for hostile deals 
than friendly deals. Indeed, large deals are more complex than small deals, and hostile 
deals are more complex than friendly deals. It is reasonable that advisors charge higher 
advisory fees for deals with greater complexity. The variable Past Experience is 
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significantly negative in all of the specifications, indicating that more experienced 
acquirers pay lower advisory fees. 
 
3.5.2.3. Time to Completion 
Table 3.9 presents the results of regression analysis of time-to-completion. Specifications 
1 and 2 represent the regression of time-to-completion on the Top-Tier dummy. 
Specifications 3 and 4 represent the regression of time-to-completion on the variable No. 
of TopTier. Specifications 5 and 6 represent the regression of time-to-completion on the 
InHouse dummy. In specifications 1, 3, and 5, deal characteristics are controlled for. In 
specifications 2, 4, and 6, both deal characteristics and acquirer firm characteristics are 
controlled for. 
 
[Insert Table 3.9 here] 
 
In specifications 1 and 2, the coefficients on the TopTier dummy is insignificant, 
indicating that top-tier advisors do not spend less time than non-top-tier advisors helping 
their clients complete deals. Similarly, in specifications 3 and 4, the coefficient on the 
variable No. of TopTier is also insignificant, indicating that an increase in top-tier advisors 
retained does not significantly shorten or extend time-to-completion. If top-tier advisors 
have superior skills, they will be able to complete deals in a shorter time than non-top-tier 
advisors. However, the insignificant coefficients on the TopTier dummy and the variable 
No. of TopTier suggest that top-tier advisors work diligently.  
 
In specification 5 and 6, the coefficient on InHouse dummy is significantly positive, 
indicating that in-house acquirers take longer than acquirers advised by investment banks 
to complete deals. This chapter also calculated the marginal effects of the InHouse dummy. 
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Specifically, in-house acquirers take 21.50 more days to complete deals compared to 
acquirers advised by banks, after controlling for deal and firm characteristics. This result is 
not difficult to explain, since financial advisors are more professional at making M&A 
deals compared to acquirers with in-house expertise. 
 
Additionally, the variable No. of Advisors is significantly positively related to 
time-to-completion in all of the specifications, suggesting that the more the advisors 
retained, the longer the time used to complete the deals. The result is consistent with 
Hunter and Jagtiani (2003). They explain this phenomenon by saying that retaining more 
advisors implies that a deal is more complex. 
 
Furthermore, the variable Relative Size is significantly positive in all of the specifications, 
indicating that acquirers take more time to complete large deals than small deals. Both the 
Cash dummy and Stock dummy are significantly negative, indicating that acquirers take 
less time on all-cash deals and all-stock deals than mixed paid deals. The Hostile dummy 
is significantly positive, indicating that acquirers use more time to complete hostile 
acquisition than friendly acquisition. The Competing Bid dummy is significantly positive, 
indicating that acquirers spend more time on the deals with bid competition. The variable 
Tender Offer is significantly negative, indicating that acquirers take less time conducting a 
tender offer. In fact, large targets, mixed payments, hostile attitude, and multiple bidder 
contests render acquisitions more complex and time-consuming.  
 
Interestingly, the variable Pre-deal Ownership is significantly positive in all of the 
specifications, which suggests that acquirers with higher pre-deal ownership use more 
time to complete deals. The variable Past Experience is insignificant in all of the 
specifications. Initially, this chapter predicted that more experienced acquirers are more 
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skilful and therefore could take less time to complete deals. However, more experienced 
acquirers do not significantly shorten the time-to-completion. The result suggests that 
more experienced acquirers are careful about due diligence and negotiations. 
 
3.5.3. Discussion 
Top-tier advisors can help acquirers pay a lower bid premium. Acquirers advised by 
multiple top-tier advisors even pay much lower bid premium than acquirers advised by a 
single top-tier advisor. These results suggest that top-tier advisors can help their clients to 
obtain a bargaining advantage in negotiation process. However, deals advised by top-tier 
investment banks require significantly higher total advisory fees. Hence, there is concern 
that overpayment could offset cost reduction in bid premium. In particular, the concern of 
overpayment will be more serious when multiple top-tier advisors are retained. Therefore, 
this chapter examines whether cost reduction in bid premiums can cover premium 
advisory fees. 
 
3.5.3.1. Deals Advised by Top-Tier Advisors versus Deals Advised by 
Non-Top-Tier Advisors 
Table 3.10 shows abnormal bid premium, abnormal acquirer total advisor fees, and 
acquirer cost reduction for deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors, and 
univariate comparison between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors.  
 
[Insert Table 3.10 here] 
 
Panel A presents abnormal bid premium. On average, transaction value-adjusted, relative 
size-adjusted, acquirer size-adjusted, acquirer industry-adjusted, and target 
industry-adjusted abnormal bid premiums are -1.63 (p=0.100), -3.72% (p=0.000), -2.51% 
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(p=0.012), -3.61% (p=0.000), and -4.02% (p=0.000), respectively. The result suggests that 
acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay significantly lower bid premiums than the 
reference groups, regardless of how the reference groups are constructed. In contrast, all of 
the mean abnormal bid premiums for deals advised by non-top-tier advisors are 
statistically insignificant. Specifically, the mean transaction value-adjusted, relative 
size-adjusted, acquirer size-adjusted, acquirer industry-adjusted, and target 
industry-adjusted abnormal bid premiums are -1.03 (p=0.398), -0.28% (p=0.815), -0.22% 
(p=0.855), -1.21% (p=0.313), and 1.67% (p=0.163), respectively. The result indicates that 
acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors do not pay significantly lower bid premiums 
than the reference groups. As a consequence, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay 
significantly lower relative size-adjusted, acquirer size-adjusted, acquirer 
industry-adjusted and target industry-adjusted abnormal bid premiums by 4.01% 
(p=0.011), 2.73% (p=0.083), 4.82% (p=0.002), and 5.69 (p=0.000), respectively. In 
addition, median abnormal bid premiums for deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier 
advisors are significantly negative, regardless of how the reference portfolios are 
constructed. However, the median relative size-adjusted, acquirer industry-adjusted and 
target industry-adjusted abnormal bid premiums for deals advised by top-tier advisors are 
significantly lower than those for deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. Overall, the 
above results are consistent with the regression analysis that acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors pay lower bid premiums than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors.  
 
Panel B presents abnormal total advisory fees for acquirers. Regardless of how the 
reference portfolios are constructed, all of the mean abnormal total advisory fees for 
acquirers are significantly positive, suggesting that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors 
pay higher advisory fees than the reference group. In contrast, every median abnormal 
total advisory fee is significantly negative except for the insignificant median acquirer 
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size-adjusted abnormal total advisory fees, suggesting that non-top-tier advisors pay lower 
advisory fees than the reference groups. Consequently, acquirers advised by top-tier 
advisors pay significantly higher advisory fees than acquirers advised by non-top-tier 
advisors on average. Specifically, the difference in mean transaction value-adjusted, 
relative size-adjusted, acquirer size-adjusted, acquirer industry-adjusted, and target 
industry-adjusted abnormal total advisory fees between deals advised by top-tier and 
non-top-tier advisors are $1.13 million (p=0.000), $4.64 million (p=0.000), $1.70 million 
(p=0.000), $3.51 million (p=0.000), and $3.48 million (p=0.000), respectively. In addition, 
the results on median values show the similar pattern. These results are consistent with the 
regression analysis that deals advised by top-tier advisors require higher advisory fees, 
compared to deals advised by non-top-tier advisors. 
 
Panel C presents cost reduction for acquirers. Based on transaction value, relative size, 
acquirer size, acquirer industry, and target industry reference groups, the mean (median) 
acquirer advised by top-tier advisors significantly reduces cost by $122.74 million ($27.67 
million), $199.23 million ($36.16 million), $167.94 million ($29.34 million), $158.83 
million ($18.25 million), and $181.48 million ($22.85 million), respectively, compared to 
acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. Therefore, top-tier advisors can help their 
acquirer clients greatly lower bid premium, although top-tier advisors charge much higher 
advisory fees. The savings in bid premium are significantly greater than expenses in 
advisory fees. Consequently, the retention of top-tier advisors leads to cost reduction. 
 
3.5.3.2 Deals Advised by Multiple Top-Tier Advisors versus Deals Advised 
by A Single Top-Tier Advisor 
Table 3.11 shows abnormal bid premium, abnormal acquirer total advisor fees, and 
acquirer cost reduction for deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors and a single top-tier 
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advisor, and univariate comparison between deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors 
and a single top-tier advisor. 
 
[Insert Table 3.11 here] 
 
Panel A presents abnormal bid premium. On average, acquirers advised by multiple 
top-tier advisors pay 7.59% (p=0.001) lower transaction value-adjusted, 10.74% (p=0.000) 
lower relative-size adjusted, 11.94% (p=0.000) lower acquirer size-adjusted, 9.65% 
(p=0.000) lower acquirer industry-adjusted, and 11.84% (p=0.000) lower target 
industry-adjusted abnormal bid premiums, compared to acquirers advised by a single 
top-tier advisor. In addition, the median acquirer advised by multiple top-tier advisors pay 
5.23% (p=0.008) lower relative-size adjusted, 6.68% (p=0.001) lower acquirer 
size-adjusted, 4.81% (p=0.017) lower acquirer industry-adjusted, and 9.42% (p=0.000) 
lower target industry-adjusted abnormal bid premiums, compared to median acquirers 
advised by a single top-tier advisor. These results are consistent with the regression 
analysis that the more top-tier advisors are retained, the lower the bid premiums paid. 
 
Panel B presents abnormal total advisory fees for acquirers. Regardless of how reference 
portfolios are constructed, acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors pay significantly 
higher abnormal total advisory fees than acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. 
Specifically, the difference in mean (median) transaction value-adjusted, relative 
size-adjusted, acquirer size-adjusted, acquirer industry-adjusted and target-industry 
adjusted abnormal total advisory fees between deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors 
and single top-tier advisor are $4.46 million ($4.70 million), $7.77 million ($9.05 million), 
$3.94 million ($3.46 million), $5.58 million ($5.95 million), and $4.91 million ($4.93 
million), respectively. These results are consistent with the regression analysis that 
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acquirer total advisory fees are positively related to the number of top-tier advisors 
retained. 
 
Panel C presents cost reduction for acquirers. Based on transaction value, relative size, 
acquirer size, acquirer industry, and target industry reference groups, the mean (median) 
acquirer advised by multiple top-tier advisors significantly reduce cost by $371.78 million 
($166.41 million), $599.17 million ($348.17 million), $555.69 million ($378.48 million), 
$511.73 million ($205.39 million), and $567.52 million ($270.84 million), respectively, 
compared to acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. These results indicate that the 
retention of multiple top-tier advisors leads to cost reduction rather than overpayment. 
 
3.5.4. Robustness Test 
This chapter address the robustness of results as follows. 
3.5.4.1. Takeover Premium 
To examine whether the results are robust, this chapter uses different measures of takeover 
premiums. Specifically, this chapter calculates bid premium of offer price to target price 
four weeks prior to the announcement, bid premium of offer price to target price one week 
prior to the announcement, and bid premium of offer price to target price one day prior to 
the announcement. In addition, this chapter uses target announcement CARs as the proxy 
of target premium, and calculates target CARs by using different event windows and 
valuation models. In addition to target CAR [-1, 1], this chapter also calculates target 
CARs over the [-2, 2] and [-5, 5] windows and measure the target CARs by using the 
market-adjusted return model, the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 
1993), and the Fama-French-momentum four-factor model (Fama and French, 1993; 
Carhart, 1997). The results are not sensitive to these variations. 
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3.5.4.2. Financial Advisor Classification 
In the same vein as the previous chapter, this chapter also evaluates whether the results are 
sensitive to different financial advisor classifications. Specifically, this chapter uses the 
top-five cut-off point by following the method of Rau (2000), the top-eight cut-off point 
by following the method of Golubov, Petmezas and Travlos (2012), and the top-fifteen 
cut-off point by following the method of Hunter and Jagtiani (2003). The results are robust 
to these classifications. 
 
3.5.4.3. Other Issues 
To control for the impact of outliers, this chapter also winsorizes all of the continuous 
variables at different levels, such as 1% and 99%, 3% and 97%, and 5% and 95%. In 
terms of sample selection, this chapter adds the restriction on regulated industries – 
financial firms (SIC codes 6000–6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 4900–4999). In 
addition to Tobit regression of advisory fees and negative binomial regression of 
time-to-completion, this chapter also applies OLS regression to examine the effects of 
top-tier advisors on total advisory fees and time-to-completion, and conduct Poisson 
regression of time-to-completion. To calculate abnormal bid premium, abnormal total 
advisory fees, and cost reduction, this chapter also constructs the reference portfolios by 
using transaction value deciles, relative size deciles, and acquirer market value deciles. 
However, the results are not sensitive to the variations mentioned above. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter explores whether top-tier financial advisors can help their acquirer clients 
enhance bargaining power, thereby minimizing takeover premiums. This chapter is also 
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interested in whether multiple top-tier advisors suffer from social loafing or can cooperate 
effectively in deal negotiations.  
 
Finally, this chapter finds that advisor reputation has a significant effect on takeover 
premiums. More specifically, through the retention of top-tier advisors, acquirers lower 
bid premiums (measured using target price four weeks prior to announcement) by 4.09%, 
after deal and firm characteristics are controlled for. In addition, an increase in the number 
of top-tier advisors retained by acquirers leads to a decrease in bid premiums. In other 
words, acquirers are advised by multiple top-tier advisors to pay lower bid premiums than 
acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. Interestingly, the number of advisors 
retained by acquirers loses its significance in the presence of the number of top-tier 
advisors. The direct comparison between the coefficients on the number of top-tier 
advisors and the number of advisors highlights top-tier advisors’ superior ability to help 
their clients enhance bargaining power.  
 
In addition, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors do not take less time to complete deals, 
compared to acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. The result suggests that top-tier 
advisors work diligently. 
 
This chapter also confirms that advisor reputation is positively related to acquirer advisory 
fees. Specifically, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay significantly higher advisory 
fees than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors, and acquirers advised by multiple 
top-tier advisors pay significantly higher advisory fees than acquirers advised by a single 
top-tier advisor. These results raise the concern that negative effects of overpayment in 
advisory fees could offset positive effects of takeover premium reduction. To address this 
issue, this chapter defines cost reduction as the difference between decreases in cost of 
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takeover premiums and increases in cost of advisory fees. Finally, this chapter finds that 
top-tier advisors greatly contribute to cost reduction. Specifically, acquirers advised by 
top-tier advisors reduce cost by about $122.74 million to $199.23 million on average, 
compared to acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. Acquirers advised by multiple 
top-tier advisors reduce cost about $371.78 million to $567.52 million on average, 
compared to acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. 
 
This chapter also pays attention to in-house deals. The results suggest that in-house 
acquirers cannot lower takeover premiums and spend more time to complete deals. 
Therefore, compared to in-house expertise, financial advisors are more professional in 
deal negotiations. 
 
Overall, the retention of top-tier advisors improves acquirer bargaining power. Multiple 
top-tier advisors do not suffer from social loafing. Instead, they can cooperate effectively 
to negotiate favourable deals for their clients. 
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Table 3.1 Summary statistics for the entire sample  
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample and univariate comparison between deals advised by investment banks and in-house deals. Panel 
A reports deal characteristics. Bid premium (4w) is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement. Bid premium (1w) is calculated as the difference between the deal price 
and the target’s stock price 1 week prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 1 week prior to the announcement. Bid premium (1d) is 
calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 1 day prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 1 day prior 
to the announcement. Target CAR [-1, 1] is the 3-day target cumulative abnormal returns around announcement calculated by using market model, 
respectively. Time-to-completion is measured as the number of days between announcement and effective date. Transaction Value is the value of the deal. 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if 
the target is publicly listed. Private dummy equals one if the target is a private firm. Subsidiary dummy equals one if the target is a subsidiary firm. Stock dummy 
equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Mixed dummy equals one if the deal is mixed paid by both 
stock and cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the 
number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the 
target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. MV is market value of equity measured 4 weeks before 
the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash 
flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Pre-deal ownership is the percentage of target stocks owned by the acquirer prior to 
the announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. 
Panel C reports financial advisor related information. No. of advisors is the number of financial advisors retained by an acquirer. Acquirer total advisory fees, 
obtained from Thomson One Banker, is the total advisory fees paid by an acquirer to all the financial advisors retained. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the 
t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians, respectively). Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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All 
Advisor  
(A) 
In-House 
(I) 
Difference (A – I) 
Mean Median 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
Bid Premium (4w) 46.32% 33.29% 3430  45.91% 33.15% 3188  51.73% 35.65% 242  -5.83% (0.297)  -2.50%* (0.068)  
Bid Premium (1w) 40.58% 28.84% 3430  40.35% 28.65% 3188  43.68% 31.17% 242  -3.33% (0.451)  -2.52%* (0.090)  
Bid Premium (1d) 35.77% 25.01% 3430  35.57% 24.73% 3188  38.40% 26.30% 242  -2.83% (0.502)  -1.57% (0.316)  
Target CAR [-1,1] 19.41% 14.88% 3081  19.08% 14.49% 2862  23.75% 18.09% 219  -4.67%** (0.016)  -3.60%** (0.012)  
Time-to-Completion 135.79  119.00  3430  135.21  118.00  3188  143.36  134.00  242  -8.14  (0.122)  -16.00***  (0.002)  
Transaction value ($ mil.) 1631.94  261.58  3430  1724.65  287.33  3188  410.68  93.01  242  1313.97***  (0.000)  194.32***  (0.000)  
Relative Size 0.43  0.23  3430  0.46  0.26  3188  0.11  0.05  242  0.35***  (0.000)  0.21***  (0.000)  
All Stock Deals 41.11% - 3430  39.71% - 3188  59.50% - 242  -19.79%*** (0.000)  - - 
All Cash Deals 28.89% - 3430  29.08% - 3188  26.45% - 242  2.63% (0.374)  - - 
Mixed Deals 30.00% - 3430  31.21% - 3188  14.05% - 242  17.16%*** (0.000)  - - 
Hostile 1.43% - 3430  1.51% - 3188  0.41% - 242  1.09%** (0.020)  - - 
Competing Bid 3.41% - 3430  3.58% - 3188  1.24% - 242  2.34%*** (0.003)  - - 
Tender Offer 22.97% - 3430  23.53% - 3188  15.70% - 242  7.82%*** (0.002)  - - 
Diversification 29.36% - 3430  29.42% - 3188  28.51% - 242  0.91% (0.763)  - - 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
MV ($ mil.) 11341.11  1473.85  3430  10458.01  1388.61  3188  22974.56  2728.54  242  -12516.54***  (0.002)  -1339.93***  (0.000)  
M/B 6.61  2.38  2539  6.70  2.34  2355  5.51  3.12  184  1.20  (0.528)  -0.78***  (0.000)  
Leverage 0.38  0.37  2526  0.38  0.36  2343  0.41  0.43  183  -0.03  (0.102)  -0.07**  (0.033)  
Cash Flows/Equity 0.06  0.05  2384  0.06  0.05  2204  0.05  0.05  180  0.02  (0.217)  0.01*  (0.066)  
RUNUP 13.09% 8.10% 3241  13.62% 8.19% 3011  6.10% 7.67% 230  7.52%*** (0.004)  0.52%** (0.045)  
Pre-deal Ownership 2.79% 0.00% 3430  2.86% 0.00% 3188  1.89% 0.00% 242  0.97% 0.167  0.00  0.423  
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Past Experience 8.40  5.00  3430  7.89  5.00  3188  15.12  11.00  242  -7.23***  (0.000)  -6.00***  (0.000)  
Panel C: Financial Advisors 
Total Advisory Fees 3.95  1.00  1450  4.75  1.70  1208  - - 242  - - - - 
Number of Advisors 1.11  1.00  3430  1.20  1.00  3188  - - 242  - - - - 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics for the sample of deals advised by investment banks 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of deals advised by investment banks and univariate comparison between deals advised by top-tier 
and non-top-tier advisors. Panel A reports deal characteristics. Bid premium (4w) is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s 
stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement. Bid premium (1w) is calculated as 
the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 1 week prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 1 week prior to the 
announcement. Bid premium (1d) is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 1 day prior to the announcement 
divided by the target’s stock price 1 day prior to the announcement. Target CAR [-1, 1] is the 3-day target cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement calculated by using market model, respectively. Time-to-completion is measured as the number of days between announcement and 
effective date. Transaction Value is the value of the deal. Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 
4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Private dummy equals one if the target is a private firm. 
Subsidiary dummy equals one if the target is a subsidiary firm. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy equals one if the 
deal is 100% paid by cash. Mixed dummy equals one if the deal is mixed paid by both stock and cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as 
hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy 
equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different firs t two-digit of primary SIC code. 
Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. MV is market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value 
of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total 
debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] 
window prior to announcement. Pre-deal ownership is the percentage of target stocks owned by the acquirer prior to the announcement. Past Experience is 
measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. Panel C reports financial advisor 
related information. No. of advisors is the number of financial advisors retained by an acquirer. Acquirer total advisory fees, obtained from Thomson One 
Banker, is the total advisory fees paid by an acquirer to all the financial advisors retained. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the t-test and the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians, respectively). Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, 
** and * respectively. 
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Advisor 
Top-Tier 
(T) 
Non-Top-Tier 
(N) 
Difference (T – N) 
Mean Median 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
Bid Premium (4w) 45.91% 33.15% 3188  44.98% 32.50% 1717  46.99% 34.14% 1471  -2.01% (0.574)  -1.64%* (0.055)  
Bid Premium (1w) 40.35% 28.65% 3188  40.14% 27.91% 1717  40.60% 29.47% 1471  -0.46% (0.886)  -1.56%** (0.033)  
Bid Premium (1d) 35.57% 24.73% 3188  35.34% 23.90% 1717  35.84% 25.97% 1471  -0.50% (0.865)  -2.07%** (0.042)  
Target CAR [-1,1] 19.08% 14.49% 2862  19.48% 14.71% 1575  18.58% 14.11% 1287  0.90% (0.288)  0.60% (0.414)  
Time-to-Completion 135.21  118.00  3188  133.32  110.00  1717  137.41  127.00  1471  -4.09  (0.211)  -17.00***  (0.000)  
Transaction value ($ mil.) 1724.65  287.33  3188  2692.27  627.47  1717  595.21  106.88  1471  2097.06***  (0.000)  520.58***  (0.000)  
Relative Size 0.46  0.26  3188  0.41  0.21  1717  0.51  0.30  1471  -0.10***  (0.002)  -0.09***  (0.000)  
All Stock Deals 39.71% - 3188  33.61% - 1717  46.84% - 1471  -13.23%*** (0.000)  - - 
All Cash Deals 29.08% - 3188  32.03% - 1717  25.63% - 1471  6.40%*** (0.000)  - - 
Mixed Deals 31.21% - 3188  34.36% - 1717  27.53% - 1471  6.83%*** (0.000)  - - 
Hostile 1.51% - 3188  2.10% - 1717  0.82% - 1471  1.28%*** (0.002)  - - 
Competing Bid 3.58% - 3188  4.19% - 1717  2.86% - 1471  1.34%** (0.040)  - - 
Tender Offer 23.53% - 3188  26.38% - 1717  20.19% - 1471  6.19%*** (0.000)  - - 
Diversification 29.42% - 3188  31.33% - 1717  27.19% - 1471  4.14%*** (0.010)  - - 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
MV ($ mil.) 10458.01  1388.61  3188  15985.49  3432.26  1717  4006.16  432.00  1471  11979.33***  (0.000)  3000.26***  (0.000)  
M/B 6.70  2.34  2355  8.06  2.54  1281  5.08  2.07  1074  2.99  (0.376)  0.47***  (0.000)  
Leverage 0.38  0.36  2343  0.37  0.35  1276  0.39  0.39  1067  -0.02  (0.103)  -0.04  (0.202)  
Cash Flows/Equity 0.06  0.05  2204  0.06  0.06  1197  0.06  0.05  1007  0.00  (0.859)  0.01***  (0.000)  
RUNUP 13.62% 8.19% 3011  12.43% 7.75% 1619  15.00% 8.79% 1392  -2.57% (0.117)  -1.04% (0.249)  
Pre-deal Ownership 2.86% 0.00% 3188  3.57% 0.00% 1717  2.03% 0.00% 1471  1.54% 0.001  0.00  0.004  
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Past Experience 7.89  5.00  3188  9.80  7.00  1717  5.65  3.00  1471  4.15***  (0.000)  4.00***  (0.000)  
Panel C: Financial Advisors 
Total Advisory Fees 4.75  1.70  1208  7.90  4.00  574  1.89  0.75  634  6.01***  (0.000)  3.25***  (0.000)  
Number of Advisors 1.20  1.00  3188  1.30  1.00  1717  1.08  1.00  1471  0.23***  (0.000)  0.00***  (0.000)  
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics for the sample of deals advised by top-tier investment banks 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of deals advised by top-tier investment banks and univariate comparison between deals advised by single 
top-tier and multiple top-tier advisors. Panel A reports deal characteristics. Bid premium (4w) is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s 
stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement. Bid premium (1w) is calculated as the 
difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 1 week prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock price 1 week prior to the announcement. 
Bid premium (1d) is calculated as the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 1 day prior to the announcement divided by the target’s stock 
price 1 day prior to the announcement. Target CAR [-1, 1] is the 3-day target cumulative abnormal returns around announcement calculated by using market model, 
respectively. Time-to-completion is measured as the number of days between announcement and effective date. Transaction Value is the value of the deal. Relative Size is 
measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. 
Private dummy equals one if the target is a private firm. Subsidiary dummy equals one if the target is a subsidiary firm. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by 
stock. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Mixed dummy equals one if the deal is mixed paid by both stock and cash. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal 
is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals 
one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. Panel B reports acquirer firm 
characteristics. MV is market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement 
divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Pre-deal ownership is the percentage of target stocks owned 
by the acquirer prior to the announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition 
in question. Panel C reports financial advisor related information. No. of advisors is the number of financial advisors retained by an acquirer. Acquirer total advisory fees, 
obtained from Thomson One Banker, is the total advisory fees paid by an acquirer to all the financial advisors retained. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the t-test and the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians, respectively). Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and 
* respectively. 
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Top-Tier 
Multiple Top-Tier 
(MT) 
Single Top-Tier 
(ST) 
Difference (MT – ST) 
Mean Median 
Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
Panel A: Deal Characteristics 
Bid Premium (4w) 44.98% 32.50% 1717  27.65% 27.47% 189  47.13% 33.33% 1528  -19.48%*** (0.000)  -5.86%*** (0.000)  
Bid Premium (1w) 40.14% 27.91% 1717  24.80% 22.63% 189  42.03% 28.53% 1528  -17.23%*** (0.000)  -5.90%*** (0.000)  
Bid Premium (1d) 35.34% 23.90% 1717  22.57% 19.63% 189  36.92% 24.47% 1528  -14.35%*** (0.000)  -4.84%*** (0.004)  
Target CAR[-1,1] 19.48% 14.71% 1575  13.97% 9.87% 167  20.14% 15.45% 1408  -6.17%*** (0.000)  -5.59%*** (0.000)  
Time-to-Completion 133.32  110.00  1717  157.30  132.00  189  130.36  108.00  1528  26.94***  (0.002)  24.00***  (0.001)  
Transaction value ($ mil.) 2692.27  627.47  1717  7917.70  3130.88  189  2045.93  512.67  1528  5871.77***  (0.000)  2618.21***  (0.000)  
Relative Size 0.41  0.21  1717  0.65  0.40  189  0.38  0.19  1528  0.27***  (0.000)  0.20***  (0.000)  
All Stock Deals 33.61% - 1717  20.63% - 189  35.21% - 1528  -14.57%*** (0.000)  - - 
All Cash Deals 32.03% - 1717  27.51% - 189  32.59% - 1528  -5.08% (0.145)  - - 
Mixed Deals 34.36% - 1717  51.85% - 189  32.20% - 1528  19.65%*** (0.000)  - - 
Hostile 2.10% - 1717  3.17% - 189  1.96% - 1528  1.21% (0.362)  - - 
Competing Bid 4.19% - 1717  6.88% - 189  3.86% - 1528  3.02% (0.116)  - - 
Tender Offer 26.38% - 1717  28.57% - 189  26.11% - 1528  2.46% (0.481)  - - 
Diversification 31.33% - 1717  23.28% - 189  32.33% - 1528  -9.05%*** (0.007)  - - 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
MV ($ mil.) 15985.49  3432.26  1717  22432.74  8828.10  189  15188.02  3120.94  1528  7244.71***  (0.006)  5707.16***  (0.000)  
M/B 8.06  2.54  1281  2.05  2.40  126  8.72  2.55  1155  -6.67*  (0.076)  -0.15  (0.184)  
Leverage 0.37  0.35  1276  0.41  0.41  126  0.37  0.35  1150  0.04*  (0.079)  0.06*  (0.071)  
Cash Flows/Equity 0.06  0.06  1197  0.10  0.07  120  0.06  0.06  1077  0.04**  (0.037)  0.01***  (0.008)  
RUNUP 12.43% 7.75% 1619  12.81% 13.17% 175  12.39% 7.33% 1444  0.42% (0.875)  5.85% (0.248)  
Pre-deal Ownership 3.57% 0.00% 1717  2.19% 0.00% 189  3.74% 0.00% 1528  -1.56% 0.087  0.00  0.154  
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Past Experience 9.80  7.00  1717  10.56  7.00  189  9.71  6.00  1528  0.85  (0.309)  1.00  (0.182)  
Panel C: Financial Advisors 
Total Advisory Fees 7.90  4.00  574  20.97  15.00  69  6.11  3.50  505  14.85***  (0.000)  11.50***  (0.000)  
Number of Advisors 1.30  1.00  1717  2.41  2.00  189  1.16  1.00  1528  1.24***  (0.000)  1.00***  (0.000)  
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Table 3.4: OLS regressions of bid premium (4 weeks) 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of bid premium. Bid premium is calculated as 
the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement divided by the target’s stock price 4 weeks prior to the announcement. In these 
models this chapter regresses bid premium against a vector of explanatory variables. The key 
explanatory variables are the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy 
equals one if an acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier 
equals the number of top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors 
equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. In-House dummy equals one if an 
acquirer does not retain any advisors for the deal. Other control variables include deal and 
firm characteristics. Ln(TV) is the natural logarithm of the transaction value. Relative Size is 
measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy 
equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified 
as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the 
number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a 
tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first 
two-digit of primary SIC code. Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
measured 4 weeks before the announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of 
M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. 
Pre-deal ownership is the percentage of target stocks owned by the acquirer prior to the 
announcement. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. This chapter 
also controls for acquirer and target industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, 
they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 155 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TopTier -0.0324* -0.0409**     
 (0.054) (0.016)     
No. of TopTier   -0.0343** -0.0419***   
 
  (0.022) (0.006)   
InHouse     -0.0158 -0.0309 
 
    (0.630) (0.374) 
No. of Advisors -0.0280** -0.0252* -0.0133 -0.0073 -0.0286** -0.0264** 
 
(0.032) (0.051) (0.405) (0.646) (0.028) (0.041) 
Ln(TV) -0.0035 -0.0339*** -0.0027 -0.0335*** -0.0102** -0.0308*** 
 
(0.504) (0.003) (0.604) (0.003) (0.024) (0.003) 
Relative Size 0.0074 0.0771*** 0.0059 0.0763** 0.0188 0.0635** 
 
(0.693) (0.010) (0.752) (0.011) (0.311) (0.024) 
Cash -0.0654*** -0.0755*** -0.0657*** -0.0760*** -0.0634*** -0.0681*** 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Stock -0.0559*** -0.0506*** -0.0566*** -0.0512*** -0.0526*** -0.0485*** 
 
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) 
Hostile 0.1089** 0.1180** 0.1103** 0.1200** 0.1118** 0.1238*** 
 
(0.028) (0.018) (0.025) (0.015) (0.019) (0.009) 
Competing Bid 0.1496*** 0.1455*** 0.1488*** 0.1445*** 0.1432*** 0.1405*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Tender Offer -0.0070 -0.0026 -0.0062 -0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0002 
 
(0.749) (0.905) (0.777) (0.944) (0.901) (0.994) 
Diversification 0.0498*** 0.0418*** 0.0490*** 0.0408** 0.0550*** 0.0513*** 
 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.012) (0.000) (0.001) 
Ln(MV)  0.0327***  0.0331***  0.0214** 
 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.024) 
Past Experience  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.0005 
 
 (0.698)  (0.694)  (0.490) 
Pre-deal Ownership  -0.0961  -0.0993  -0.1291** 
 
 (0.114)  (0.103)  (0.026) 
Constant 0.5475*** 0.4667*** 0.5297*** 0.4444*** 0.5616*** 0.5090*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3188 3188 3188 3188 3430 3430 
R2 0.078 0.083 0.078 0.083 0.073 0.076 
adj. R2 0.062 0.066 0.062 0.067 0.061 0.063 
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Table 3.5: OLS regressions of bid premium (1 week) 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of bid premium. Bid premium is calculated as 
the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 1 week prior to the 
announcement divided by the target’s stock price 1 week prior to the announcement. In these 
models this chapter regresses bid premium against a vector of explanatory variables. The key 
explanatory variables are the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy 
equals one if an acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier 
equals the number of top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors 
equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. In-House dummy equals one if an 
acquirer does not retain any advisors for the deal. Other control variables include deal and 
firm characteristics. Ln(TV) is the natural logarithm of the transaction value. Relative Size is 
measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy 
equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified 
as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the 
number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a 
tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first 
two-digit of primary SIC code. Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
measured 4 weeks before the announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of 
M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. 
Pre-deal ownership is the percentage of target stocks owned by the acquirer prior to the 
announcement. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. This chapter 
also controls for acquirer and target industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, 
they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TopTier -0.0277* -0.0316**     
 (0.059) (0.032)     
No. of TopTier   -0.0325** -0.0363***   
 
  (0.013) (0.006)   
InHouse     0.0013 -0.0045 
 
    (0.962) (0.877) 
No. of Advisors -0.0262** -0.0248** -0.0120 -0.0090 -0.0267** -0.0254** 
 
(0.015) (0.020) (0.365) (0.494) (0.012) (0.017) 
Ln(TV) -0.0052 -0.0212** -0.0041 -0.0206** -0.0111*** -0.0157* 
 
(0.253) (0.036) (0.373) (0.041) (0.005) (0.083) 
Relative Size 0.0088 0.0441* 0.0069 0.0435* 0.0176 0.0247 
 
(0.576) (0.086) (0.660) (0.090) (0.265) (0.314) 
Cash -0.0569*** -0.0626*** -0.0569*** -0.0628*** -0.0580*** -0.0580*** 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Stock -0.0661*** -0.0631*** -0.0669*** -0.0638*** -0.0630*** -0.0613*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hostile 0.1458*** 0.1521*** 0.1473*** 0.1539*** 0.1478*** 0.1571*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Competing Bid 0.1563*** 0.1531*** 0.1554*** 0.1521*** 0.1483*** 0.1464*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender Offer -0.0087 -0.0059 -0.0079 -0.0050 -0.0072 -0.0063 
 
(0.651) (0.758) (0.679) (0.795) (0.699) (0.738) 
Diversification 0.0464*** 0.0418*** 0.0456*** 0.0408*** 0.0508*** 0.0504*** 
 
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(MV)  0.0151  0.0158  0.0030 
 
 (0.113)  (0.100)  (0.724) 
Past Experience  0.0006  0.0006  0.0005 
 
 (0.418)  (0.424)  (0.509) 
Pre-deal Ownership  -0.0747  -0.0767  -0.0999** 
 
 (0.145)  (0.135)  (0.042) 
Constant 0.5181*** 0.4849*** 0.5006*** 0.4641*** 0.5314*** 0.5289*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3188 3188 3188 3188 3430 3430 
R2 0.072 0.075 0.073 0.076 0.068 0.069 
adj. R2 0.056 0.058 0.057 0.059 0.056 0.057 
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Table 3.6: OLS regressions of bid premium (1 day) 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of bid premium. Bid premium is calculated as 
the difference between the deal price and the target’s stock price 1 day prior to the 
announcement divided by the target’s stock price 1 day prior to the announcement. In these 
models this chapter regresses bid premium against a vector of explanatory variables. The key 
explanatory variables are the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy 
equals one if an acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier 
equals the number of top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors 
equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. In-House dummy equals one if an 
acquirer does not retain any advisors for the deal. Other control variables include deal and 
firm characteristics. Ln(TV) is the natural logarithm of the transaction value. Relative Size is 
measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy 
equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified 
as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the 
number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a 
tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first 
two-digit of primary SIC code. Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
measured 4 weeks before the announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of 
M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. 
Pre-deal ownership is the percentage of target stocks owned by the acquirer prior to the 
announcement. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. This chapter 
also controls for acquirer and target industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, 
they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
TopTier -0.0326** -0.0363***     
 (0.017) (0.007)     
No. of TopTier   -0.0352*** -0.0387***   
 
  (0.004) (0.001)   
InHouse     0.0106 0.0070 
 
    (0.692) (0.804) 
No. of Advisors -0.0201* -0.0190* -0.0050 -0.0024 -0.0210** -0.0198* 
 
(0.051) (0.063) (0.690) (0.846) (0.040) (0.052) 
Ln(TV) -0.0015 -0.0160* -0.0006 -0.0156 -0.0088** -0.0116 
 
(0.730) (0.096) (0.885) (0.105) (0.022) (0.176) 
Relative Size 0.0021 0.0347 0.0005 0.0339 0.0128 0.0164 
 
(0.887) (0.146) (0.975) (0.154) (0.383) (0.471) 
Cash -0.0462*** -0.0519*** -0.0465*** -0.0523*** -0.0503*** -0.0496*** 
 
(0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Stock -0.0464*** -0.0439*** -0.0471*** -0.0445*** -0.0429*** -0.0415*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) 
Hostile 0.1472*** 0.1516*** 0.1487*** 0.1534*** 0.1500*** 0.1581*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Competing Bid 0.1413*** 0.1386*** 0.1406*** 0.1376*** 0.1363*** 0.1347*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender Offer -0.0149 -0.0125 -0.0141 -0.0115 -0.0134 -0.0127 
 
(0.406) (0.490) (0.434) (0.526) (0.440) (0.465) 
Diversification 0.0357*** 0.0312** 0.0349*** 0.0302** 0.0403*** 0.0404*** 
 
(0.006) (0.020) (0.007) (0.024) (0.001) (0.002) 
Ln(MV)  0.0137  0.0141  0.0017 
 
 (0.133)  (0.122)  (0.834) 
Past Experience  0.0007  0.0007  0.0003 
 
 (0.326)  (0.331)  (0.632) 
Pre-deal Ownership  -0.0560  -0.0586  -0.0862* 
 
 (0.253)  (0.232)  (0.071) 
Constant 0.4510*** 0.4212*** 0.4326*** 0.4001*** 0.4675*** 0.4669*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3188 3188 3188 3188 3430 3430 
R2 0.063 0.065 0.064 0.066 0.057 0.058 
adj. R2 0.047 0.048 0.048 0.049 0.045 0.045 
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Table 3.7: OLS regressions of target announcement returns 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of target announcement abnormal returns. In 
these models, this chapter regresses target CAR [-1, 1] against a vector of explanatory 
variables. The key explanatory variables are the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. 
TopTier dummy equals one if an acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. 
of TopTier equals the number of top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. 
of Advisors equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. In-House dummy equals 
one if an acquirer does not retain any advisors for the deal. Other control variables include 
deal and firm characteristics. Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the 
acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if 
the target is publicly listed. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock 
dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is 
identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one 
if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a 
tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first 
two-digit of primary SIC code. Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
measured 4 weeks before the announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of 
M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. 
Pre-deal ownership is the percentage of target stocks owned by the acquirer prior to the 
announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement 
divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is 
measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash 
Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided 
by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as 
market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. This chapter also controls for acquirer and 
target industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. 
The P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Top-Tier -0.0190** -0.0186*     
 (0.022) (0.081)     
No. of Top-Tier   -0.0206*** -0.0202**   
 
  (0.005) (0.034)   
In-House     0.0200 0.0129 
 
    (0.252) (0.537) 
No. of Advisors -0.0227*** -0.0285*** -0.0137* -0.0190* -0.0231*** -0.0286*** 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.085) (0.082) (0.001) (0.002) 
Relative Size -0.0380*** -0.0406*** -0.0380*** -0.0405*** -0.0416*** -0.0462*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash 0.0022 -0.0011 0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0062 
 
(0.855) (0.938) (0.874) (0.939) (0.871) (0.668) 
Stock -0.0376*** -0.0382*** -0.0381*** -0.0389*** -0.0366*** -0.0334*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.007) 
Hostile 0.1319*** 0.1387*** 0.1324*** 0.1402*** 0.1317*** 0.1335*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
Competing Bid -0.0199 -0.0247 -0.0204 -0.0249 -0.0225 -0.0261 
 
(0.250) (0.259) (0.237) (0.255) (0.183) (0.216) 
Tender Offer -0.0122 -0.0125 -0.0117 -0.0122 -0.0055 -0.0043 
 
(0.282) (0.371) (0.303) (0.384) (0.617) (0.755) 
Diversification 0.0314*** 0.0322*** 0.0308*** 0.0317*** 0.0334*** 0.0330*** 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.002) 
Ln(MV) 0.0056** 0.0031 0.0061** 0.0035 0.0028 0.0006 
 
(0.043) (0.391) (0.027) (0.315) (0.268) (0.854) 
Past Experience 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0003 
 
(0.583) (0.432) (0.591) (0.437) (0.955) (0.624) 
Pre-deal Ownership -0.0585* -0.0996** -0.0599* -0.1024** -0.0739** -0.1110*** 
 
(0.072) (0.022) (0.067) (0.019) (0.017) (0.008) 
M/B  0.0002  0.0002  -0.0005 
 
 (0.857)  (0.876)  (0.685) 
Leverage  -0.0056  -0.0059  -0.0060 
 
 (0.792)  (0.781)  (0.768) 
Cash Flows/Equity  0.0035  0.0054  0.0170 
 
 (0.956)  (0.933)  (0.788) 
RUNUP  -0.0074  -0.0072  -0.0049 
 
 (0.606)  (0.613)  (0.725) 
Constant 0.2037*** 0.3130*** 0.1922*** 0.3004*** 0.2250*** 0.3309*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 2862 1917 2862 1917 3081 2074 
R2 0.122 0.119 0.123 0.120 0.114 0.106 
adj. R2 0.104 0.091 0.105 0.092 0.101 0.085 
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Table 3.8: Tobit regressions of acquirer total advisory fees 
This table presents results of Tobit regressions of acquirer total advisor fees. Acquirer total 
advisory fees, obtained from Thomson One Banker, is the total advisory fees paid by an 
acquirer to all the financial advisors retained. In these models, this chapter regresses acquirer 
total advisory fees against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variables 
are the TopTier dummy and the term No. of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if an 
acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for the deal. No. of TopTier equals the number of 
top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. Furthermore, No. of Advisors equals the number of 
advisors retained by the acquirer. Other control variables include deal and firm characteristics. 
Ln(TV) is the natural logarithm of the transaction value. Relative Size is measured as the 
transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy equals 
one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as 
hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the 
number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a 
tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first 
two-digit of primary SIC code. Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
measured 4 weeks before the announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of 
M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. 
Pre-deal ownership is the percentage of target stocks owned by the acquirer prior to the 
announcement. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. This chapter 
also controls for acquirer and target industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, 
they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Top-Tier 0.9749*** 0.9083***   
 (0.001) (0.002)   
No. of Top-Tier   1.4074*** 1.3803*** 
 
  (0.001) (0.001) 
No. of Advisors 4.2675*** 4.2302*** 3.8422*** 3.7909*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(TV) 2.3322*** 2.2774*** 2.2472*** 2.2525*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Size 1.0323** 1.1225** 1.1281*** 1.1018** 
 
(0.012) (0.045) (0.006) (0.048) 
Cash 0.4149 0.5533 0.3597 0.5195 
 
(0.458) (0.301) (0.515) (0.328) 
Stock 0.4212 0.4087 0.4374 0.4183 
 
(0.330) (0.343) (0.309) (0.329) 
Hostile 2.2714* 2.5042* 2.2538* 2.4783* 
 
(0.091) (0.063) (0.086) (0.061) 
Competing Bid 0.7897 0.9078 0.8561 0.9722 
 
(0.421) (0.345) (0.376) (0.307) 
Tender Offer 0.2201 0.1889 0.2597 0.2380 
 
(0.682) (0.718) (0.626) (0.646) 
Diversification 0.1814 0.2554 0.1918 0.2754 
 
(0.608) (0.469) (0.585) (0.431) 
Ln(MV)  0.2407  0.1740 
 
 (0.302)  (0.444) 
Past Experience  -0.0862***  -0.0853*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Pre-deal Ownership  -0.7450  -0.7112 
 
 (0.547)  (0.567) 
Constant -15.0966*** -15.8338*** -14.4201*** -15.0118*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1450 1450 1450 1450 
pseudo R2 0.160 0.163 0.162 0.164 
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Table 3.9: Negative binomial regressions of time-to-completion 
This table presents results of negative binomial regressions of time-to-completion. 
Time-to-completion is measured as the number of days between announcement and effective 
date. In these models, this chapter regresses acquirer total advisory fees against a vector of 
explanatory variables. The key explanatory variables are the TopTier dummy and the term No. 
of TopTier. TopTier dummy equals one if an acquirer retains at least one top-tier advisor for 
the deal. No. of TopTier equals the number of top-tier advisors retained by the acquirer. 
Furthermore, No. of Advisors equals the number of advisors retained by the acquirer. Other 
control variables include deal and firm characteristics. Ln(TV) is the natural logarithm of the 
transaction value. Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer 
market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 
100% paid by cash. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy 
equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing 
Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy 
equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the 
target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. Past Experience is 
measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to 
the acquisition in question. Pre-deal ownership is the percentage of target stocks owned by the 
acquirer prior to the announcement. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% 
levels. This chapter also controls for acquirer and target industry fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Top-Tier 0.0025 -0.0137     
 
(0.939) (0.653)     
No. of Top-Tier   0.0025 -0.0071   
 
  (0.929) (0.785)   
In-House     0.1671*** 0.1582*** 
 
    (0.000) (0.002) 
No. of Advisors 0.0624*** 0.0557** 0.0613** 0.0581** 0.0647*** 0.0559** 
 
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.004) (0.013) 
Ln(TV) 0.0158 0.0071 0.0158 0.0068 0.0150* 0.0066 
 
(0.154) (0.791) (0.147) (0.800) (0.080) (0.782) 
Relative Size 0.0943*** 0.1425*** 0.0943*** 0.1424*** 0.0997*** 0.1473*** 
 
(0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.002) 
Cash -0.2760*** -0.2977*** -0.2760*** -0.2983*** -0.2573*** -0.2812*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock -0.0527** -0.0575** -0.0527** -0.0574** -0.0584** -0.0627** 
 
(0.042) (0.024) (0.042) (0.024) (0.019) (0.010) 
Hostile 0.6491*** 0.6073*** 0.6490*** 0.6075*** 0.6335*** 0.5894*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Competing Bid 0.2338*** 0.2391*** 0.2339*** 0.2389*** 0.2292*** 0.2326*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Tender Offer -0.4879*** -0.4908*** -0.4879*** -0.4906*** -0.5008*** -0.5009*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0162 -0.0328 -0.0162 -0.0327 -0.0154 -0.0320 
 
(0.485) (0.174) (0.484) (0.173) (0.490) (0.168) 
Ln(MV)  0.0190  0.0185  0.0167 
 
 (0.365)  (0.379)  (0.389) 
Past Experience  -0.0013  -0.0013  -0.0012 
 
 (0.320)  (0.323)  (0.297) 
Pre-deal Ownership  0.5747***  0.5727***  0.5963*** 
 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 4.7058*** 4.6383*** 4.7070*** 4.6369*** 4.7268*** 4.6670*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 3188 3188 3188 3188 3430 3430 
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Table 3.10: Abnormal bid premium, abnormal acquirer total advisory fees and acquirer 
cost reduction for deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors 
This table presents abnormal bid premium, abnormal acquirer total advisory fees and acquirer 
cost reduction for deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors, and the univariate 
comparison between deals advised by top-tier and non-top-tier advisors. Panel A, B and C 
report abnormal bid premium, abnormal acquirer total advisor fees and acquirer cost 
reductions, respectively. Abnormal bid premium is calculated as: 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡, where Bid Premiumit is the 
bid premium for acquirer i on date t; and Bid Premiumpt is the mean bid premium for the 
reference portfolio p at year t. Abnormal total advisory fees is calculated 
as: 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑡 , 
where Total Advisory Feesit is the total advisory fees for acquirer i on date t; and Total 
advisory Feespt is the mean acquirer total advisory fees for the reference portfolio p at year t. 
Cost Reduction is calculated as:  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = −𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡, where Target Market Valueit is the 
market value for target i on date t. Reference portfolios are constructed in each year. TV refers 
to reference portfolio that is constructed based on transaction value quintile. RS refers to 
reference portfolio that is constructed based on relative size quintile. A_MV refers to 
reference portfolio that is constructed based on acquirer market value quintile. A_Ind refers to 
reference portfolio that is constructed based on acquirer industry. T_Ind refers to reference 
portfolio that is constructed based on target industry. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the 
t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians, respectively). 
Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
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 Top-Tier (T) Non-Top-Tier (N) Difference (T – N) 
 Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Panel A: Abnormal Bid Premium 
TV -1.63%* -8.02%*** 1717  -1.03% -9.23%*** 1471  -0.60% 1.22% 
 (0.100)  (0.000)   (0.398)  (0.000)   (0.704)  (0.361)  
RS -3.72%*** -10.76%*** 1717  0.28% -7.78%*** 1471  -4.01%** -2.97%* 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.815)  (0.000)   (0.011)  (0.058)  
A_MV -2.51%** -8.76%*** 1717  0.22% -7.62%*** 1471  -2.73%* -1.14% 
 (0.012)  (0.000)   (0.855)  (0.000)   (0.083)  (0.409)  
A_Ind -3.61%*** -8.12%*** 1717  1.21% -5.01%*** 1471  -4.82%*** -3.11%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.313)  (0.000)   (0.002)  (0.006)  
T_Ind -4.02%*** -8.21%*** 1717  1.67% -4.69%*** 1471  -5.69%*** -3.52%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.163)  (0.002)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
Panel B: Abnormal Total Advisory Fees ($ mil.) 
TV 0.90***  0.11  574  -0.24**  -0.10***  634  1.13***  0.21***  
 (0.000)  (0.162)   (0.026)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.004)  
RS 2.86***  0.53***  574  -1.78***  -1.60***  634  4.64***  2.13***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
A_MV 1.72***  0.61***  574  0.02  -0.17***  634  1.70***  0.78***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.833)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
A_Ind 2.49***  0.49***  574  -1.02***  -0.94***  634  3.51***  1.42***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
T_Ind 2.47***  0.57***  574  -1.01***  -0.97***  634  3.48***  1.54***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
Panel C: Cost Reduction ($ mil.) 
TV 173.88***  33.37***  574  51.15***  5.70***  634  122.74***  27.67***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.006)  (0.000)  
RS 262.85***  44.87***  574  63.62***  8.71***  634  199.23***  36.16***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
A_MV 216.27***  34.76***  574  48.33***  5.42***  634  167.94***  29.34***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
A_Ind 199.88***  24.28***  574  41.05***  6.03***  634  158.83***  18.25***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.001)  
T_Ind 225.69***  28.24***  574  44.20***  5.39***  634  181.48***  22.85***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
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Table 3.11: Abnormal bid premium, abnormal acquirer total advisory fees and acquirer 
cost reduction for deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors and single top-tier advisor 
This table presents results of abnormal bid premium, abnormal acquirer total advisory fees 
and acquirer cost reduction for deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors and single top-tier 
advisor, and the univariate comparison between deals advised by multiple top-tier advisors 
and single top-tier advisor. Panel A, B and C report abnormal bid premium, abnormal 
acquirer total advisor fees and acquirer cost reductions, respectively. Abnormal bid premium 
is calculated as: 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡, where Bid 
Premiumit is the bid premium for acquirer i on date t; and Bid Premiumpt is the mean bid 
premium for the reference portfolio p at year t. Abnormal total advisory fees is calculated 
as: 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑡 , 
where Total Advisory Feesit is the total advisory fees for acquirer i on date t; and Total 
advisory Feespt is the mean acquirer total advisory fees for the reference portfolio p at year t. 
Cost Reduction is calculated as:  𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = −𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑡 ×
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑖𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚𝑖𝑡 − 𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑑𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡, where Target Market Valueit is the 
market value for target i on date t. Reference portfolios are constructed in each year. TV refers 
to reference portfolio that is constructed based on transaction value quintile. RS refers to 
reference portfolio that is constructed based on relative size quintile. A_MV refers to 
reference portfolio that is constructed based on acquirer market value quintile. A_Ind refers to 
reference portfolio that is constructed based on acquirer industry. T_Ind refers to reference 
portfolio that is constructed based on target industry. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the 
t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians, respectively). 
Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
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 Multiple Top-Tier (MT) Single Top-Tier (ST) Difference (MT – ST) 
 Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Panel A: Abnormal Bid Premium 
TV -8.38%*** -10.74%*** 189  -0.79% -7.69%*** 1528  -7.59%*** -3.05% 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.465)  (0.000)   (0.001)  (0.175)  
RS -13.04%*** -14.82%*** 189  -2.57%** -9.60%*** 1528  -10.47%*** -5.23%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.018)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.008)  
A_MV -13.13%*** -14.48%*** 189  -1.19% -7.80%*** 1528  -11.94%*** -6.68%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.271)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.001)  
A_Ind -12.20%*** -11.91%*** 189  -2.55%** -7.10%*** 1528  -9.65%*** -4.81%** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.017)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.017)  
T_Ind -14.56%*** -16.74%*** 189  -2.72%*** -7.32%*** 1528  -11.84%*** -9.42%*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.010)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
Panel B: Abnormal Total Advisory Fees ($ mil.) 
TV 4.82***  4.70***  69  0.36  0.00  505  4.46***  4.70***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.125)  (0.719)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
RS 9.70***  9.33***  69  1.93***  0.28***  505  7.77***  9.05***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
A_MV 5.18***  3.95***  69  1.25***  0.49***  505  3.94***  3.46***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
A_Ind 7.40***  6.21***  69  1.82***  0.27***  505  5.58***  5.95***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
T_Ind 6.79***  5.34***  69  1.88***  0.41***  505  4.91***  4.93***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
Cost Reduction ($ mil.) 
TV 500.97**  195.45***  69  129.19***  29.04***  505  371.78*  166.41**  
 (0.011)  (0.003)   (0.002)  (0.000)   (0.063)  (0.011)  
RS 754.80***  383.98***  69  195.63***  35.81***  505  559.17***  348.17***  
 (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.008)  (0.000)  
A_MV 705.16***  405.30***  69  149.47***  26.82***  505  555.69**  378.48***  
 (0.003)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.017)  (0.001)  
A_Ind 650.10***  222.32***  69  138.37***  16.93***  505  511.73**  205.39***  
 (0.001)  (0.001)   (0.001)  (0.000)   (0.012)  (0.006)  
T_Ind 724.99***  291.86***  69  157.46***  21.02***  505  567.52***  270.84***  
 (0.001)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.006)  (0.000)  
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Appendix 3.1: Top 25 U.S. financial advisor ranking based on transaction value 
 
The table presents the ranking of the top-25 financial advisors based on the transaction value 
for acquisitions of U.S. targets over the period January 1990 to December 31, 2012 obtained 
from the Thomson One Banker. Panel A and Panel B present the financial advisor ranking in 
the two periods – 1990s and 2000-2012, respectively. Transaction value is shown in U.S. 
million dollars.  
 
Rank Financial Advisor Transaction Value Number of Deals 
Panel A: 1990 – 1999 
 
Top-Tier 
  
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 2,108,483.06 1,601 
2 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 1,756,874.86 2,153 
3 Morgan Stanley 1,669,074.77 1,338 
4 JP Morgan 1,366,348.57 1,691 
5 Credit Suisse 1,342,830.48 2,010 
6 Citi (Salomon Brother/Salomon Smith Barney) 1,192,974.73 1,676 
7 Barclays Capital (Lehman Brothers) 698,713.29 874 
8 Lazard 613,378.80 568 
9 UBS 435,536.00 1,018 
10 Deutsche Bank 369,381.67 969 
 
Non-Top-Tier 
  
11 Sagent Advisors Inc 240,950.63 183 
12 Commerzbank AG 233,242.03 326 
13 Allen & Co Inc 121,159.69 50 
14 Houlihan Lokey 111,308.94 390 
15 Gleacher & Co Inc 92,671.86 78 
16 Blackstone Group LP 69,979.81 142 
17 RBC Capital Markets 65,626.50 495 
18 Evercore Partners 63,025.41 11 
19 Societe Generale 59,085.45 103 
20 Greenhill & Co, LLC 59,037.24 30 
21 Rothschild 57,591.51 88 
22 RBS 49,244.64 341 
23 Keefe Bruyette & Woods Inc 43,877.64 233 
24 CIBC World Markets Inc 43,771.35 205 
25 Jefferies & Co Inc 42,621.50 544 
Panel B: 2000 – 2012 
 
Top-Tier 
  
1 Goldman Sachs & Co 4,973,479.30 2,114 
2 Morgan Stanley 3,792,996.37 1,645 
3 JP Morgan 3,706,846.89 2,150 
4 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 3,505,114.78 2,300 
5 Citi (Salomon Smith Barney) 2,968,442.45 1,727 
6 Barclays Capital (Lehman Brothers) 2,501,839.85 1,339 
7 Credit Suisse 2,479,914.42 1,968 
8 UBS 1,413,062.93 1,129 
9 Lazard 1,333,620.86 1,137 
10 Deutsche Bank 1,240,930.78 832 
 
Non-Top-Tier 
  
11 Evercore Partners 1,003,975.81 330 
12 Wells Fargo & Co 463,484.25 596 
13 Houlihan Lokey 421,989.49 1,776 
14 Blackstone Group LP 387,492.69 228 
15 Commerzbank AG 356,890.59 139 
16 Jefferies LLC 338,686.24 1,129 
17 Rothschild 319,548.31 343 
18 Greenhill & Co, LLC 319,022.93 177 
19 Centerview Partners LLC 307,798.76 76 
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20 Stifel/KBW 295,882.18 1,125 
21 Moelis & Co 217,178.07 252 
22 BNP Paribas SA 215,787.84 55 
23 Duff and Phelps 192,720.99 658 
24 RBC Capital Markets 182,751.21 919 
25 Perella Weinberg Partners LP 174,874.07 71 
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Appendix 3.2: Definitions of control variables 
 
This table describes control variables in the regressions of this chapter. The definition for each variable are shown in the table. Panel A and B present firm 
characteristics and deal characteristics, respectively. 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Ln(MV) 
 
The logarithm of the acquirer market value measured 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item 
PRC×SHROUT). 
M/B 
 
Market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT) divided by book value 
of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item CEQ). 
Leverage 
 
Total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item 
(DTLL+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+SEQ)). 
Cash Flows/Equity 
 
Cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item IB+DP-DVP-DVC) divided by 
market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT). 
RUNUP Acquirer market-adjusted CARs before announcement date over the [-365, -28] window. 
Past Experience The number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics 
Ln(TV) The logarithm of the transaction value (from Thomson One Banker). 
Relative Size 
 
Transaction value (from Thomson One Banker) divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT).  
Pre-deal Ownership The percentage of target stocks owned by the acquirer prior to the announcement. 
Public Dummy variable equals one if the target is a publicly listed firm. 
Stock Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. 
Cash Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. 
Hostile Dummy variable equals one if the deal attitude is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. 
Competing Bid Dummy variable equals one if there are more than one bidding firms reported by Thomson One Banker. 
Tender Offer Dummy variable equals one if the deal is identified as a tender offer by Thomson One Banker. 
Diversification Dummy variable equals one if the acquirer and the target have the different first two-digit of primary SIC code. 
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Chapter 4 : Financial Analyst Reputation and M&A 
Performance Predictive Ability 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter investigates whether analyst recommendations are predictive of acquirer 
announcement performance, and more importantly explores how analyst reputation 
impacts recommendation predictive ability for acquirer performance. 
 
Sell-side analyst behaviour around M&A and the role of analysts in M&As have been 
examined by literature. For example, Bradley, Morgan and Wolf (2007) analyse 
recommendations issued around tender offer announcements and suggest that analysts are 
not able to predict target firms and cannot identify deals that create value for acquirers in 
the long term. They find evidence of conflicts of interest that make affiliated analysts issue 
more favourable recommendations; however, the biased recommendations can be 
recognised by the stock market, and therefore have little influence on investors. Kolasinski 
and Kothari (2008) further examine analyst conflicts of interest in M&As and find that 
analysts, whether they are affiliated with acquirer or target investment banks, make biased 
recommendations to curry favour with their clients. In addition, Haushalter and Lowry 
(2011) find that acquirer investment banks reduce shareholdings of acquirers after their 
analysts downgrade the stock recommendations, but do not respond to recommendation 
upgrade by affiliated analysts, suggesting that asset managers affiliated with acquirer 
banks make investment decisions rationally following unbiased recommendations. 
Sibilkov, Straska and Waller (2013) suggest that acquiring firms reward banks that 
provide analyst coverage with M&A advisory business and premium advisory fees, and 
affiliated analysts tend to initiate or continue coverage. Tehranian, Zhao and Zhu (2014) 
 174 
 
argue that analysts, who cover target firms before acquisitions and remain to cover 
combined firms after acquisitions, have a strong ability to make accurate forecasts and are 
more optimistic about the prospects of combined firms. They find that combined firms 
that gain more coverage from remaining target firms achieve better post-deal performance 
in the long term. Becher, Cohn and Juergens (2014) suggest that post-announcement 
recommendations have significant effects on deal completion rates. Specifically, acquirers 
(targets) with favourable (unfavourable) recommendations are more likely to successfully 
complete deals. 
 
The literature discussed above has examined how analysts behave around M&As, and 
how markets respond to analyst recommendations for merger participants. However, to 
the best of the author’s knowledge, no paper has directly investigated whether analyst 
pre-deal recommendations can be used to predict acquirer announcement performance. 
Sell-side analysts who are sophisticated in processing information have stock-picking and 
market-timing abilities; they are, therefore, able to make profitable stock 
recommendations (Womack, 1996; Ivković and Jegadeesh, 2004; Mikhail, Walther and 
Willis, 2004). On one hand, if analyst recommendations correctly reflect stock valuation, 
optimistic and pessimistic recommendations suggest that the stock is undervalued and 
overvalued, respectively. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that market misvaluation 
drives M&As, and overvalued firms tend to become acquirers. However, overvalued 
acquirers are more likely to engender negative market reactions, underperforming around 
announcements (Dong et al., 2006). As a result, acquirers with favourable pre-deal 
recommendations are expected to gain better announcement performance than acquirers 
with unfavourable recommendations. On the other hand, if analysts appropriately consider 
growth business opportunities of firms, they should issue more optimistic 
recommendations for well-managed firms that have good future prospects. Previous 
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studies (Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991) also suggest that well-managed 
acquirers outperform poorly managed acquirers over announcements. Consequently, 
acquirers with optimistic recommendations outperform acquirers with pessimistic 
recommendations. Overall, whether analyst recommendations are used as the proxy of 
firm valuation or firm growth prospects, it is reasonable to predict that more favourable 
recommendations are associated with better acquirer performance. In other words, analyst 
recommendations prior to acquisitions should have predictive ability for acquirer 
announcement performance. 
 
More importantly, different from the above-mentioned literature that concentrates more on 
analyst conflicts of interest, this chapter focuses on the reputation–quality mechanism. 
More specifically, this chapter examines whether recommendations of star analysts have 
stronger predictive ability for acquirer performance than those of non-star analysts, and 
how star and non-star analysts respond to M&As.24 Since star status is a key determinant 
of analyst compensation and promotion (Stickel, 1992; Michaely and Womack, 1999; 
Hong and Kubik, 2003; Leone and Wu, 2007), star analysts are supposed to provide high 
quality service, such as profitable recommendations, accurate earnings forecast, in-depth 
written reports and so forth.  
 
However, the existing literature shows mixed results of this reputation–quality mechanism. 
More specifically, a considerable number of studies suggest that star analysts outperform 
non-star analysts in terms of forecast accuracy and recommendation profitability. For 
                                                 
24 In each year, both Institutional Investor and The Wall Street Journal issue their star analyst rankings 
(‘All-American Research Team’ for Institutional Investor, and ‘Best on the Street’ for The Wall Street 
Journal). However, compared to rankings of The Wall Street Journal, Institutional Investor star analyst 
rankings are more influential, since the rankings have the longer history and more fund managers involve in 
the selection process. Therefore, this chapter examines Institutional Investor rankings. 
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instance, Stickel (1992) finds that earnings forecast errors are smaller for star analysts than 
for non-star analysts, and star forecast revisions exert a stronger influence on stock price 
than non-star revisions do. Desai, Liang and Singh (2000) find that star analysts 
recommended stocks that have better long-term performance compared to size- and 
industry-adjusted matching portfolios, indicating star analysts’ superior stock-picking 
ability. Leone and Wu (2007) suggest that star analysts make more accurate earnings and 
more profitable recommendations than non-star analysts, and their outperformance can 
persist in the long term after star selections. Loh and Stulz (2011) find that star analysts’ 
changes in recommendations are more influential in driving stock price movements. Fang 
and Yasuda (2009) suggest that analyst reputation has a positive effect on earnings 
forecast accuracy, and star analysts’ forecast quality holds in the presence of conflicts of 
interest, indicating that analyst reputation alleviates moral hazard. Fang and Yasuda (2014) 
further find that investors gain excess returns by following star recommendations, and the 
returns are even higher for investors who have advanced access to analyst information, 
indicating that star recommendations are informative.  
 
Meanwhile, Gleason and Lee (2003) find that star status does not have significant effects 
on post-forecast revision price drift. More importantly, Emery and Li (2009) suggest that 
star analyst elections are similar to a popularity contest that emphasizes analyst 
recognition rather than performance. Specifically, analysts who have had the star title 
before, who work for large or famous brokers, who cover large-cap stocks, who cover 
more firms, and who make more optimistic recommendations tend to be voted as stars. In 
other words, these factors enhance analyst recognition and increase the probability of them 
becoming stars. However, analyst performance measures are relatively ignored in the star 
election process. In particular, after an election, star analysts do not provide a higher 
quality service than non-star analysts, and even underperform.  
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Therefore, if star analysts have superior skills and their behaviours are not driven by 
conflicts of interest, star recommendations should have stronger predictive ability for 
acquirer announcement performance. However, if star rankings are a popularity contest, 
star recommendations will not be a more effective predictor of acquirer performance. 
 
Motivated by the aforementioned unaddressed issues, this chapter investigates the 
predictive ability of analyst recommendations for acquirer announcement performance, 
through analysing a sample of 10169 US M&A deals made by acquirers with stock 
recommendations during 1996–2010. In this study, star analysts refer to analysts elected 
as members of the All-America Research Team (including first, second, third, and 
runner-up teams) by Institutional Investor magazine. Acquirer announcement 
performance is measured by five-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR 
[-2, 2]) and standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR [-2, 2]). Analysts’ 
consensus recommendations for acquirers are measured by analysts’ average 
recommendations over the pre-deal [-182, -7] window, and post-deal [7, 182] window.  
 
As a consequence, this chapter finds that acquirers with more favourable consensus 
recommendations prior to takeover deals earn higher announcement returns, indicating 
that acquirer performance can be predicted by analyst recommendations. However, 
analyst reputation does not enhance recommendation informativeness. Specifically, there 
is no significant relation between star pre-deal consensus recommendations and acquirer 
announcement performance. In contrast, more optimistic non-star consensus 
recommendations, better acquirer performance. These results suggest that 
recommendations issued by star analysts are not as predictive as non-star 
recommendations. After takeover announcements, both star and non-star analysts provide 
more favourable recommendations for acquirers that gain higher returns around 
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announcement. In other words, both star and non-star analysts respond to acquisitions, 
adjusting stock recommendations based on takeover performance. Since the decisions on 
stock coverage may influence decisions on stock recommendations, in other words, the 
sample of acquirers with analyst recommendations are not randomly selected, and the 
results may suffer from selection bias. Therefore, this chapter uses the Heckman selection 
model to address this issue. The results are not qualitatively changed, confirming that 
non-star recommendations have stronger predictive ability for acquirer performance than 
star recommendations. In other words, this conclusion is consistent with the notion that 
star analyst rankings are a popularity contest (Emery and Li, 2009) 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature in the following aspects. First, this chapter 
links analyst recommendations with acquirer performance. Different from papers that 
investigate whether analysts forecast M&As, this chapter explores whether investors can 
use analyst recommendations to predict acquirer performance. The existing literature 
suggests that recommendation change can drive stock price movement, whereas 
recommendations do not have such an effect (Womack, 1996; Loh and Stulz, 2011). 
Therefore, by examining stock recommendations rather than change in recommendations, 
this chapter distinguishes acquirer announcement effects from analyst revision effects. 
Although Bradley, Morgan and Wolf (2007) suggest that analysts do not recognize targets, 
this chapter finds that analyst pre-deal recommendations are an effective predictor of 
acquirer announcement performance, whether analysts forecast acquisitions or not.  
 
Second, this chapter adds new evidence on the analyst reputation-quality mechanism in 
the context of M&As. Given the nature of the popularity contest, this chapter finds star 
recommendations to not be predictive for acquirer performance, whereas non-star 
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recommendations have strong predictive ability for acquirer performance. In other words, 
star analysts underperform.  
 
Third, this chapter also has important implications for practitioners. The existing literature 
suggests that star analysts revisions are more influential to drive stock price drift (Stickel, 
1992; Loh and Stulz, 2011). However, to predict acquirer announcement performance, 
investors would be better to follow non-star analysts’ recommendations.   
 
The reminder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 conducts literature review. 
Section 3 develops the hypotheses. Section 4 introduces data selection process and 
methodology. Section 5 shows empirical results and discussion. Section 6 draws the 
conclusion. 
 
4.2. Literature Review 
This chapter reviews two schools of literature – the relations between analyst reputation 
and analyst performance, and the role of analysts in M&As. 
 
4.2.1. Analysts and M&As 
The relations between financial analysts and takeovers have been attracting increasing 
academic attention. For instance, through analysing analyst behaviour around 
announcements of tender offers, Bradley, Morgan and Wolf (2007) investigate whether 
investment bank affiliation results in biased stock recommendations, whether investors 
can de-bias the over-optimistic recommendations issued by affiliated analysts, and 
whether bank affiliation has negative effects on recommendation profitability in the long 
term. They find that recommendations of affiliated analysts tend to be biased towards 
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favourable recommendations over the internet bubble period from 1990–2000, implying 
analyst conflicts of interest, even though affiliated analysts do not make more optimistic 
recommendations than unaffiliated analysts over the full-sample period. If analysts are 
able to identify takeover targets, recommendations for targets should be more positive 
around announcements, since targets gain positive announcement abnormal returns. 
However, the empirical results show that recommendations for target firms over the 
period a quarter prior to the announcements are least optimistic during the pre-deal quarter 
[-4, 0] window, suggesting that analysts are not able to identify targets. In addition, market 
reactions to analyst recommendations for acquirers are negatively related to investment 
bank affiliation over the internet bubble period, which indicate that investors are able to 
recognize analyst conflicts of interest and de-bias the affiliated recommendations. 
Furthermore, acquirers with optimistic recommendations underperform acquirers with 
pessimistic recommendations in the long term, suggesting that analysts cannot identify 
value-enhancing deals. Finally, the difference in long-term profitability between affiliated 
and unaffiliated recommendations is insignificant, suggesting that the cost of analyst 
conflicts of interest is limited to investors in the long term. 
 
Additionally, to distinguish analyst conflicts of interest from selection bias that ensures 
that investment banks with analysts who make favourable recommendations are chosen as 
M&A advisors, Kolasinski and Kothari (2008) examine the behaviour of 
acquirer-affiliated analysts in all-cash deals and target-affiliated analysts in all-stock deals. 
They find that acquirer-affiliated analysts make more favourable stock recommendations 
for acquirers surrounding announcements, and target-affiliated analysts upgrade stock 
recommendations for acquirers after the announcement date when the stock exchange rate 
is fixed. In other words, whether analysts are affiliated with acquirer or target investment 
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banks, they issue biased recommendations to curry favour with their clients, indicating the 
analyst conflicts of interest.  
 
By analysing behaviour of investment banking divisions, sell-side analysts, and asset 
managers of acquirer banks, Haushalter and Lowry (2011) explore the relations between 
investment bank affiliation, conflicts of interest, and information flow between different 
divisions. They find that acquirer banks adjust the shareholdings of the acquirers after the 
analysts of these banks adjust their recommendations for the acquirers during the 
post-merger period. However, this pattern of investment bank behaviour does not exist 
prior to announcements. More importantly, acquirer banks reduce acquirers’ 
shareholdings if their analysts downgrade the recommendations. In contrast, acquirer 
banks’ asset managers do not significantly respond to analyst upgrade recommendations. 
For banks that rely more on investment banking business, there are no significant relations 
between changes in analyst recommendations and asset managers’ decisions. These 
results suggest that asset managers make investment decisions based on recommendations 
that are less likely to be driven by conflicts of interest for analysts.  
 
Sibilkov, Straska and Waller (2013) investigate whether analyst coverage is rewarded by 
firms with M&A advisory business. Their study shows that investment banks that provide 
acquirers with analyst coverage prior to acquisitions tend to be retained by the acquirers as 
M&A financial advisors. After the deals, analysts affiliated with acquirer banks are more 
likely to continue covering the acquirers, compared to non-affiliated analysts. Additionally, 
affiliated analysts that did not provide coverage prior to acquisitions are more likely to 
begin to cover the acquirers after deals. For investment banks that did not provide analyst 
coverage before acquisitions, banks gain higher advisory fees if they initiate coverage 
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after acquisitions. In other words, acquirers use investment-banking business to 
compensate financial advisors for their analyst coverage. 
 
Tehranian, Zhao and Zhu (2014) investigate whether information on analysts’ decisions to 
cover merger participants add value to investors. In particular, the authors (Tehranian, 
Zhao and Zhu, 2014) focus on target analysts who continue to cover merged firms, and 
argue that these target analysts’ coverage decisions should contain more information about 
the quality of the deals and the performance of merged firms compared to acquirer 
analysts, since target analysts are confronted with more complex situations that targets are 
delisted after mergers, and merged firms are more difficult to analyse. Tehranian, Zhao 
and Zhu (2014) find that earnings forecasts for merged firms made by target analysts 
maintaining coverage are more accurate than those made by acquirer analysts maintaining 
coverage, indicating that remaining target analysts are more skilful than remaining 
acquirer analysts. Compared to acquirer analysts, target analysts tend to retain coverage 
for merged firms, when acquirers gain better announcement performance and pay lower 
bid premiums. Consequently, target analysts maintaining coverage make more favourable 
recommendations and more optimistic long-term forecasts for merged firms. Additionally, 
the percentage of remaining target analysts is positively related to merged firms’ post-deal 
long-term operating and stock performance, while there is no relation between the 
percentage of remaining acquirer analysts and merged firms’ performance. These results 
suggest that the coverage decisions of target analysts have strong predictive power for the 
performance of merged firms. 
 
Becher, Cohn and Juergens (2014) investigate whether post-announcement analyst 
recommendations impact M&A deal completion. They (Becher, Cohn and Juergens, 2014) 
find that deal completion rates are positively (negatively) related to the number of upgrade 
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(downgrade) recommendations for acquirers, and are negatively (positively) related to the 
number of upgrade (downgrade) recommendations for targets. In other words, acquirers 
with favourable recommendations are more likely to complete deals, whereas targets with 
unfavourable recommendations are more likely to complete deals. Further tests suggest 
that the target termination rate is positively (negatively) related to the number of 
downgrade (upgrade) recommendations for acquirers, whereas there is no significant 
relation between acquirer termination and analyst recommendations. In other words, 
targets tend to terminate deals, when recommendations for acquirers are unfavourable. In 
addition, analyst recommendations have significant effects on deal completion in stock 
deals, but have no effects on deal completion in all-cash deals. These results suggest that 
the relations between deal completion and analysts’ recommendations are driven by 
targets’ considerations of the valuations of acquirers and targets. After deal resolution, 
both acquirers and targets with favourable recommendations significantly underperform in 
the long term, compared to merger participants with unfavourable recommendations. 
 
Different from the above research of analysts’ effects on M&As, Wu and Zang (2009) 
focus on mergers of financial firms that are employers of sell-side financial analysts, and 
explore how bank mergers influence analysts’ careers. They (Wu and Zang, 2009) find 
that target analysts, accurate analysts in terms of earnings forecast, and analysts who have 
direct competitors in the merger counter party, are more likely to experience higher 
turnover during bank mergers. In comparison, more experienced analysts and star analysts 
tend to gain the promotion to research executives over the post-merger period. 
 
4.2.2. Analyst Reputation and Analyst Performance 
In terms of the effects of analyst reputation on analyst performance, there are two 
competing hypotheses – ‘superior skills’ and ‘popularity contests’. The superior skills 
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hypothesis suggests that star analysts have superior abilities to process information, pick 
stocks and choose right timings; they can therefore provide more accurate earnings 
forecasts and more valuable recommendations. In contrast, the popularity contest 
hypothesis suggests that star status is determined by recognition rather than performance, 
and star analysts do not outperform non-star analysts.  
 
The superior skills hypothesis is supported by considerable empirical evidence. 
Specifically, Stickel (1990) developed a model to predict analyst earnings forecast, and 
find that Institutional Investor star analysts are less likely to exhibit herding behaviour 
when they make earnings forecasts, and star analysts’ earnings forecasts are less likely to 
be predicted compared to non-star analysts. Stickel (1992) further investigates reputation, 
forecast performance, and influence of financial analysts. The study (Stickel, 1992) shows 
that the absolute forecast errors are smaller for star analysts than for non-star analysts. In 
other words, star analysts make more accurate earnings forecasts compared to non-star 
analysts. Additionally, the mean time span between forecasts is shorter for star analysts 
than for non-star analysts, suggesting star analysts update their earnings forecasts more 
frequently than non-star analysts. In terms of the effects of downward forecast revisions 
on stock price, the difference between star and non-star analysts is insignificant. However, 
the abnormal returns after star analysts’ upward forecast revisions are larger than the 
abnormal returns after non-star analysts’ upward forecast revisions, indicating that star 
analysts’ earnings forecasts have greater influence on stock price. In other words, star 
analysts’ earnings forecasts are more informative. Stickel (1995) expanded the research by 
analysing analysts’ recommendations, and finds that the effects of analyst 
recommendations on stock price are positively related to analyst reputation. In other words, 
star analysts’ recommendations are more influential. 
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Desai, Liang and Singh (2000) examine whether Wall Street Journal star analysts have 
superior stock-picking skills, and find that one- and two-year buy-and-hold returns are 
significantly higher for stocks recommended by star analysts than for size- and 
industry-adjusted matching stocks, suggesting that recommendations of star analysts have 
investment value. However, the difference in abnormal returns between stocks 
recommended by different ranks of star analysts is insignificant. In addition, stocks 
recommended by star analysts who cover only one industry offer significantly positive 
abnormal returns, while stocks recommended by star analysts who cover multiple 
industries offer insignificantly negative abnormal returns, suggesting that focused star 
analysts outperform diversified star analysts in terms of investment value of 
recommendations. Furthermore, stocks recommended by multiple star analysts do not 
outperform stocks recommended by a single star analyst. Although information 
asymmetry is lower for large-cap stocks than for small-cap stocks, large-cap stocks 
recommended by star analysts provide significantly positive abnormal returns, suggesting 
that star analysts’ superior stock-picking ability is also present in large-cap stocks.  
 
Leone and Wu (2007) analyse the relations between Institutional Investor analyst rankings 
and analyst performance, and find that star analysts outperform non-star analysts in terms 
of both earnings forecasts and stock-picking abilities, and star analysts’ forecast accuracy 
and recommendation profitability persist in the long term after they were voted as stars. 
Furthermore, star analysts are more likely to make bolder earnings forecasts that 
significantly deviate from analyst consensus, whereas non-star analysts tend to follow 
stars’ forecasts. Compared to non-star analysts, star analysts are more likely to experience 
job promotion and move from a small broker to a large broker. 
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Loh and Stulz (2011) study the factors that determine the effects of recommendation 
changes on stock prices. They find that changes in recommendations are influential in 
moving stock prices when analysts were able to make influential recommendations in the 
past, when analysts are ranked as stars by Institutional Investor, when the 
recommendations deviate from consensus, when the recommendations are issued around 
earnings forecast announcements by the same analysts, and when the recommendations 
are made by leader analysts; whereas forecast accuracy and analyst experience do not 
render recommendations influential. In particular, star status is the most influential 
analyst-specific factor that impacts stock price in terms of both magnitude and statistical 
significance.  
 
Fang and Yasuda (2009) investigate whether the reputations of banks and analysts are 
effective to discipline sell-side research. Their research suggests that more prestigious 
banks and Institutional Investor star analysts offer more accurate and less biased earnings 
forecasts, compared to less prestigious banks and non-star analysts. However, the effects 
of reputation on the quality of earnings forecasts alter according to the extent of conflicts 
of interest. Specifically, conflicts of interest lower the quality of earnings forecasts 
provided by prestigious banks, while star analysts still make higher quality earnings 
forecasts in the presence of conflicts of interest. In other words, analyst reputation rather 
than bank reputation alleviates conflicts of interest. Fang and Yasuda (2014) further 
examine the effects of analyst reputation on stock recommendation values, and find that 
investors gain excess returns by following star analysts’ stock recommendations, 
compared to investors who follow non-star recommendations. In other words, star analyst 
recommendations are more informative. These information advantages are more 
significant for institutional investors that tend to have advanced access to analyst 
recommendations. In addition, the empirical evidence suggests that the outperformance of 
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star analysts should be attributed to superior skills rather than good luck, market 
overreaction to star status, or access to private information. 
 
In contrast, there are also some studies in line with popularity contest hypothesis. For 
example, Gleason and Lee (2003) explore how analysts’ revision of their earnings 
forecasts affect post-revision stock price movement, and find that neither Institutional 
Investor nor The Wall Street Journal star status have effects on post-revision abnormal 
returns. However, the effects of earnings revision signal on post-revision returns are 
significantly lower for Institutional Investor stars, but significantly higher for the Wall 
Street Journal stars, compared to non-star analysts. 
 
Emery and Li (2009) investigate the determinants of sell-side analyst rankings and 
examine the post-voting performance of star analysts. Analysts who have been elected as 
Institutional Investor or The Wall Street Journal star analysts in the past, who work for 
more famous brokers, who work for larger brokers, who work for brokers with IPO 
reputation, who cover larger firms, and who cover more firms are more likely to be voted 
as Institutional Investor stars. Similarly, past star status, analyst experience, and working 
for large brokers increase the probability of being voted as The Wall Street Journal stars. 
In other words, both analyst rankings are determined by factors that help analysts win 
personal recognition. Furthermore, both Institutional Investor and The Wall Street Journal 
reward analysts who issue a higher percentage of optimistic (‘buy’ and ‘strong buy’) 
recommendations. However, analyst performance, such as forecast accuracy and 
recommendation values, exerts little influence on the probability of becoming Institutional 
Investor stars. In contrast, The Wall Street Journal ranking emphasizes recommendation 
performance, but does not consider earnings forecast quality. About 70% of Institutional 
Investor stars and just under 20% of The Wall Street Journal stars can repeat, indicating 
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that it is relatively easier for Institutional Investor stars but relatively difficult for The Wall 
Street Journal stars to maintain their star title. Although Institutional Investor does not 
disclose eligibility requirements, Institutional Investor creates greater barriers for analysts 
to compete. Meanwhile, the eligibility requirements of The Wall Street Journal also 
impede a vast number of top-performing analysts from being voted as stars, which impair 
its declaration of rankings being solely determined by performance. During the 
post-election period, neither Institutional Investor stars nor The Wall Street Journal stars 
outperform non-stars, whether analyst performance is measure by recommendation values 
or forecast accuracy. In particular, The Wall Street Journal stars even underperform 
non-stars in terms of recommendation values.  
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
The above-mentioned studies have examined the behaviour of analysts around M&As. 
However, no paper has investigated whether analyst recommendations can be used to 
predict acquirer performance. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are driven by market misvaluation (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). 
Overvalued acquirers lead to negative market reactions, and therefore underperform 
around takeover announcements (Dong et al., 2006). Logically, analysts should advise 
investors to buy a stock when its market value drops under its intrinsic value, and to sell a 
stock when its market value rises above its intrinsic value. In other words, analysts issue 
optimistic recommendations for undervalued stocks, and pessimistic recommendations for 
overvalued stocks, if they are not driven by conflicts of interest. Therefore, if analysts 
judge stock value rationally, their stock recommendations announced prior to the 
acquisitions should have predictive ability for acquirer performance. In addition, 
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well-managed acquirers with growth prospects outperform poorly managed acquirers 
(Lang, Stulz and Walkling, 1989; Servaes, 1991). If information about managerial 
performance and business opportunities has been incorporated into stock 
recommendations, acquirer announcement performance should be predicable by analysing 
pre-deal recommendations. Based on the above reasons, this chapter expects that acquirers 
with more optimistic recommendations gain higher announcement abnormal returns. 
 
More importantly, unlike the literature that concentrates on conflicts of interest, this 
chapter focuses on the reputation-quality mechanism. Specifically, this chapter 
investigates whether analyst reputation is positively related to recommendation predictive 
ability for acquirer performance. However, the literature reviewed above shows 
inconclusive evidence on the informativeness of star recommendations and forecasts. If 
star analysts have superior skills (Stickel, 1995; Desai, Liang and Singh, 2000; Leone and 
Wu, 2007; Fang and Yasuda, 2014) and reputation capital helps to discipline conflicts of 
interest (Fang and Yasuda, 2009), star recommendations should be a better predictor for 
acquirer performance. Therefore, this chapter constructs the following hypothesis: 
H1: Star consensus recommendations have stronger predictive ability for acquirer 
performance than non-star consensus recommendations. 
 
On the other hand, if analyst rankings are only a popularity contest (Emery and Li, 2009), 
star analysts will not make more informative recommendations compared to non-star 
analysts. In addition, star analysts tend to work for prestigious and large investment banks, 
and cover large-cap stocks (Emery and Li, 2009). Furthermore, star coverage can help 
banks gain more investment banking business (Clarke et al., 2007). As a result, conflicts 
of interest are potentially more severe for star analysts than for non-star analysts. 
Therefore, this chapter also constructs the following alternative hypothesis: 
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H1a: Non-star consensus recommendations have stronger predictive ability for acquirer 
performance than star consensus recommendations. 
 
4.4. Data and Methodology 
4.4.1. Sample Selection 
This chapter analyses a sample of US domestic M&As announced from 1st January 1996 
to 31st December 201025 acquired from Thomson One Banker. Acquirers are required to 
be publicly listed firms, and targets are required to be public, private or subsidiary firms. 
The original sample includes 75275 deals. This chapter drops observations of acquisitions 
with transaction value less than $1 million, leaving 42084 deals. Bankruptcy acquisitions, 
going-private transactions, leveraged buyouts, liquidations, repurchases, restructurings, 
reverse takeovers, and privatizations are excluded from the sample, which leaves 28365 
deals. To control for deal characteristics, observations are required report transaction value 
and payment method information to Thomson One Banker, which yields a sample of 
20221 deals. In addition, this chapter obtains analyst stock recommendations data from the 
Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES). Acquirers are required to have analyst 
recommendations over the period beginning 182 and ending 7 calendar days before the 
announcement [-182, -7], and beginning 7 and ending 182 calendar days after the 
announcement [7, 182]. To calculate announcement abnormal returns, acquirers are 
required to file sufficient stock price data with the CRSP database, which leaves a sample 
of 13605 deals. To measure firm characteristics, acquirers are required to have sufficient 
accounting data in the Compustat database, yielding a final sample of 10169 deals. In the 
                                                 
25 Stock recommendation data in IBES database are available from October 1993. This chapter examines 
stock recommendations of acquirers one year around the acquisition announcement and use consensus 
recommendations over the period beginning 730 and ending 182 days before the announcement as the 
exclusion restriction in the Heckman selection model. Therefore, the sample of M&A deals of this chapter 
starts in 1st January 1996. 
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final sample, acquirers of 9179 deals have analyst stock recommendations over the 
pre-deal [-182, -7] window; acquirers of 9285 deals have post-deal analyst stock 
recommendations over the post-deal [7, 182] window. 
 
4.4.2. Methodology 
4.4.2.1. Measure of Consensus Recommendations 
Analyst recommendations recorded in the IBES database are based on a five-point scale. 
Codes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 stand for ‘strong buy’, ‘buy’, ‘hold’, ‘underperform’, and ‘sell’, 
respectively. To map a more optimistic recommendation to a larger number, this chapter 
reverses the IBES codes, using 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 to represent ‘strong sell’, ‘sell’, ‘hold’, 
‘buy’, and ‘strong buy’, respectively. Analysts’ consensus recommendations for acquirers 
are calculated as analysts’ average recommendations. Correspondingly, consensus 
recommendations range from 1 to 5, where 1 and 5 represent the most pessimistic and the 
most optimistic consensus recommendations, respectively. This chapter calculates analysts’ 
consensus recommendations over the pre-deal [-182, -7] window and post-deal [7, 182] 
window.26 For the analyst who made several recommendations for a particular acquirer 
over the pre-deal or post-deal period, the analyst recommendation announced closest to 
the acquisition announcement is used to calculate consensus recommendations. 
 
4.4.2.2. Measure of Analyst Reputation 
This chapter uses a binary classification to distinguish between star and non-star analysts. 
Star analysts are defined as analysts voted as members of the All-America Research Team 
                                                 
26 Since this chapter calculate acquirer abnormal returns over the [-1, 1], [-2, 2], and [-5, 5] event windows, 
consensus recommendations are measured during pre-deal [-182, -7] and [7, 182] windows to prevent overlap 
between acquisition event window and stock recommendation window. 
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(including first, second, third, and runner-up teams) by Institutional Investor magazine in 
the year prior to the announcement year.  
 
Since analyst rankings are industry-specific, this chapter measures star status based on 
given industries. Following Boni and Womack (2006); Clarke et al. (2007); Emery and Li 
(2009), the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) developed by Standard & 
Poor's and MSCI is used in this chapter to identify industries. The GICS codes categorize 
companies into 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 industries and 154 sub-industries27. The 
GICS codes for companies are extracted from the Compustat database. This chapter 
assigns each star analyst a GICS industry based on the analyst specialized industry 
recorded by Institutional Investor magazine. 
 
4.4.2.3. Measure of Performance 
This chapter uses two measures to estimate acquirer announcement performance –
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and standardized cumulative abnormal returns 
(SCAR). Market-adjusted abnormal returns are defined as follows: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚𝑡 
where Rit is the daily stock return for firm i on date t and Rmt is the daily return for the 
value-weighted CRSP index on date t. Subsequently, market-adjusted CARs are calculated over 
a [-2, 2] window around announcements (CAR [-2, 2]), as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
 
 
                                                 
27  Based on GICS structure and sub-industry definition effective June 30, 2010. Online at 
http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/gics/en/au 
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In addition, SCARs over a [-2, 2] window around announcement (SCAR [-2, 2]) are 
calculated as follows: 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇1,𝑇2 =
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑇2
𝑡=𝑇1
𝜎(𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡)
 
where σ(ARit) is the standard deviation of daily market-adjusted abnormal returns over the 
period beginning 365 and ending 28 calendar days prior to the announcement [-365, -28]. 
 
4.4.2.4. Regression Analysis 
This chapter examines whether star or non-star consensus recommendations have 
predictive ability for acquirer announcement performance, whether star or non-star 
analysts respond to M&As, and whether star or non-star consensus recommendations have 
predictive ability for deal completion. 
 
4.4.2.4.1. Acquirer Announcement Performance 
This chapter investigates whether consensus recommendations made by star or non-star 
analysts are effective predictors of acquirer announcement performance, via conducting 
the following OLS regressions: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
where CARi and SCARi, the dependent variables in the regressions, are used as the proxy 
of acquirer announcement performance, representing cumulative abnormal returns and 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns for acquirer i around the announcement, 
respectively. Consensus_prei, the key explanatory variables in this research, represent the 
consensus recommendations for acquirers i over the pre-deal [-182, -7] window. In 
addition, this chapter includes a series of control variables that impact acquirer returns. 
Specifically, Firmi represents the firm characteristics of acquirer i at the end of the fiscal 
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year prior to the announcement. Deali represents the deal characteristics for acquirer i. The 
explicit description of firm, and deal characteristics will be shown later in this section. 
This research also controls for year fixed effects (ft) and industry fixed effects (find.).  
 
4.4.2.4.2. Analyst Post-Deal Consensus Recommendations 
This chapter investigates whether star or non-star analysts’ consensus recommendations 
announced over the post-deal period reflect acquirer announcement performance, through 
conducting the following OLS regressions: 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
where Consensus_post, the dependent variable in this research, represent the consensus 
recommendations for acquirer i over the post-deal [7, 182] window. CARi and SCARi, the 
key independent variables in the regressions, represent cumulative abnormal returns and 
standardized cumulative abnormal returns for acquirer i around the announcement, 
respectively. Other control variables, such as Firmi, Deali, ft and find., have been explained 
above. 
 
4.4.2.4.3. Deal Completion 
This chapter investigates whether consensus recommendations made by star or non-star 
analysts are effective predictors of deal completion, via conducting the following Probit 
regression: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖)
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖 
where Completed Deali dummy, the dependent variables in the regressions, equals one if 
the deal is successfully completed by acquirer i. Consensusi, the key explanatory variables 
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in this research, represent the consensus recommendations for acquirers i over the pre-deal 
[-182, -7] window. Other control variables, such as Firmi, Deali, ft and find., have been 
explained above. 
 
4.4.2.4.4. Selection Bias 
The aforementioned regressions only include observations of acquirers with analyst 
recommendations. If the analyst stock coverage and the stock recommendations are not 
independently decided, in other words, acquirers with recommendations are not randomly 
selected, then the above regression results will suffer from selection bias.  
 
For the regressions of acquirer announcement performance and the regressions of 
post-deal consensus recommendations, this chapter uses the Heckman selection model 
(Heckman, 1976; 1978; 1979) to address the selection bias. The Heckman selection model 
(Heckman, 1976; 1978; 1979) includes two equations – the selection equation and the 
regression equation. Specifically, the selection equation addresses whether variables are 
observed and the mechanism of selectivity. The regression equation addresses the 
relations between observed variables – in other words, the mechanism of outcome. The 
Heckman selection models of acquirer announcement performance are shown as follows: 
{
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜖𝑖
 
 
{
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜖𝑖
 
 196 
 
where Coverage_prei dummy equals one if acquirer i is covered by analyst 
recommendations over the pre-deal [-182, -7] window. Coverage_pasti dummy
28 equals 
one if acquirer i is covered by analyst recommendations over the pre-deal [-730, -182] 
window. Other variables in the equations have been described above. Intuitively, the 
decision on stock coverage will not be affected by the details of a merger deal that has not 
made, unless analysts know the event will happen. Therefore, deal characteristics (Deali) 
are not included in the selection equations.29 
 
In addition, the Heckman selection models of post-deal consensus recommendations are 
shown as follows: 
{
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜖𝑖
 
 
{
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛼4𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜖𝑖
 
where Coverage_posti dummy equals one if acquirer i is covered by analyst 
recommendations over the post-deal [7, 182] window. Coverage_pasti dummy
30 equals 
one if acquirer i is covered by analyst recommendations over the pre-deal [-730, -7] 
window. Other variables in the equations have been described above. 
 
                                                 
28 This variable is used to impose exclusion restrictions. In the Heckman selection model, it is advisable to 
include an exogenous variable in the selection equation, and exclude the variable from the regression 
equation. This variable should have influence on the selectivity, but do not have direct influence on the 
outcome. 
29 Results hold if deal characteristics are included in the selection equations. 
30 This variable is used to impose exclusion restrictions.  
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For the probit model of deal completion, this chapter uses the probit model with sample 
selection (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) to address selection bias. Similarly, the 
probit model with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) also includes two 
equations – selection equation and probit equation. The probit model with sample 
selection of deal completion is shown as follows: 
{
𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼0+𝛼1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒_𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜀𝑖
𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑠_𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛼3𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝑓𝑡 + 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑑. + 𝜖𝑖
 
where Coverage_prei dummy equals one if acquirer i is covered by analyst 
recommendations over the pre-deal [-182, -7] window. The Coverage_pasti dummy
31 
equals one if acquirer i is covered by analyst recommendations over the pre-deal [-730, 
-182] window. Other variables in the equations have been described above. 
 
4.4.2.4.5. Control Variables: Firm and Deal characteristics 
The control variables in this chapter include firm and deal characteristics.32 For firm 
characteristics (Firmi), this chapter controls for size (Ln(MV)), market-to-book ratio (M/B), 
leverage (Leverage), cash flow-to-equity ratio (Cash flows/Equity), pre-deal stock 
performance (RUNUP), stock risk (Sigma), and acquirer takeover experience (Past 
Experienced).  
 
For deal characteristics (Deali), this chapter controls for deal size (Ln(TV)), relative 
transaction values (Relative Size), acquirer public status (Public), payment method 
                                                 
31 This variable is used to impose exclusion restrictions.  
32 All the control variables mentioned in this section are described in Appendix 4.1, where Panels A and B 
present firm characteristics and deal characteristics, respectively. 
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(Cash/Stock), deal attitude (Hostile), bid competition (Competing Bid), tender offers 
(Tender offer), and diversifying deals (Diversification). 
 
4.5. Results 
4.5.1. Summary Statistics and Univariate Test 
4.5.1.1. Summary Statistics for the Sample of M&A Deals 
Table 4.1 exhibits summary statistics for the sample of M&A deals by acquirers covered 
by analyst recommendations around the announcement, and the univariate comparison 
between acquirers with star recommendations and without star recommendations. The 
sample includes 10169 deals. 3497 deals are made by acquirers with star 
recommendations, while 6672 deals are made by acquirers without star recommendations. 
 
[Insert Table 4.1 here] 
 
Panel A presents acquirer announcement performance. For the entire sample, acquirer 
CAR [-2, 2] is significantly positive, averaging 1.053% (p=0.000). The mean and median 
CAR [-2, 2] for acquirers covered by star analysts are 0.573% (p=0.000) and 0.142% 
(p=0.001), respectively; whereas the mean and median CAR [-2, 2] for acquirers covered 
by non-star analysts only are 1.305% (p=0.000) and 0.638% (p=0.000), respectively. 
Acquirers covered by star analysts underperform acquirers covered by non-star analysts 
only by 0.732% (p=0.000) on average. Furthermore, acquirer SCAR [-2, 2] average 
32.086% (p=0.000). The mean and median SCAR for acquirers covered by star analysts 
are 17.366% and 6.641%, respectively; while the mean and median SCAR [-2, 2] for 
acquirers covered by non-star analysts are only 39.801% and 23.928%, respectively. 
Acquirers covered by star analysts gain significantly lower SCAR, compared to acquirers 
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covered by non-star analysts only. Overall, regardless of measure of acquirer returns, 
acquirers covered by star analysts significantly underperform acquirers covered by 
non-star analysts around the announcement. 
 
Panel B shows firm characteristics of acquirers. For the entire sample, the acquirer market 
value averages $6646.352 million. The mean (median) market value for acquirers covered 
by star analysts is $14457.385 ($3176.558) million, while the mean (median) market value 
for acquirers covered by non-star analysts is only $2552.350 million ($436.26 million). 
The difference is statistically significant. The mean (median) size of acquirers covered by 
star analysts is 5.66 (7.28) times as large as the mean (median) size of acquirers covered 
by non-star analysts only. The mean and median market-to-book ratio for acquirers in the 
entire sample is 4.741 and 2.819, respectively. Acquirers covered by star analysts have 
significantly higher market-to-book ratio than other acquirers in the sample. The mean 
(median) leverage ratio for acquirers in the entire sample is 0.313 (0.285). Acquirers 
covered by star analysts have significantly higher leverage ratios than other acquirers in 
the sample. The mean (median) cash flows-to-equity ratio for acquirers in the entire 
sample is 0.044 (0.047). Acquirers covered by star analysts have a significantly higher 
cash flows-to equity ratio than other acquirers in the sample. The mean and median 
pre-deal stock price runups for acquirers in the entire sample are 18.367% and 11.204%, 
respectively. Acquirers covered by star analysts significantly underperform over the 
pre-deal [-365, -28] window, although the difference in median runup between acquirers 
covered by star analysts and non-star analysts only is insignificant. The mean (median) 
sigma for acquirers in the entire sample is 0.031 (0.026). Acquirers covered by star 
analysts have significantly lower sigma than other acquirers in the sample. For the entire 
sample, acquirers made 7.879 deals over the five-year period prior to acquisition on 
average. The median acquirer made five deals over the five-year period prior to 
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acquisition. Acquirers covered by star analysts are significantly more experienced than 
other acquirers in the sample.  
 
Panel C shows the deal characteristics. The mean (median) transaction value for the entire 
sample is $272.979 million ($49.500 million). The mean and median transaction values 
for deals by acquirers covered by star analysts are $514.953 million and $130.000 million, 
respectively; while the mean and median transaction values for deals by acquirers covered 
by non-star analysts only are $146.154 million and $32.000 million, respectively. The 
difference is significant. The mean (median) transaction value for deals by acquirers 
covered by star analysts is 3.52 (4.06) times as large as the mean (median) transaction 
value for deals by other acquirers in the sample. The mean (median) relative size for deals 
by acquirers covered by star analysts is 0.167 (0.064). Deals by acquirers covered by star 
analysts have significantly lower relative size than other deals in the sample. 26.856% of 
deals in the entire sample are public acquisitions. Acquirers covered by star analysts make 
a significantly higher percentage of public acquisitions. All-stock deals, all-cash deals and 
mixed paid deals account for 23.493%, 41.892% and 34.615% of the sample, respectively. 
Acquirers covered by star analysts make a significantly higher percentage of all-cash deals, 
and a lower percentage of mixed paid deals than other acquirers in the sample. Hostile 
deals account for 1.160% of the sample. Acquirers covered by star analysts make a 
significantly higher percentage of hostile deals. 1.583% of deals in the entire sample are 
competing bids. Acquirers covered by star analysts involve a significantly higher 
percentage of competing bids. Tender offers account for 6.126% of deals in the entire 
sample. Acquirers covered by star analysts make a higher percentage of tender offers. 
Diversifying deals occupy 36.719% of the deals in the entire sample. The difference in 
making diversifying deals between acquirers covered by star analysts and other acquirers 
is insignificant. 91.769% of deals in the sample are successfully completed. The difference 
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in deal completion rate between acquirers covered by star analysts and other acquirers is 
insignificant. 
 
Overall, Table 4.1 suggests that acquirers covered by star analysts gain significantly lower 
abnormal returns around the announcement, compared to acquirers covered by non-star 
analysts only. In addition, compared to only non-star covered acquirers, acquirers covered 
by star analysts tend to be larger firms, more glamour firms, firms with higher leverage, 
firms with a higher cash flows-to-equity ratio, firms with lower stock price runup, lower 
sigma firms, and more firms with more M&A experience. Moeller, Schlingemann and 
Stulz (2004) show that large firms tend to make value-destroying M&A deals. Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998), and Dong et al. (2006) suggest that glamour acquirers underperform 
value acquirers. Jensen (1986), Smith and Kim (1994), and Harford (1999) argue that 
cash-richness has negative effects on acquirer performance. Therefore, it is not difficult to 
understand why star-covered acquirers gain lower abnormal returns. Furthermore, 
acquirers covered by star analysts tend to make deals with larger transaction values but 
with lower relative size, a higher percentage of public acquisitions, a higher percentage of 
all-cash deals, a lower percentage of mixed paid deals, a higher percentage of hostile deals, 
a higher percentage of competing bids, and a higher percentage of tender offers. 
 
4.5.1.2. Consensus Recommendations for Acquirers Around Announcements 
Table 4.2 shows analyst consensus recommendations, star consensus recommendations 
and non-star consensus recommendations for acquirers surrounding M&A 
announcements.  
 
[Insert Table 4.2 here] 
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Panel A presents consensus recommendations over the pre-deal [-182, -7] window. 
Specifically, consensus recommendations of all analysts average 3.923. Star and non-star 
consensus recommendations average 3.783 and 3.930, respectively. Although the 
difference in consensus recommendations between star and non-star analysts is 
statistically significant (p=0.000), both star and non-star pre-deal consensus 
recommendations are close to 4 (‘buy’) – in other words, optimistic.  
 
Panel B presents consensus recommendations over the post-deal [7, 182] window. 
Specifically, consensus recommendations of all analysts average 3.860. Star and non-star 
consensus recommendations average 3.741 and 3.864, respectively. Both star and non-star 
post-deal consensus recommendations are optimistic, although the star consensus 
recommendations are significantly lower than non-star consensus recommendations. 
 
Panel C presents the difference between post-deal and pre-deal consensus 
recommendations. Whether the consensus recommendations are made by star or non-star 
analysts, post-deal consensus recommendations are significantly lower than pre-deal 
consensus recommendations. However, the magnitude of the adjustment is relatively 
small. 
 
Overall, both star and non-star consensus recommendations around announcement are 
optimistic. Furthermore, both star and non-star analysts lower the consensus 
recommendations after the announcement. However, the consensus recommendations are 
still optimistic. 
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4.5.1.3. Announcement Performance for Acquirers with Different Pre-Deal 
Consensus Recommendations 
Table 4.3 shows announcement performance for acquirers with different consensus 
recommendations over the pre-deal [-182, -7] window. Acquirers are divided into groups 
based on consensus recommendations.  
 
[Insert Table 4.3 here] 
 
Panel A presents announcement performance for acquirers with pessimistic, neutral, and 
optimistic consensus recommendations. Consensus recommendations are defined as 
pessimistic, if 1≤Consensus<2.5. Consensus recommendations are defined as neutral, if 
2.5 ≤ Consensus<3.5. Consensus recommendations are defined as optimistic, if 
3.5≤Consensus≤5. Panel A1 relates to acquirers covered by analysts. Acquirers with 
pessimistic, neutral and optimistic consensus recommendations account for 1.296%, 
22.366% and 76.337% of observations in the sample. In other words, the majority of 
analyst-covered acquirers have optimistic consensus recommendations prior to 
announcements. Mean and median CARs for acquirers with pessimistic analyst consensus 
recommendations are statistically insignificantly different from zero, whereas mean and 
median CARs for acquirers with optimistic consensus recommendations are 1.069% 
(p=0.000) and 0.508% (p=0.000), respectively. The differences in mean and median 
CARs between acquirers with pessimistic and optimistic consensus recommendations are 
statistically significant. In addition, mean and median SCARs for acquirers with 
pessimistic analyst consensus recommendations are statistically insignificantly different 
from zero, whereas mean and median SCARs for acquirers with optimistic consensus 
recommendations are 32.391% (p=0.000) and 20.385% (p=0.000), respectively. The 
differences in median SCARs between acquirers with pessimistic and optimistic 
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consensus recommendations are statistically significant. These results suggest that more 
optimistic pre-deal analyst consensus recommendations associate with better acquirer 
performance. 
 
Panel A2 relates to acquirers covered by star analysts. Acquirers with pessimistic, neutral 
and optimistic consensus recommendations account for 3.673%, 31.633% and 64.694% of 
observations in the sample. In other words, the majority of star-covered acquirers have 
optimistic star consensus recommendations prior to announcements. Whether acquirer 
performance is measured by CAR or SCAR, the difference in announcement performance 
between acquirers with pessimistic and optimistic consensus recommendations is 
statistically insignificant. In other words, there are no relations between pre-deal star 
consensus recommendations and acquirer announcement performance. 
 
Panel A3 relates to acquirers covered by non-star analysts. Acquirers with pessimistic, 
neutral and optimistic consensus recommendations account for 1.358%, 22.097% and 
76.545% of observations in the sample. In other words, the majority of non-star covered 
acquirers have optimistic non-star consensus recommendations prior to announcements. 
Mean and median CARs for acquirers with pessimistic non-star consensus 
recommendations are statistically insignificantly different from zero, whereas mean and 
median CARs for acquirers with optimistic non-star consensus recommendations are 
1.075% (p=0.000) and 0.509% (p=0.000), respectively. The median SCARs for acquirers 
with optimistic non-star consensus recommendations are significantly higher than that for 
acquirers with pessimistic non-star consensus recommendations. In addition, acquirers 
with pessimistic non-star consensus recommendations gain insignificant SCARs, whereas 
acquirers with optimistic consensus recommendations gain significantly positive SCARs 
(mean and median SCARs are 32.201% and 20.920%, respectively). The differences in 
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median SCARs between acquirers with pessimistic and optimistic consensus 
recommendations are statistically significant. These results suggest that more optimistic 
pre-deal non-star consensus recommendations there are, the better the acquirer 
announcement performance is. 
 
Since the majority of consensus recommendations for acquirers are optimistic, this chapter 
conducts further testing on acquirers with optimistic consensus recommendations. Panel B 
shows announcement performance for acquirers with optimistic consensus 
recommendations. Optimistic consensus recommendations are further divided into two 
levels – less optimistic (3.5≤Consensus<4.5) and more optimistic (4.5≤Consensus≤5). 
Panel B1 relates to acquirers covered by analysts. The mean and median CARs for 
acquirers with less optimistic analyst consensus recommendations are 0.759% (p=0.000) 
and 0.266% (p=0.000), respectively; while the mean and median CARs for acquirers with 
more optimistic consensus recommendations are 1.756% (p=0.000) and 1.134% 
(p=0.000), respectively. The differences in mean and median CARs are statistically 
significant. Furthermore, the mean and median SCARs for acquirers with less optimistic 
consensus recommendations are 23.133% (p=0.000) and 11.367% (p=0.000), respectively; 
whereas the mean and median SCARs for acquirers with more optimistic consensus 
recommendations are 52.987% (p=0.000) and 38.928% (p=0.000), respectively. The 
differences in mean and median SCARs are statistically significant. These results suggest 
that acquirers with more optimistic analyst recommendations gain significantly higher 
announcement abnormal returns compared to acquirers with less optimistic 
recommendations. 
 
Panel B2 relates to acquirers covered by star analysts. Whether acquirer performance is 
measured by CAR or SCAR, the differences in announcement performance between 
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acquirers with less optimistic and more optimistic star consensus recommendations are 
statistically insignificant. In other words, acquirers with more optimistic star 
recommendations do not outperform acquirers with less optimistic star consensus 
recommendations. The results suggest that star consensus recommendations do not relate 
to acquirer announcement performance. 
 
Panel B3 relates to acquirers covered by non-star analysts. The mean and median 
acquirers with less optimistic consensus recommendations gain CARs of 0.760% 
(p=0.000) and 0.266% (p=0.000), respectively. In contrast, the mean and median acquirers 
with more optimistic consensus recommendations gain CARs of 1.735% (p=0.000) and 
1.071% (p=0.000), respectively. CARs for acquirers with more optimistic non-star 
consensus recommendations are significantly higher than those for acquirers with less 
optimistic non-star consensus recommendations. In addition, the mean and median 
acquirers with less optimistic consensus recommendations gain SCARs of 23.399% 
(p=0.000) and 11.640% (p=0.000), while the mean and median acquirers with more 
optimistic consensus recommendations gain SCARs of 50.624% (p=0.000) and 37.446% 
(p=0.000). SCARs are significantly higher for acquirers with more optimistic non-star 
consensus recommendations than for acquirers with less optimistic non-star consensus 
recommendations. These results suggest that acquirers with more optimistic non-star 
consensus recommendations gain better announcement performance.  
 
Overall, the above results suggest that pre-deal non-star consensus is an effective predictor 
for acquirer performance, whereas star consensus recommendations have no effects on 
forecasting acquirer performance. 
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4.5.1.4. Post-Deal Recommendations for Acquirers with Different 
Announcement Performance 
Table 4.4 shows consensus recommendations over the post-deal [7, 182] window for 
acquirers with different announcement performance.  
 
[Insert Table 4.4 here] 
 
Panel A presents post-deal consensus recommendations for acquirers with different CARs. 
Acquirers are categorized into quartiles based on announcement CARs. Consensus 
recommendations of all analysts, star consensus recommendations, and non-star 
consensus recommendations for acquirer quartile of highest CARs are 3.947, 3.874 and 
3.946, respectively. Whether the recommendations are all made by analysts, star analysts 
or non-star analysts, acquirer quartiles of the highest CARs have the most optimistic 
consensus recommendations; and the differences in consensus recommendations between 
the acquirer quartiles of the highest CARs and the lowest CARs are statistically significant. 
These results suggest that post-deal consensus recommendations of all analysts, stars and 
non-stars are positively related to acquirer CARs. 
 
Panel B presents post-deal consensus recommendations for acquirers with different 
SCARs. For analyst consensus recommendations and non-star consensus 
recommendations, acquirer quartiles of the lowest SCARs have the least optimistic 
consensus recommendations (3.821 for analyst consensus, and 3.825 for non-star 
consensus); acquirer quartiles of the highest SCARs have the most optimistic consensus 
recommendations (3.890 for analysts’ consensus, and 3.892 for non-star consensus). The 
difference in consensus recommendations between the acquirer quartiles of the lowest 
SCARs and the highest SCARs are statistically significant. For star consensus 
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recommendations, acquirer quartile of the highest SCAR has the most optimistic 
consensus recommendations, although the difference in consensus recommendations 
between the acquirer quartiles of the lowest SCARs and the highest SCARs are 
statistically insignificant. However, apart from the acquirer quartile of the lowest SCARs, 
there is a trend that star consensus recommendations become increasingly optimistic with 
the increase in acquirer SCARs (star consensus 3.716, 3.733 and 3.780 for acquirer 
quartile of third highest, second highest, and the most highest SCARs). These results 
suggest that post-deal consensus recommendations of all analysts, stars and non-stars are 
positively related to acquirer SCARs. 
 
In general, more optimistic post-deal consensus recommendations are associated with 
greater acquirer announcement abnormal returns. The results suggest that both star and 
non-star post-deal consensus recommendations respond to acquirer announcement 
performance.  
 
4.5.2. Regression Analysis 
This chapter conducts regressions to examine whether star and non-star consensus 
recommendations have predictive ability for acquirer performance, whether star and 
non-star analysts respond to M&As, and whether star and non-star consensus 
recommendations can be used to predict deal completion.  
 
4.5.2.1. Acquirer Announcement Performance 
Table 4.5 shows the results of the OLS regressions of the acquirer announcement 
performance for the sample of acquirers covered by analysts (specifications 1 and 4), the 
subsample of acquirers covered by star analysts (specifications 2 and 5), and the 
subsample of acquirers covered by non-star analysts (specifications 3 and 6). Star analysts 
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are defined as analysts voted as the Institutional Investor all-star analysts in the year 
before the acquisition year. In these models, this chapter regresses acquirer performance 
(CAR [-2, 2] for specifications 1, 2, and 3; and SCAR [-2, 2] for specifications 4, 5, and 6 
against a vector of explanatory variables. The key explanatory variable is Consensus, 
calculated as the average analyst recommendations (Consensus of all analyst in 
Specification 1 and 4; Consensus of star analysts in Specification 2 and 5; and Consensus 
of non-star analysts in Specification 3 and 6). 
 
[Insert Table 4.5 here] 
 
The key explanatory variable Consensus is significantly positive in specifications 1, 3, 4, 
and 6. In other words, regardless of the measure of acquirer performance used, pre-deal 
consensus recommendations of all analysts are significantly positively related to acquirer 
announcement performance, suggesting that acquirers with more optimistic pre-deal 
consensus recommendations gain higher announcement returns. In addition, consensus 
recommendations of stars are significantly positively related to acquirer performance, 
whereas consensus recommendations of non-stars do not relate to acquirer performance. 
These results suggest that non-star consensus recommendations are effective predictors for 
acquirer performance, while star consensus recommendations do not have predictive 
ability for acquirer performance. 
 
Furthermore, the variable Ln(MV) is significantly negative in specifications 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6, 
which indicate that larger acquirers obtain better announcement performance. The variable 
Cash Flows/Equity is significantly positive in specifications 2 and 5, suggesting that 
acquirers with a higher cash flows-to-equity ratio gain higher announcement abnormal 
returns. In other words, acquirers with better pre-deal operating performance outperform 
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around announcement. The variable RUNUP is significantly positive in all of the 
specifications, which suggests that acquirers with better pre-deal stock performance gain 
higher announcement abnormal returns. The variable Sigma is significantly positive in 
specification 2, indicating that high sigma acquirers outperform low sigma acquirers. The 
variable Relative Size is significantly positive in specifications 1, 3, 4 and 6, suggesting 
that acquisitions of relatively larger targets create more value for acquirers. The Public 
dummy is significantly negative in all of the specifications, indicating that public 
acquisitions create less value for acquirers compared to private and subsidiary acquisitions. 
The Cash dummy is significantly positive in all of the specifications, which suggest that 
acquirers that make all-cash deals outperform acquirers that make all-stock deals or mixed 
paid deals. The Hostile dummy is significantly negative in all of the specifications, 
indicating that hostile deals decrease value. The Competing Bid dummy is significantly 
negative in all of the specifications, suggesting that acquisition contests have negative 
effects on acquirer performance. The Tender Offer dummy is significantly positive in all 
of the specifications, which indicate that acquirers that make tender offers gain higher 
abnormal returns. The Diversification dummy is significantly negative in specification 5, 
indicating that diversifying deals decrease value for acquirers.  
 
Since analyst stock coverage and stock recommendations may be not independently 
decided, there should be concern about selection bias. This chapter employs the Heckman 
selection model to address the potential selection bias. Table 4.6 shows the results of the 
Heckman selection model of the acquirer announcement performance for the sample of 
acquirers covered by analysts (specifications 1 and 4), the subsample of acquirers covered 
by star analysts (specifications 2 and 5), and the subsample of acquirers covered by 
non-star analysts (specification 3 and 6). In these models, the dependent variables of 
selection equation and regression equation are pre-deal [-182, -7] recommendation 
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coverage (analyst coverage for specifications 1 and 4; star coverage for specifications 2 
and 5; non-star coverage for specifications 3 and 6) and acquirer performance (CAR [-2, 2] 
for specifications 1, 2, and 3; and SCAR [-2, 2] for specifications 4, 5, and 6), 
respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 4.6 here] 
 
According to specifications 1 and 4, the selection equations suggest that financial analysts 
tend to cover large firms, glamour firms, firms with high leverage ratio, firms with high 
cash flows-to-equity ratio, firms with low stock price runup, and high sigma firms. The 
Inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant in the regression equations, indicating that the 
above OLS regressions for the sample of acquirers covered by analysts suffer from 
selection bias. Furthermore, the significant positive coefficients on the Inverse Mills ratio 
imply that given observables and latent variables that increase the probability of analyst 
coverage are associated with higher acquirer announcement returns. Although the 
selection bias presents, the relations between pre-deal analyst consensus recommendations 
and acquirer announcement performance are robust. The regression equations still suggest 
that more favourable pre-deal analysts’ consensus recommendations are associated with 
higher acquirer returns.  
 
According to specifications 2 and 5, the selection equations suggest that star analysts are 
more likely to cover large firms, value firms, firms with high leverage ratio, firms with 
high cash flows-to-equity ratio, firms with low stock price run-up, high sigma firms, and 
firms with relatively less acquisition experience. The Inverse Mills ratio is statistically 
insignificant in the regression equations, proving the consistency of OLS estimators for 
the sample of acquirers covered by stars. The insignificant coefficients on the Inverse 
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Mills ratio indicate that the given observable and latent variables that increase the 
probability of star coverage are not related to acquirer performance.  
 
According to specifications 3 and 6, the selection equations suggest that large firms, 
glamour firms, firms with high leverage ratio, firms with a high cash flows-to-equity ratio, 
firms with low stock price runup, and high sigma firms are more likely to be covered by 
non-stars. The Inverse Mills ratio is significantly positive in the regression equations, 
suggesting that selection bias presents in above OLS regressions for the sample of 
acquirers covered by non-stars, and indicating that the given observable and latent 
variables that increase the probability of non-star coverage relate to better acquirer 
performance. The regression equations imply that more favourable pre-deal non-start 
consensus recommendations for acquirers, higher acquirer abnormal returns. 
 
Overall, acquirers with higher pre-deal non-star consensus recommendations obtain better 
performance around announcements. In contrast, acquirers with higher pre-deal star 
consensus recommendations do not outperform other acquirers. In other words, non-star 
consensus recommendations are effective predictors for acquirer performance, whereas 
star-consensus recommendations do not have predictive ability for acquirer performance.  
 
4.5.2.2. Post-Deal Consensus Recommendations 
Table 4.7 shows the results of OLS regressions of post-deal [7, 182] consensus 
recommendations on acquirer performance for the sample of acquirers covered by 
analysts (specifications 1 and 4), the subsample of acquirers covered by star analysts 
(specifications 2 and 5), and the subsample of acquirers covered by non-star analysts 
(specifications 3 and 6). The key explanatory variables are CAR [-2, 2] (in specifications 1, 
2, and 3) and SCAR [-2, 2] (in specifications 4, 5, and 6).  
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[Insert Table 4.7 here] 
 
The coefficients on CAR [-2, 2] are significantly positive in specifications 1 and 3. The 
coefficients on SCAR [-2, 2] are significantly positive in specifications 4 and 6. These 
results suggest that post-deal analyst consensus recommendations are more favourable for 
acquirers with higher announcement returns. Additionally, non-stars make more 
favourable post-deal consensus recommendations for better-performing acquirers. The 
coefficient on the CAR [-2, 2] and SCAR [-2, 2] lose the significance in the specifications 
2 and 5, respectively. However, these results suffer from selection bias. Further testing of 
Heckman selection model33 suggests that star consensus recommendations over the 
post-deal period are also significantly positively related to acquirer announcement 
performance. 
 
In addition, the variable Ln(MV) is significantly negatively related to analyst consensus 
recommendations. The result is driven by the subsample of non-star analysts. In other 
words, non-stars do not value large firms. The variable M/B is significantly positive in 
specification 2, indicating that post-deal star consensus recommendations are more 
favourable for more glamour acquirers. The variable RUNUP is significantly positive in 
all of the specifications, suggesting that analysts, including both stars and non-stars, make 
more favourable recommendations for acquirers with better pre-deal stock performance. 
The variable sigma is significantly negative related to analyst consensus recommendations. 
The result is driven by the subsample of non-star analysts, indicating that lower sigma 
acquirers get more favourable non-star consensus recommendations over the post-deal 
period. The variable Past Experience is significantly positive in all of the specifications, 
                                                 
33 The results will be discussed in detail later in this section. 
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which suggests that both stars and non-stars value experienced acquirers. The variable 
Relative Size is significantly positive in specifications 3 and 6, implying that stars make 
more favourable post-deal consensus recommendations for acquirers that make 
acquisitions of relatively larger targets. The variables Cash and Stock are significantly 
negatively related to analyst consensus recommendations. The results are driven by the 
subsample of non-star analysts, suggesting that non-stars do not value acquirers that make 
all-cash deals or all-stock deals. The variable Tender Offer is significantly negatively 
related to analyst consensus recommendations. The result is driven by the subsample of 
non-star analysts, indicating that non-stars make unfavourable consensus 
recommendations for acquirers that make tender offers. 
 
To address selection bias, the Heckman selection model is used. Table 4.8 shows the 
results of the Heckman selection model of post-deal [7, 182] consensus recommendations 
for the sample of acquirers covered by analysts (specification 1 and 4), the subsample of 
acquirers covered by star analysts (specification 2 and 5), and the subsample of acquirers 
covered by non-star analysts (specification 3 and 6). In these models, the dependent 
variables of selection equation and regression equation are post-deal [7, 182] 
recommendation coverage (analyst coverage for specifications 1 and 4; star coverage for 
specifications 2 and 5; non-star coverage for specifications 3 and 6) and post-deal 
consensus recommendations for acquirers (all analyst consensus recommendations in 
specifications 1 and 4; star analyst consensus recommendations in specifications 2 and 5; 
and non-star analyst consensus recommendations in specifications 3 and 6, respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 4.8 here] 
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Selection equations in specifications 2 and 5 suggest that stars tend to cover larger firms, 
firms with higher leverage ratio, high sigma firms, and firms acquiring relatively larger 
targets over the post-deal period. In contrast, selection equations in specifications 3 and 6 
suggest that non-stars are more likely to cover larger firms, firms with a higher cash 
flows-to-equity ratio, high sigma firms, firms acquiring relatively larger targets, but are 
less likely to cover firms making public acquisitions, firms making tender offers, and 
firms making diversifying deals over the post-deal period.  
 
Furthermore, the Inverse Mills ratio in all of the specifications are significantly positive, 
implying that all of the OLS regressions above suffer from selection bias, and given the 
observable and latent variables that increase the probability of analyst coverage, are 
associated with more favourable post-deal consensus recommendations of both stars and 
non-stars.  
 
Although the selection bias present in the OLS regressions above, the relations between 
acquirer performance and post-deal non-star consensus recommendations are not 
qualitatively changed. However, the relations between acquirer performance and post-deal 
star consensus recommendations become statistically significant after controlling for 
selection bias. More specifically, the measures of acquirer performance are significantly 
positive in all of the regression equations, indicating that both stars and non-stars make 
more favourable consensus recommendations for better-performed acquirers. In other 
words, both stars and non-stars respond to M&As. 
 
In general, the relations between post-deal consensus recommendations and control 
variables hold, after selection bias is controlled for. However, the variable Ln(MV) loses 
the significance in the regression equations for the subsample of acquirers covered by 
 216 
 
non-stars, and become significantly positive in the regression equations for the subsample 
of acquirers covered by stars. The result indicates that stars make more favourable 
recommendations for larger acquirers, whereas non-stars do not value large acquirers. 
 
4.5.2.3. Deal Completion 
Table 4.9 presents the results of the probit model of deal completion for the sample of 
acquirers covered by analysts (specification 1), the subsample of acquirers covered by star 
analysts (specification 2), and the subsample of acquirers covered by non-star analysts 
(specification 3). In these models, this chapter regresses the Completed Deal dummy 
against a vector of explanatory variables. The Completed Deal dummy equals one if the 
deal is successfully completed. The key explanatory variable is Consensus (consensus of 
all analysts in Specification 1; consensus of star analysts in specification 2; and consensus 
of non-star analysts in specification 3).  
 
[Insert Table 4.9 here] 
 
The variable Consensus is statistically insignificant in all of the specifications, indicating 
that both star and non-star consensus recommendations do not have predictive ability for 
deal completion. Furthermore, the variable Ln(MV) is significantly positive in all of the 
specifications, indicating that larger acquirers have a higher deal completion rate. The 
variable M/B is significantly positive in specifications 1 and 3, which suggests that more 
glamour acquirers are more likely to successfully complete deals. The variable Sigma is 
significantly negative in specifications 1 and 3, implying that the probability of deal 
completion is lower for high sigma acquirers. The variable Public is significantly negative 
in specifications 1 and 3, suggesting that public acquisitions have lower deal completion 
rate, compared to private and subsidiary acquisitions. The variable Cash is significantly 
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negative in all of the specifications, and the variable Stock is significantly in specifications 
1 and 3, indicating that all-cash or all-stock deals have lower deal completion rate 
compared to mixed paid deals. The variable Competing Bid is significantly negative in all 
of the specifications, which suggests that biding contests lower the probability of deal 
completion. 
 
In addition, the probit model with sample selection (Van de Ven and Van Praag, 1981) is 
applied to address selection bias. Table 4.10 presents the results of the probit model with 
sample selection of the deal completion for the sample of acquirers covered by analysts 
(specification 1), the subsample of acquirers covered by star analysts (specification 2), and 
the subsample of acquirers covered by non-star analysts (specification 3). In these models, 
the dependent variables of selection equation and regression equation are pre-deal [-182, 
-7] recommendation coverage (analyst coverage for specification 1; star coverage for 
specification 2; non-star coverage for specification 3) and Completed Deal dummy, 
respectively.  
 
[Insert Table 4.10 here] 
 
Since the Wald tests have p-values of 0.355, 0.445, and 0.454 in specifications 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively, the hypothesis that the selection equation and probit equation are 
independent cannot be rejected. In other words, the results of the above probit models are 
reliable. 
 
Overall, pre-deal consensus recommendations are not related to the probability of deal 
completion. In other words, neither star consensus recommendations nor non-star 
consensus recommendations are an effective predictor for deal successfulness.  
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4.5.2.4. Star Analysts’ Predictive Ability in the Year Before Voted as Stars 
The results above suggest that star consensus recommendations do not have predictive 
ability for acquirer performance. Since stars are elected based on the last year performance, 
it is necessary to examine star analysts’ predictive ability in the year before elections. 
Table 4.11 presents results of OLS regressions of the acquirer announcement performance 
for the sample of acquirers covered by analysts (specifications 1 and 4), the subsample of 
acquirers covered by star analysts (specifications 2 and 5), and the subsample of acquirers 
covered by non-star analysts (specifications 3 and 6). To examine the predictive ability of 
stars in the year before election, star analysts are defined as analysts voted as the 
Institutional Investor all-star analysts in the year after the acquisition year.  
 
[Insert Table 4.11 here] 
 
The results show that pre-deal star consensus recommendations are not related to acquirer 
performance, whereas non-star consensus recommendations are significantly positively 
related to acquirer performance. In other words, pre-deal consensus recommendations of 
stars in the year before elections do not have predictive ability for acquirer performance.  
 
The Heckman selection model is used to address potential selection bias. Table 4.12 
shows results of the Heckman selection model of the acquirer announcement performance 
that examine star analysts’ predictive ability in the year before election.  
 
[Insert Table 4.12 here] 
 
The Inverse Mills ratio are statistically significant in the regression equations for the 
sample of acquirers covered by analysts and the subsample of acquirers covered by 
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non-stars, which suggests that corresponding OLS regressions suffer from selection bias. 
However, selection bias does not qualitatively affect the results. The Heckman selection 
model also suggests that acquirers with more favourable non-star consensus 
recommendations gain better announcement performance. In other words, consensus 
recommendations of non-stars are an effective predictor for acquirer performance. In 
contrast, the Inverse Mills ratios are statistically insignificant in the regression equations 
for the sample of acquirers covered by stars, indicating that the above OLS regressions of 
acquirer performance on star consensus recommendations are reliable. In other words, the 
Heckman selection models confirm the results that pre-deal consensus recommendations 
of stars in the year before election have no predictive ability on acquirer performance. 
 
4.5.3. Robustness Test 
This chapter addresses the robustness of the results as follows.   
4.5.3.1. Announcement Performance 
To examine whether the results are sensitive to the measures of acquirer performance, this 
chapter uses different valuation models and event windows to calculate announcement 
abnormal returns. In addition to the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
and standardized cumulative abnormal returns (SCAR), this chapter also uses the market 
model, the Fama-French three-factor model (Fama and French, 1993), and the 
Fama-French-momentum four-factor model (Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997) to 
compute announcement abnormal returns. In addition to the [-2, 2] window, this chapter 
also calculate abnormal returns over the [-1, 1] and [-5, 5] windows. The results are robust 
to these variations. 
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4.5.3.2. Star Analyst Status 
This chapter defines stars as analysts voted as the members of the All-America Research 
Team by Institutional Investor magazine in the year prior to the announcement year. This 
chapter has examined the performance of stars in the year before election. In addition, this 
chapter also examines the performance of stars in the year of election. The results are not 
sensitive to these variations. 
 
4.5.3.3. Consensus Recommendations 
This chapter measures consensus recommendations over different windows. In addition to 
pre-deal [-182, -7] and post-deal [7, 182] windows, this chapter also measures pre-deal 
consensus recommendations over the [-365, -7], [-91, -7], and [-61, -7] windows, and 
post-deal consensus recommendations over the [7, 61], [7, 91] and [7, 365] windows. The 
results are robust to these variations. 
 
4.5.3.4. Other Issues 
To control for the impact of outliers, this chapter also winsorizes all of the continuous 
variables at different levels, such as 1% and 99%, 3% and 97%, and 5% and 95%. In 
terms of sample selection, this chapter excludes financial (SIC codes 6000–6999) and 
utility firms (SIC codes 4900–4999). For the Heckman selection model, this chapter does 
not impose exclusion restrictions. In addition to a two-step estimator, this chapter also uses 
the maximum likelihood estimator in Heckman selection models. The results are not 
sensitive to the variations discussed above. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
Using a sample of US acquisitions by acquirers with analyst coverage during 1996–2010, 
this chapter examines financial analyst behaviour around takeovers to investigate whether 
analyst recommendations can be used to predict acquirer performance, and whether 
analysts respond to M&A announcements. More importantly, this chapter compares and 
contrasts the recommendations of star and non-star analysts to investigate whether 
high-ranked analysts’ recommendations have stronger predictive ability for acquirer 
performance. 
 
This chapter finds that acquirers with more favourable pre-deal consensus 
recommendations outperform acquirers with less favourable pre-deal consensus 
recommendations, suggesting that analyst recommendations have predictive ability for 
acquirer performance. On the other hand, if analyst recommendations are used as the 
proxy of stock valuation and future business opportunities, the results also suggest that 
firms that are temporarily undervalued but have growth prospects are more likely to 
become better acquirers. However, pre-deal recommendations are not predictive of deal 
completion. Additionally, financial analysts adjust their recommendations after acquisition 
announcements. Post-deal consensus recommendations are more favourable for acquirers 
that gain higher announcement returns. In other words, financial analysts respond to 
M&As.  
 
This chapter also compares star and non-star analysts. Compared to non-star analysts, star 
analysts are more likely to cover larger acquirers, glamour acquirers, acquirers with higher 
leverage, acquirers with lower pre-deal stock performance, acquirers with lower stock 
return volatility, and more experienced acquirers. Acquirers covered by star analysts also 
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tend to conduct larger transactions and make more public acquisitions but gain 
significantly lower announcement returns. 
 
On average, non-star analysts make more optimistic recommendations for acquirers than 
star analysts. However, star pre-deal consensus recommendations are not significant 
related to acquirer performance, whereas more favourable non-star recommendations are 
associated with better acquirer announcement performance. In other words, although 
non-star analysts are more biased towards favourable recommendations, non-star analysts’ 
recommendations are more informative to predict acquirer performance. If investors can 
identify this systematic bias, non-star analyst recommendations for acquirers have greater 
investment values around announcements. Furthermore, both star and non-star analysts 
respond to acquisitions by making recommendations according to acquirer performance. 
 
Since the decisions on stock coverage and stock recommendations may be correlated, in 
other words, the sample of acquirers with recommendations are not randomly selected, 
regression results may suffer from selection bias. This chapter uses the Heckman model to 
address this issue. Consequently, the results are not qualitatively changed.  
 
Overall, star recommendations have stronger predictive ability for acquirer performance 
than non-star recommendations, indicating that analyst rankings are a popularity contest. 
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Table 4.1 Summary statistics for the M&A deals 
This table presents summary statistics for the sample of M&A deals by acquirers covered by analysts around announcements, and univariate 
comparison between deals by acquirers covered by star analysts and non-star analysts only. Panel A reports acquirer announcement performance. 
CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns around announcements. SCAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day standardized cumulative 
abnormal returns around announcements. Panel B reports acquirer firm characteristics. MV is market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the 
announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is 
measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP 
is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Sigma is measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s 
market-adjusted daily abnormal return over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A 
deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. Panel C reports deal characteristics. Transaction Value is 
the value of the deal. Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Cash dummy 
equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Mixed dummy equals one if the deal is mixed paid by both stock and cash. Hostile dummy equals one if 
the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more 
than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different 
first two-digit of primary SIC code. Completed Deals dummy equals one if the deal is completed. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% 
and 98% levels. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the mean and median abnormal returns, 
respectively; the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians, respectively). Statistical significance at the 1% 
level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
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 All 
 
Star Coverage 
(S) 
Only Non-Star Coverage 
(N) 
Difference (S) – (N) 
 Mean Median 
 
Mean Median No. Mean Median No. Mean Median No. Mean P-Value Median P-Value 
Panel A: Announcement Performance 
CAR [-2,2] 1.053%*** 0.464%*** 10169 0.573%*** 0.142%*** 3497 1.305%*** 0.638%*** 6672 -0.732%*** (0.000) -0.496%*** (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.001) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
     
SCAR [-2,2] 32.086%*** 18.745%*** 10169 17.366%*** 6.641%*** 3497 39.801%*** 23.928%*** 6672 -22.435%*** (0.000) -17.287%*** (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) (0.004) 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
     
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
MV ($ mil.) 6646.352 796.811 10169 14457.385 3176.558 3497 2552.350 436.26 6672 11905.035*** (0.000) 2740.302*** (0.000) 
M/B 4.741 2.819 10169 5.248 3.142 3497 4.475 2.640 6672 0.773*** (0.000) 0.503*** (0.000) 
Leverage 0.313 0.285 10169 0.353 0.334 3497 0.292 0.247 6672 0.061*** (0.000) 0.087*** (0.000) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.044 0.047 10169 0.052 0.049 3497 0.039 0.045 6672 0.013*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
RUNUP 18.376% 11.204% 10169 17.180% 10.798% 3497 19.00% 11.415% 6672 -1.824%* (0.054) -0.617% (0.394) 
Sigma 0.031 0.026 10169 0.027 0.023 3497 0.033 0.028 6672 -0.005*** (0.000) -0.005*** (0.000) 
Past Experience 7.879 5.000 10169 11.649 8.000 3497 5.903 4.000 6672 5.746*** (0.000) 4.000*** (0.000) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value ($ mil.) 272.979 49.500 10169 514.953 130.000 3497 146.154 32.000 6672 368.800*** (0.000) 98.000*** (0.000) 
Relative Size 0.167 0.064 10169 0.144 0.040 3497 0.180 0.078 6672 -0.036*** (0.000) -0.037*** (0.000) 
Public 26.856% – 10169 34.601% – 3497 22.797% - 6672 11.804%*** (0.000) – – 
Stock 23.493% – 10169 23.563% – 3497 23.456% - 6672 0.107% (0.904) – – 
Cash 41.892% – 10169 47.126% – 3497 39.149% - 6672 7.977%*** (0.000) – – 
Mix 34.615% – 10169 29.311% – 3497 37.395% - 6672 -8.084%*** (0.000) – – 
Hostile 1.160% – 10169 1.630% – 3497 0.914% - 6672 0.716%*** (0.003) – – 
Competing Bid 1.583% – 10169 2.259% – 3497 1.229% - 6672 1.030%*** (0.000) – – 
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Tender Offer 6.126% – 10169 8.665% – 3497 4.796% - 6672 3.868%*** (0.000) – – 
Diversification 36.719% – 10169 37.489% – 3497 36.316% - 6672 1.173% (0.245) – – 
Completed Deals 91.769% – 10169 92.279% – 3497 91.502% - 6672 0.777% (0.170) – – 
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Table 4.2: Consensus recommendations for acquirers around announcements 
This table presents analyst consensus recommendations, star analyst consensus recommendations, 
and non-star analyst consensus recommendations for acquirers around M&A announcements. 
Panel A reports pre-deal consensus recommendations for acquirers over the period beginning 182 
and ending 7 days before the announcement. Panel B reports post-deal consensus 
recommendations for acquirers beginning 7 and ending 182 days after the announcement. Panel C 
reports the difference in consensus recommendations for acquirers between the post-deal and 
pre-deal periods. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the t-test for the differences in means). 
Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
 
 
 
All 
Consensus 
 
Star 
Consensus 
(S) 
Non-Star 
Consensus 
(N) 
Difference 
(S) – (N) 
    Mean P-value 
Panel A: Pre-deal [-182, -7] Consensus 
Mean 3.923 3.783 3.930 -0.147*** (0.000) 
No. 9179 2450 9060   
Panel B: Post-deal [7, 182] Consensus 
Mean 3.860 3.741 3.864 -0.123*** (0.000) 
No. 9285 2555 9192   
Panel C: Difference (Panel B – Panel A) 
Mean -0.063*** -0.041* -0.065***   
P-value (0.000) (0.080) (0.000)   
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Table 4.3: Announcement performance for acquirers with different pre-deal consensus recommendations 
This table presents announcement performance for acquirers with different consensus recommendations over the period beginning 182 and ending 7 days before the 
announcement. Analyst recommendations from IBES are based on a five-point scale. Codes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 stand for ‘strong buy’, ‘buy’, ‘hold’, ‘underperform’, and 
‘sell’, respectively. To map a more optimistic recommendation to a larger number, this chapter reverse IBES codes, using 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 to represent ‘strong sell’, 
‘sell’, ‘hold’, ‘buy’, and ‘strong buy’, respectively. Correspondingly, consensus recommendations range from 1 to 5, where 1 and 5 represent the most pessimistic and 
the most optimistic consensus recommendations, respectively. Acquirer announcement performance is measured by CAR and SCAR. Specifically, CAR [-2, 2] is the 
5-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns around announcement, and SCAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day standardized cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement. Panel A reports announcement performance for acquirers with pessimistic (1≤Consensus<2.5), neutral (2.5≤Consensus<3.5), and optimistic 
(2.5≤Consensus<3.5) consensus recommendations. Panel A1, A2, and A3 relates to results for acquirers covered by analysts, acquirers covered by star analysts, and 
acquirers covered by non-star analysts, respectively. Panel B reports announcement performance for acquirers with less optimistic (3.5≤Consensus<4.5) and more 
optimistic (4.5≤Consensus≤5) consensus recommendations. Panel B1, B2, and B3 relates to results for acquirers covered by analysts, acquirers covered by star 
analysts, and acquirers covered by non-star analysts, respectively. P-Values are shown in parentheses (the t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for the mean and median 
abnormal returns, respectively; the t-test and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test for the differences in means and medians, respectively). CARs and SCARs are winsorized at the 2% 
and 98% levels. Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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Panel A: Announcement Performance for Acquirers with pessimistic, neutral and optimistic consensus recommendations 
 Consensus Recommendations  Difference 
 Pessimistic (P) 
1≤Consensus<2.5 
Neutral (N) 
2.5≤Consensus<3.5 
Optimistic (O) 
3.5≤Consensus≤5 
 
(O) – (P) 
  
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median 
Panel A1: Acquirers with Analyst Recommendation Coverage 
CAR [-2,2] -0.204% -0.380% 0.755%*** 0.218%*** 1.069%*** 0.508%***  1.272%* 0.888%** 
P-Value (0.753)  (0.372)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.054)  (0.042)  
SCAR [-2,2] -5.975% -16.237% 23.288%*** 10.975%*** 32.391%*** 20.385%***  38.367% 36.622%* 
P-Value (0.808)  (0.423)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.124)  (0.046)  
No. 119 119 2053 2053 7007 7007    
Panel A2: Acquirers with Star Analyst Recommendation Coverage 
CAR [-2,2] 1.052% 0.337% 0.424%* 0.102% 0.509%*** 0.112%*  -0.543% -0.225% 
P-Value (0.140)  (0.263)  (0.073)  (0.237)  (0.008)  (0.069)   (0.459)  (0.512)  
SCAR [-2,2] 23.322% 17.460% 17.655%* 3.936% 15.475%** 6.238%  -7.847% -11.221% 
P-Value (0.405)  (0.287)  (0.058)  (0.213)  (0.020)  (0.101)   (0.785)  (0.579)  
No. 90 90 775 775 1585 1585    
Panel A3: Acquirers with Non-Star Analyst Recommendation Coverage 
CAR [-2,2] 0.046% -0.253% 0.808%*** 0.251%*** 1.075%*** 0.509%***  1.029% 0.762%* 
P-Value (0.942)  (0.672)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.110)  (0.096)  
SCAR [-2,2] -0.483% -11.607% 25.637%*** 13.125%*** 32.201%*** 20.920%***  32.684% 32.527%* 
P-Value (0.984)  (0.586)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.181)  (0.079)  
No. 123 123 2002 2002 6935 6935    
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Panel B: Announcement Performance for Acquirers with less optimistic and more optimistic consensus recommendations 
 Consensus Recommendations  Difference 
 Less Optimistic (LO) 
3.5≤Consensus<4.5 
More Optimistic (MO) 
4.5≤Consensus≤5 
 
(MO) – (LO) 
  
 Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median 
Panel B1: Acquirers with Analyst Recommendation Coverage 
CAR [-2,2] 0.759%*** 0.266%*** 1.756%*** 1.134%***  0.997%*** 0.869%*** 
P-Value (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
SCAR [-2,2] 23.133%*** 11.367%*** 52.987%*** 38.928%***  29.853%*** 27.561%*** 
P-Value (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
No. 4834 4834 2173 2173    
Panel B2: Acquirers with Star Analyst Recommendation Coverage 
CAR [-2,2] 0.454%* 0.103% 0.610%* 0.167%  0.156% 0.064% 
P-Value (0.057)  (0.146)  (0.057)  (0.284)   (0.695)  (0.994)  
SCAR [-2,2] 14.690%* 5.720% 16.917% 6.798%  2.227% 1.079% 
P-Value (0.081)  (0.171)  (0.123)  (0.367)   (0.872)  (0.917)  
No. 1026 1026 559 559    
Panel B3: Acquirers with Non-Star Analyst Recommendation Coverage 
CAR [-2,2] 0.760%*** 0.266%*** 1.735%*** 1.071%***  0.974%*** 0.806%*** 
P-Value (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
SCAR [-2,2] 23.399%*** 11.640%*** 50.624%*** 37.446%***  27.225%*** 25.806%*** 
P-Value (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000)  
No. 4693 4693 2242 2242    
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Table 4.4: Post-deal consensus recommendations for acquirers with different 
announcement performance 
This table presents post-deal consensus recommendations over the period beginning 7 ending 
182 days after the announcement. Panel A reports post-deal [7, 182] consensus 
recommendations for acquirers with different CARs. CAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns around announcement. Acquirers are categorized into quartiles 
based on CARs, where group (1) and group (4) represent acquirers with lowest and highest 
CARs, respectively. Panel A1, A2 and A3 relate to analyst consensus, star analyst consensus, 
and non-star analyst consensus, respectively. Panel B reports post-deal [7, 182] consensus 
recommendations for acquirers with different SCARs. SCAR [-2, 2] is the 5-day standardized 
cumulative abnormal returns around announcement. Acquirers are categorized into four 
groups based on SCARs, where group (1) and group (4) represents acquirers with lowest and 
highest SCARs, respectively. Panel B1, B2 and B3 relate to analyst consensus, star analyst 
consensus, and non-star analyst consensus, respectively. P-Values are shown in parentheses 
(the t-test for the differences in means). Statistical significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 
10% level is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 
Panel A: Post-deal [7, 182] Consensus Recommendations for Acquirers with Different CARs 
 CAR [-2, 2] 
Low---------------------------------------------High 
Difference 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) – (1) 
     Mean P-Value 
Panel A1: Analyst Consensus 
Consensus 3.862  3.810  3.829  3.947  0.084***  (0.000)  
N 2340 2427 2351 2167   
Panel A2: Star Analyst Consensus 
Consensus 3.767  3.704  3.666  3.874  0.107**  (0.034)  
N 641 726 706 482   
Panel A3: Non-Star Analyst Consensus 
Consensus 3.865  3.811  3.843  3.946  0.081***  (0.000)  
N 2318 2402 2324 2148   
Panel B: Post-deal [7, 182] Recommendations for Acquirers with Different SCARs  
 SCAR [-2, 2] 
Low---------------------------------------------High 
Difference 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4) – (1) 
     Mean P-Value 
Panel B1: Analyst Consensus 
Consensus 3.821  3.857  3.874  3.890  0.069***  (0.001)  
N 2440 2294 2272 2279   
Panel B2: Star Analyst Consensus 
Consensus 3.739  3.716  3.733  3.780  0.042  (0.375)  
N 732 611 628 584   
Panel B3: Non-Star Analyst Consensus 
Consensus 3.825  3.860  3.884  3.892  0.066***  (0.001)  
N 2417 2271 2247 2257   
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Table 4.5: OLS regressions of acquirer announcement performance 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of the acquirer announcement performance for 
the sample of acquirers covered by analysts (Specifications 1 and 4), the subsample of 
acquirers covered by star analysts (Specifications 2 and 5), and the subsample of acquirers 
covered by non-star analysts (Specifications 3 and 6). Star analysts are defined as analysts 
voted as the Institutional Investor all-star analysts in the year before the acquisition year. In 
these models this chapter regresses acquirer performance (CAR [-2, 2] for Specifications 1, 2, 
and 3; SCAR [-2, 2] for Specifications 4, 5, and 6) against a vector of explanatory variables. 
The key explanatory variable is Consensus calculated as the average analyst 
recommendations (Consensus of all analyst in Specifications 1 and 4; Consensus of star 
analysts in Specifications 2 and 5; and Consensus of non-star analysts in Specifications 3 and 
6). Control variables include acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics. For 
acquirer firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 
weeks before the announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before 
the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end 
before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. 
RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to 
announcement. Sigma is measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily 
abnormal return over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is 
measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to 
the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured as the 
transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Cash dummy equals 
one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. 
Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One 
Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. 
Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one 
if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. This chapter 
also controls for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported 
in the table. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. The P-Values 
shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 Regression of CAR on Consensus  Regression of SCAR on Consensus 
 All Star Non-Star  All Star Non-Star 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Consensus 0.0035** -0.0004 0.0029**  0.1309*** -0.0025 0.1085** 
 (0.012) (0.832) (0.033)  (0.006) (0.974) (0.018) 
Ln(MV) -0.0029*** -0.0019 -0.0030***  -0.1172*** -0.1169** -0.1212*** 
 (0.000) (0.181) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) 
M/B 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001  0.0072 0.0122 0.0069 
 (0.610) (0.672) (0.637)  (0.121) (0.157) (0.137) 
Leverage 0.0044 -0.0077 0.0050  -0.0004 -0.3187 0.0140 
 (0.247) (0.267) (0.195)  (0.997) (0.200) (0.910) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.0164 0.0536** 0.0149  0.2810 1.1543* 0.2602 
 (0.227) (0.031) (0.279)  (0.421) (0.077) (0.463) 
RUNUP 0.0050* 0.0135** 0.0052*  0.1673** 0.3590** 0.1780** 
 (0.084) (0.018) (0.073)  (0.016) (0.013) (0.010) 
Sigma 0.1710 0.4035* 0.1748  -3.2061 3.6558 -3.1637 
 (0.128) (0.070) (0.122)  (0.223) (0.456) (0.233) 
Past Experience 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001  0.0009 0.0012 0.0012 
 (0.518) (0.998) (0.458)  (0.795) (0.825) (0.726) 
Relative Size 0.0136*** -0.0010 0.0129**  0.3686** 0.0353 0.3231* 
 (0.006) (0.901) (0.010)  (0.026) (0.914) (0.055) 
Public -0.0232*** -0.0144*** -0.0232***  -0.8135*** -0.5223*** -0.8128*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash 0.0055*** 0.0100*** 0.0056***  0.2457*** 0.4992*** 0.2464*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock -0.0012 -0.0043 -0.0008  -0.0618 -0.1267 -0.0485 
 (0.677) (0.394) (0.792)  (0.452) (0.424) (0.558) 
Hostile -0.0237*** -0.0197** -0.0236***  -1.0589*** -0.9463** -1.0524*** 
 (0.001) (0.040) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) 
Competing Bid -0.0181*** -0.0231*** -0.0175**  -0.6254** -1.1056*** -0.5789** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.005) (0.030) 
Tender Offer 0.0336*** 0.0163*** 0.0334***  1.3403*** 0.7856*** 1.3394*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0007 -0.0047 -0.0006  -0.0749 -0.2407** -0.0719 
 (0.693) (0.139) (0.735)  (0.212) (0.039) (0.235) 
Constant 0.0088 0.0207 0.0117  0.6165* 1.2410* 0.7369** 
 (0.433) (0.305) (0.298)  (0.084) (0.090) (0.038) 
N 9179 2450 9060  9179 2450 9060 
R2 0.038 0.053 0.038  0.049 0.062 0.049 
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.037 0.034  0.045 0.046 0.045 
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Table 4.6: Heckman selection model (two-step) of acquirer announcement performance 
This table presents results of Heckman selection model of the acquirer announcement performance for the sample of acquirers covered by analysts 
(Specifications 1 and 4), the subsample of acquirers covered by star analysts (Specifications 2 and 5), and the subsample of acquirers covered by non-star 
analysts (Specification 3 and 6). Star analysts are defined as analysts voted as the Institutional Investor all-star analysts in the year before the acquisition year. 
In these models, the dependent variables of selection equation and regression equation are pre-deal [-182, -7] recommendation coverage (analyst coverage for 
Specifications 1 and 4; star coverage for Specifications 2 and 5; non-star coverage for Specifications 3 and 6) and acquirer performance (CAR [-2, 2] for 
Specifications 1, 2, and 3; SCAR [-2, 2] for Specifications 4, 5, and 6), respectively. The key explanatory variable is Consensus calculated as the average 
analyst recommendations (Consensus of all analyst in Specification 1 and 4; Consensus of star analysts in Specification 2 and 5; and Consensus of non-star 
analysts in Specification 3 and 6). Control variables include acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics. For acquirer firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is 
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal 
year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of 
equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Sigma is 
measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily abnormal return over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is 
measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative 
Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target 
is publicly listed. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals 
one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. 
Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of 
primary SIC code. Past Coverage dummy is used as the variable of exclusion restriction. Past Coverage dummy equals one if the acquirer is covered by analysts 
(all analysts in Specification 1 and 4; star analysts in Specification 2 and 5; and non-star analysts in Specification 3 and 6) over the [-730, -182] window prior 
to announcement. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. The P-Values are shown in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and 
* respectively.
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 Regression of CAR on Consensus  Regression of SCAR on Consensus 
 All 
(1) 
 Star 
(2) 
 Non-Star 
(3) 
 All 
(4) 
 Star 
(5) 
 Non-Star 
(6)       
 Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression 
Consensus  0.0032**   -0.0005   0.0025*   0.1238***   0.0005   0.1001** 
  (0.025)   (0.807)   (0.067)   (0.007)   (0.995)   (0.027) 
Ln(MV) 0.4952*** -0.0010  0.3520*** -0.0014  0.4571*** -0.0010  0.4952*** -0.0766***  0.3520*** -0.1422**  0.4571*** -0.0755** 
 (0.000) (0.259)  (0.000) (0.436)  (0.000) (0.276)  (0.000) (0.008)  (0.000) (0.033)  (0.000) (0.011) 
M/B 0.0098*** 0.0001  -0.0064** -0.0002  0.0105*** 0.0001  0.0098*** 0.0071  -0.0064** 0.0129  0.0105*** 0.0070 
 (0.001) (0.498)  (0.016) (0.517)  (0.000) (0.501)  (0.001) (0.126)  (0.016) (0.159)  (0.000) (0.134) 
Leverage 0.2151*** 0.0050  0.3370*** -0.0073  0.1616*** 0.0053  0.2151*** 0.0117  0.3370*** -0.3382  0.1616*** 0.0215 
 (0.001) (0.164)  (0.000) (0.276)  (0.009) (0.141)  (0.001) (0.921)  (0.000) (0.165)  (0.009) (0.855) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.4922*** 0.0203*  0.7378*** 0.0545***  0.4988*** 0.0191*  0.4922*** 0.3640  0.7378*** 1.1001  0.4988*** 0.3532 
 (0.001) (0.050)  (0.000) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.069)  (0.001) (0.283)  (0.000) (0.113)  (0.001) (0.302) 
RUNUP -0.1300*** 0.0049**  -0.1695*** 0.0133***  -0.1241*** 0.0051**  -0.1300*** 0.1658**  -0.1695*** 0.3732**  -0.1241*** 0.1752** 
 (0.000) (0.019)  (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.016)  (0.000) (0.016)  (0.000) (0.010)  (0.000) (0.011) 
Sigma 5.8196*** 0.1705**  10.0374*** 0.4090***  5.9316*** 0.1772**  5.8196*** -3.2184  10.0374*** 3.3322  5.9316*** -3.1102 
 (0.000) (0.030)  (0.000) (0.006)  (0.000) (0.025)  (0.000) (0.209)  (0.000) (0.535)  (0.000) (0.227) 
Past Experience -0.0025 0.0000  -0.0090*** -0.0000  -0.0032 0.0000  -0.0025 -0.0001  -0.0090*** 0.0016  -0.0032 0.0001 
 (0.375) (0.872)  (0.000) (0.952)  (0.238) (0.801)  (0.375) (0.972)  (0.000) (0.727)  (0.238) (0.968) 
Relative Size  0.0127***   -0.0010   0.0120***   0.3510***   0.0323   0.3033** 
  (0.000)   (0.881)   (0.001)   (0.003)   (0.891)   (0.011) 
Public  -0.0233***   -0.0144***   -0.0233***   -0.8160***   -0.5231***   -0.8152*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Cash  0.0055***   0.0101***   0.0056***   0.2452***   0.4947***   0.2455*** 
  (0.007)   (0.005)   (0.006)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Stock  -0.0009   -0.0043   -0.0005   -0.0553   -0.1297   -0.0417 
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  (0.724)   (0.341)   (0.857)   (0.495)   (0.422)   (0.610) 
Hostile  -0.0235***   -0.0197*   -0.0233***   -1.0535***   -0.9473**   -1.0449*** 
  (0.004)   (0.081)   (0.005)   (0.000)   (0.020)   (0.000) 
Competing Bid  -0.0179***   -0.0230**   -0.0173**   -0.6211***   -1.1087***   -0.5748** 
  (0.010)   (0.025)   (0.015)   (0.006)   (0.003)   (0.013) 
Tender Offer  0.0333***   0.0163***   0.0333***   1.3359***   0.7857***   1.3361*** 
  (0.000)   (0.004)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Diversification  -0.0011   -0.0046   -0.0010   -0.0835   -0.2434**   -0.0811 
  (0.528)   (0.130)   (0.568)   (0.152)   (0.027)   (0.167) 
Past Coverage 0.8700***   1.0098***   0.8489***   0.8700***   1.0098***   0.8489***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Inverse Mills ratio  0.0158***   0.0016   0.0167***   0.3335**   -0.0941   0.3732** 
  (0.001)   (0.753)   (0.001)   (0.040)   (0.609)   (0.026) 
Constant -3.2314*** -0.0079  -4.6255*** 0.0150  -2.9688*** -0.0061  -3.2314*** 0.2636  -4.6255*** 1.5739*  -2.9688*** 0.3392 
 (0.000) (0.493)  (0.000) (0.559)  (0.000) (0.597)  (0.000) (0.482)  (0.000) (0.091)  (0.000) (0.369) 
N 11846 9179  11846 2450  11846 9060  11846 9179  11846 2450  11846 9060 
Pseudo R2 0.363 –  0.342 –  0.336 –  0.363 –  0.342 –  0.336 – 
Adjusted R2 – 0.025  – 0.031  – 0.025  – 0.034  – 0.040  – 0.034 
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Table 4.7: OLS regressions of post-deal consensus recommendations for acquirers 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of post-deal [7, 182] consensus 
recommendations for the sample of acquirers covered by analysts (Specifications 1 and 4), the 
subsample of acquirers covered by star analysts (Specifications 2 and 5), and the subsample 
of acquirers covered by non-star analysts (Specifications 3 and 6). Star analysts are defined as 
analysts voted as the Institutional Investor all-star analysts in the year before the acquisition 
year. In these models this chapter regresses post-deal consensus recommendations for 
acquirers (all analyst consensus recommendations in Specifications 1 and 4; star analyst 
consensus recommendations in Specifications 2 and 5; non-star analyst consensus 
recommendations in Specifications 3 and 6) against a vector of explanatory variables. The key 
explanatory variables are CAR [-2, 2] and SCAR [-2, 2]. Control variables include acquirer 
firm characteristics and deal characteristics. For acquirer firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. 
M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book 
value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total 
debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is 
measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value 
of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs 
over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Sigma is measured as the standard 
deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily abnormal return over the [-365, -28] window prior 
to announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an 
acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of 
equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly 
listed. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy equals one if the 
deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or 
unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of 
bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. 
Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of 
primary SIC code. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
For brevity, they are not reported in the table. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% 
and 98% levels. The P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
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 Regression of Consensus on CAR  Regression of Consensus on SCAR 
 All Star Non-Star  All Star Non-Star 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
CAR [-2,2] 0.1861** 0.3355 0.1544*     
 (0.031) (0.122) (0.079)     
SCAR [-2,2]     0.0064** 0.0094 0.0057** 
     (0.016) (0.108) (0.034) 
ln(MV) -0.0357*** -0.0026 -0.0352***  -0.0356*** -0.0022 -0.0350*** 
 (0.000) (0.863) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.887) (0.000) 
M/B -0.0000 0.0048* 0.0004  -0.0001 0.0047 0.0003 
 (0.986) (0.091) (0.785)  (0.966) (0.100) (0.802) 
Leverage 0.0141 -0.0684 0.0309  0.0150 -0.0658 0.0317 
 (0.696) (0.438) (0.391)  (0.676) (0.456) (0.379) 
Cash Flows/Equity -0.0530 -0.0105 -0.0897  -0.0528 -0.0048 -0.0894 
 (0.646) (0.966) (0.459)  (0.648) (0.985) (0.460) 
RUNUP 0.3020*** 0.2483*** 0.2968***  0.3018*** 0.2488*** 0.2965*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sigma -1.8261** -1.0120 -2.0033***  -1.7727** -0.8899 -1.9572*** 
 (0.012) (0.555) (0.008)  (0.015) (0.603) (0.009) 
Past Experience 0.0045*** 0.0058*** 0.0042***  0.0045*** 0.0058*** 0.0042*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Size 0.0469 0.0390 0.0652*  0.0469 0.0383 0.0650* 
 (0.152) (0.589) (0.052)  (0.152) (0.596) (0.052) 
Public 0.0096 0.0420 -0.0009  0.0106 0.0429 0.0004 
 (0.586) (0.275) (0.963)  (0.548) (0.264) (0.984) 
Cash -0.0505*** -0.0188 -0.0476***  -0.0510*** -0.0197 -0.0482*** 
 (0.003) (0.679) (0.006)  (0.003) (0.663) (0.005) 
Stock -0.0518** -0.0599 -0.0439**  -0.0517** -0.0603 -0.0438** 
 (0.010) (0.227) (0.033)  (0.010) (0.225) (0.034) 
Hostile -0.0282 0.0984 -0.0347  -0.0259 0.1014 -0.0323 
 (0.685) (0.559) (0.624)  (0.711) (0.547) (0.650) 
Competing Bid 0.0128 -0.1454 0.0127  0.0138 -0.1443 0.0139 
 (0.827) (0.291) (0.831)  (0.814) (0.294) (0.816) 
Tender Offer -0.1303*** -0.0649 -0.1337***  -0.1328*** -0.0668 -0.1365*** 
 (0.000) (0.303) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.289) (0.000) 
Diversification 0.0120 0.0540 0.0104  0.0124 0.0546 0.0108 
 (0.426) (0.178) (0.497)  (0.412) (0.172) (0.482) 
Constant 3.9838*** 3.7242*** 3.9741***  3.9813*** 3.7177*** 3.9715*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 9285 2555 9192  9285 2555 9192 
R2 0.166 0.187 0.154  0.166 0.187 0.154 
Adjusted R2 0.162 0.174 0.150  0.162 0.174 0.150 
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Table 4.8: Heckman selection model (two-step) of post-deal consensus recommendations for acquirers 
This table presents results of Heckman selection model of post-deal [7, 182] consensus recommendations for the sample of acquirers covered by analysts 
(Specifications 1 and 4), the subsample of acquirers covered by star analysts (Specifications 2 and 5), and the subsample of acquirers covered by non-star 
analysts (Specifications 3 and 6). Star analysts are defined as analysts voted as the Institutional Investor all-star analysts in the year before the acquisition year. 
In these models, the dependent variables of selection equation and regression equation are post-deal [7, 182] recommendation coverage (analyst coverage for 
Specifications 1 and 4; star coverage for Specifications 2 and 5; non-star coverage for Specifications 3 and 6) and post-deal consensus recommendations for 
acquirers (all analyst consensus recommendations in Specifications 1 and 4; star analyst consensus recommendations in Specifications 2 and 5; non-star 
analyst consensus recommendations in Specifications 3 and 6), respectively. The key explanatory variables are CAR [-2, 2] and SCAR [-2, 2].  Control 
variables include acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics. For acquirer firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of 
equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book value of 
equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash 
Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. 
RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Sigma is measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s 
market-adjusted daily abnormal return over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by 
an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by 
the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly listed. Cash dummy equals one if the 
deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited 
by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a 
tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of primary SIC code. Past Coverage dummy is used as 
the variable of exclusion restriction. Past Coverage dummy equals one if the acquirer is covered by analysts (all analysts in Specifications 1 and 4; star analysts 
in Specifications 2 and 5; and non-star analysts in Specifications 3 and 6) over the [-730, -7] window prior to announcement. This chapter also controls for 
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. The 
P-Values are shown in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 Regression of Consensus on CAR  Regression of Consensus on SCAR 
 All 
(1) 
 Star 
(2) 
 Non-Star 
(3) 
 All 
(4) 
 Star 
(5) 
 Non-Star 
(6)       
 Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression 
CAR [-2,2] 0.3004 0.1901**  0.2284 0.3799*  0.2833 0.1600*          
 (0.108) (0.019)  (0.275) (0.079)  (0.123) (0.054)          
SCAR [-2,2]          0.0027 0.0063**  0.0104* 0.0109*  0.0037 0.0058** 
          (0.670) (0.011)  (0.093) (0.063)  (0.540) (0.023) 
Ln(MV) 0.4894*** -0.0054  0.3085*** 0.0396**  0.4615*** -0.0032  0.4881*** -0.0051  0.3091*** 0.0401**  0.4605*** -0.0029 
 (0.000) (0.430)  (0.000) (0.027)  (0.000) (0.657)  (0.000) (0.454)  (0.000) (0.026)  (0.000) (0.685) 
M/B 0.0019 -0.0002  -0.0020 0.0046*  0.0016 0.0002  0.0020 -0.0002  -0.0021 0.0044*  0.0017 0.0002 
 (0.532) (0.863)  (0.480) (0.086)  (0.586) (0.861)  (0.514) (0.843)  (0.464) (0.097)  (0.573) (0.880) 
Leverage 0.1145* 0.0246  0.3173*** -0.0324  0.0564 0.0359  0.1153* 0.0255  0.3188*** -0.0295  0.0572 0.0367 
 (0.084) (0.376)  (0.000) (0.643)  (0.382) (0.209)  (0.082) (0.358)  (0.000) (0.672)  (0.375) (0.199) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.5596*** -0.0036  0.2545 0.0215  0.5617*** -0.0391  0.5645*** -0.0023  0.2555 0.0275  0.5657*** -0.0380 
 (0.000) (0.965)  (0.215) (0.919)  (0.000) (0.643)  (0.000) (0.977)  (0.213) (0.897)  (0.000) (0.653) 
RUNUP 0.0513 0.3068***  -0.0270 0.2349***  0.0312 0.2997***  0.0518 0.3066***  -0.0277 0.2354***  0.0316 0.2995*** 
 (0.174) (0.000)  (0.522) (0.000)  (0.398) (0.000)  (0.170) (0.000)  (0.511) (0.000)  (0.392) (0.000) 
Sigma 2.8906** -1.9326***  3.3504** -0.7786  3.4321*** -2.0446***  2.9558** -1.8783***  3.4277** -0.6419  3.5061*** -1.9958*** 
 (0.032) (0.002)  (0.029) (0.626)  (0.010) (0.001)  (0.029) (0.002)  (0.026) (0.687)  (0.008) (0.001) 
Past Experience 0.0024 0.0038***  -0.0027 0.0052***  -0.0013 0.0034***  0.0024 0.0038***  -0.0027 0.0052***  -0.0012 0.0034*** 
 (0.444) (0.000)  (0.108) (0.000)  (0.646) (0.000)  (0.441) (0.000)  (0.108) (0.000)  (0.653) (0.000) 
Relative Size 0.1193** 0.0414  0.2430*** 0.0699  0.0965* 0.0588**  0.1261** 0.0416  0.2426*** 0.0691  0.1018* 0.0587** 
 (0.044) (0.134)  (0.000) (0.291)  (0.094) (0.039)  (0.033) (0.133)  (0.000) (0.296)  (0.078) (0.039) 
Public -0.0975* -0.0011  -0.0137 0.0396  -0.0952* -0.0115  -0.1043** -0.0003  -0.0105 0.0408  -0.1002** -0.0104 
 (0.051) (0.954)  (0.760) (0.315)  (0.051) (0.547)  (0.037) (0.988)  (0.816) (0.301)  (0.040) (0.586) 
Cash -0.0455 -0.0549***  0.0488 -0.0120  -0.0452 -0.0526***  -0.0441 -0.0554***  0.0474 -0.0132  -0.0440 -0.0532*** 
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 (0.245) (0.001)  (0.226) (0.753)  (0.236) (0.001)  (0.259) (0.000)  (0.240) (0.729)  (0.248) (0.001) 
Stock -0.0646 -0.0502***  -0.0704 -0.0681  -0.0238 -0.0396**  -0.0635 -0.0500***  -0.0699 -0.0685  -0.0229 -0.0395** 
 (0.167) (0.009)  (0.153) (0.155)  (0.603) (0.046)  (0.174) (0.010)  (0.156) (0.152)  (0.617) (0.047) 
Hostile -0.3368** -0.0403  -0.0589 0.0998  -0.2638 -0.0431  -0.3410** -0.0381  -0.0532 0.1036  -0.2668* -0.0408 
 (0.041) (0.542)  (0.696) (0.420)  (0.100) (0.524)  (0.038) (0.564)  (0.724) (0.403)  (0.097) (0.547) 
Competing Bid 0.0766 0.0224  0.0828 -0.1457  0.0159 0.0184  0.0714 0.0233  0.0859 -0.1443  0.0116 0.0195 
 (0.626) (0.685)  (0.516) (0.173)  (0.914) (0.746)  (0.649) (0.673)  (0.500) (0.178)  (0.938) (0.732) 
Tender Offer -0.2832*** -0.1488***  -0.0683 -0.0671  -0.2804*** -0.1543***  -0.2710*** -0.1511***  -0.0746 -0.0696  -0.2720*** -0.1569*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.348) (0.277)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.306) (0.260)  (0.001) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0490 0.0039  -0.0175 0.0539*  -0.0567* 0.0017  -0.0490 0.0042  -0.0167 0.0546*  -0.0567* 0.0020 
 (0.159) (0.781)  (0.616) (0.096)  (0.094) (0.907)  (0.159) (0.762)  (0.632) (0.091)  (0.094) (0.889) 
Past Coverage 1.1381***   1.2660***   1.1414***   1.1383***   1.2665***   1.1416***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Inverse Mills ratio  0.2537***   0.1678***   0.2626***   0.2548***   0.1676***   0.2634*** 
  (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000) 
Constant -3.1727*** 3.7128***  -4.6182*** 3.1301***  -3.0625*** 3.6854***  -3.1673*** 3.7090***  -4.6263*** 3.1234***  -3.0590*** 3.6817*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
N 11846 9285  11846 2555  11846 9192  11846 9285  11846 2555  11846 9192 
Pseudo R2 0.387 –  0.384 –  0.365 –  0.387 –  0.385 –  0.365 – 
Adjusted R2 – 0.166  – 0.178  – 0.154  – 0.167  – 0.178  – 0.154 
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Table 4.9: Probit model of deal completion 
This table presents results of probit model of the deal completion for the sample of acquirers 
covered by analysts (Specification 1), the subsample of acquirers covered by star analysts 
(Specification 2), and the subsample of acquirers covered by non-star analysts (Specification 
3). Star analysts are defined as analysts voted as the Institutional Investor all-star analysts in 
the year before the acquisition year. In these models this chapter regresses Completed Deal 
dummy against a vector of explanatory variables. Completed Deal dummy equals one if the 
deal is completed. The key explanatory variable is Consensus calculated as the average 
analyst recommendations (Consensus of all analysts in Specification 1; Consensus of star 
analysts in Specification 2; and Consensus of non-star analysts in Specification 3). Control 
variables include acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics. For acquirer firm 
characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 
weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is 
measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Sigma 
is measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily abnormal return over 
the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of 
M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. 
For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the 
acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if 
the target is publicly listed. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock 
dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is 
identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one 
if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a 
tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first 
two-digit of primary SIC code. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and year 
fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. The P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
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 All Star Non-Star 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Consensus -0.0359 -0.0526 -0.0453 
 (0.273) (0.316) (0.155) 
Ln(MV) 0.0743*** 0.1195*** 0.0724*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
M/B 0.0083** 0.0044 0.0084** 
 (0.021) (0.526) (0.020) 
Leverage 0.0548 -0.1248 0.0557 
 (0.518) (0.495) (0.514) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.2544 -0.1742 0.2782 
 (0.274) (0.698) (0.232) 
RUNUP 0.0183 0.0734 0.0192 
 (0.717) (0.545) (0.706) 
Sigma -4.3070** -2.5632 -4.0879** 
 (0.025) (0.472) (0.035) 
Past Experience -0.0020 0.0033 -0.0017 
 (0.612) (0.451) (0.657) 
Relative Size -0.0647 0.1737 -0.0940 
 (0.427) (0.311) (0.248) 
Public -0.1419** -0.1636 -0.1283** 
 (0.015) (0.158) (0.029) 
Cash -0.2276*** -0.3061*** -0.2316*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
Stock -0.3100*** -0.0745 -0.3215*** 
 (0.000) (0.584) (0.000) 
Hostile -1.7272*** -1.5774*** -1.7148*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Competing Bid -1.1096*** -0.9464*** -1.0972*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tender Offer -0.0000 0.0966 -0.0086 
 (1.000) (0.555) (0.929) 
Diversification -0.0692 -0.0035 -0.0663 
 (0.136) (0.968) (0.157) 
Constant 4.8766*** 4.8157*** 4.9168*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 9179 2450 9060 
Pseudo R2 0.111 0.145 0.110 
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Table 4.10: Probit model with sample selection of deal completion 
This table presents results of probit model with sample selection of the deal completion for 
the sample of acquirers covered by analysts (Specification 1), the subsample of acquirers 
covered by star analysts (Specification 2), and the subsample of acquirers covered by non-star 
analysts (Specification 3). Star analysts are defined as analysts voted as the Institutional 
Investor all-star analysts in the year before the acquisition year. In these models, the 
dependent variables of selection equation and regression equation are pre-deal [-182, -7] 
recommendation coverage (analyst coverage for Specification 1; star coverage for 
Specification 2; non-star coverage for Specification 3) and Completed Deal dummy, 
respectively. Completed Deal dummy equals one if the deal is completed. The key 
explanatory variable is Consensus calculated as the average analyst recommendations 
(Consensus of all analyst in Specification 1; Consensus of star analysts in Specification 2; and 
Consensus of non-star analysts in Specification 3). Control variables include acquirer firm 
characteristics and deal characteristics. For acquirer firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. 
M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement divided by book 
value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total 
debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is 
measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value 
of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs 
over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Sigma is measured as the standard 
deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily abnormal return over the [-365, -28] window prior 
to announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of M&A deals made by an 
acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, 
Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of 
equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target is publicly 
listed. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy equals one if the 
deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is identified as hostile or 
unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of 
bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. 
Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of 
primary SIC code. Past Coverage dummy is used as the variable of exclusion restriction. Past 
Coverage dummy equals one if the acquirer covered by analysts (all analysts in Specification 1; 
star analysts in Specification 2; and non-star analysts in Specification 3) over the [-730, -182] 
window prior to announcement. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and year 
fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. The P-Values are shown in parentheses. Significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively.
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 All 
(1) 
 Star 
(2) 
 Non-Star 
(3)    
 Selection Probit  Selection Probit  Selection Probit 
Consensus  -0.0382   -0.0563   -0.0473 
  (0.250)   (0.301)   (0.149) 
Ln(MV) 0.4952*** 0.0892***  0.3520*** 0.1474***  0.4571*** 0.0848*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.003)  (0.000) (0.000) 
M/B 0.0099*** 0.0083**  -0.0064** 0.0033  0.0106*** 0.0085** 
 (0.001) (0.028)  (0.016) (0.663)  (0.000) (0.025) 
Leverage 0.2157*** 0.0588  0.3371*** -0.0996  0.1622*** 0.0573 
 (0.001) (0.488)  (0.000) (0.584)  (0.009) (0.502) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.4898*** 0.2869  0.7376*** -0.1039  0.4976*** 0.3044 
 (0.001) (0.214)  (0.000) (0.835)  (0.001) (0.193) 
RUNUP -0.1301*** 0.0171  -0.1693*** 0.0596  -0.1242*** 0.0181 
 (0.000) (0.733)  (0.000) (0.589)  (0.000) (0.721) 
Sigma 5.8020*** -4.3074**  10.0343*** -2.1213  5.9175*** -4.0725** 
 (0.000) (0.019)  (0.000) (0.612)  (0.000) (0.028) 
Past Experience -0.0024 -0.0022  -0.0090*** 0.0029  -0.0030 -0.0019 
 (0.403) (0.358)  (0.000) (0.518)  (0.257) (0.429) 
Relative Size  -0.0693   0.1770   -0.0977 
  (0.383)   (0.300)   (0.223) 
Public  -0.1425**   -0.1602   -0.1287** 
  (0.011)   (0.135)   (0.023) 
Cash  -0.2268***   -0.3003***   -0.2310*** 
  (0.000)   (0.004)   (0.000) 
Stock  -0.3061***   -0.0726   -0.3185*** 
  (0.000)   (0.581)   (0.000) 
Hostile  -1.7257***   -1.5720***   -1.7130*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Competing Bid  -1.1085***   -0.9397***   -1.0964*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Tender Offer  -0.0016   0.0968   -0.0094 
  (0.985)   (0.515)   (0.917) 
Diversification  -0.0715*   0.0008   -0.0681 
  (0.094)   (0.992)   (0.113) 
Past Coverage 0.8685***   1.0099***   0.8475***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Constant 0.8497 5.1077  -4.4612*** 4.9790  1.3259 5.2668 
 (0.998) (0.990)  (0.000) (0.991)  (0.998) (0.992) 
N 11846 9179  11846 2450  11846 9060 
𝜒2 (𝜌=0) 0.854 (p=0.355)  0.582 (p=0.445)  0.561 (p=0.454) 
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Table 4.11: OLS regressions of acquirer announcement performance (Examining star 
analyst predictive ability in the year before elections) 
 
This table presents results of OLS regressions of the acquirer announcement performance for 
the sample of acquirers covered by analysts (Specifications 1 and 4), the subsample of 
acquirers covered by star analysts (Specifications 2 and 5), and the subsample of acquirers 
covered by non-star analysts (Specifications 3 and 6). Star analysts are defined as analysts 
voted as the Institutional Investor all-star analysts in the year after the acquisition year. In 
these models this chapter regresses acquirer performance (CAR [-2, 2] for Specifications 1, 2, 
and 3; SCAR [-2, 2] for Specifications 4, 5, and 6) against a vector of explanatory variables. 
The key explanatory variable is Consensus calculated as the average analyst 
recommendations (Consensus of all analyst in Specification 1 and 4; Consensus of star 
analysts in Specification 2 and 5; and Consensus of non-star analysts in Specification 3 and 6). 
Control variables include acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics. For acquirer 
firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 
weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. 
Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the 
announcement divided by market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is 
measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Sigma 
is measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily abnormal return over 
the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is measured as the number of 
M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. 
For deal characteristics, Relative Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the 
acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if 
the target is publicly listed. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock 
dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals one if the deal is 
identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one 
if the number of bidding firms is more than one. Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a 
tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first 
two-digit of primary SIC code. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 2% and 98% 
levels. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, 
they are not reported in the table. The P-Values shown in parentheses are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and acquirer clustering. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is 
denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
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 Regression of CAR on Consensus  Regression of SCAR on Consensus 
 All Star Non-Star  All Star Non-Star 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Consensus 0.0033** -0.0013 0.0029**  0.1454*** -0.0390 0.1186** 
 (0.024) (0.529) (0.046)  (0.003) (0.616) (0.013) 
Ln(MV) -0.0029*** -0.0029** -0.0030***  -0.1115*** -0.1355*** -0.1162*** 
 (0.000) (0.046) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) 
M/B 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001  0.0075 0.0043 0.0075 
 (0.641) (0.545) (0.624)  (0.113) (0.626) (0.117) 
Leverage 0.0047 -0.0022 0.0045  -0.0170 -0.1934 -0.0270 
 (0.236) (0.760) (0.268)  (0.894) (0.435) (0.834) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.0138 0.0241 0.0104  0.1669 0.3381 0.0684 
 (0.348) (0.353) (0.479)  (0.654) (0.646) (0.854) 
RUNUP 0.0050* 0.0148*** 0.0051*  0.1506** 0.3250** 0.1604** 
 (0.097) (0.008) (0.089)  (0.035) (0.024) (0.025) 
Sigma 0.1590 0.1685 0.1483  -3.9376 -0.6990 -4.2508 
 (0.178) (0.470) (0.212)  (0.153) (0.897) (0.124) 
Past Experience 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001  0.0001 -0.0026 0.0003 
 (0.588) (0.487) (0.573)  (0.968) (0.558) (0.939) 
Relative Size 0.0138*** -0.0036 0.0126**  0.3566** -0.0893 0.2961* 
 (0.006) (0.685) (0.014)  (0.037) (0.783) (0.085) 
Public -0.0235*** -0.0200*** -0.0233***  -0.8342*** -0.7350*** -0.8289*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash 0.0055*** 0.0076** 0.0058***  0.2385*** 0.3990*** 0.2433*** 
 (0.007) (0.032) (0.005)  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Stock -0.0013 -0.0012 -0.0011  -0.0638 -0.0112 -0.0554 
 (0.654) (0.808) (0.705)  (0.449) (0.943) (0.514) 
Hostile -0.0232*** -0.0216** -0.0231***  -1.0465*** -1.0162** -1.0363*** 
 (0.002) (0.021) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) 
Competing Bid -0.0202*** -0.0201* -0.0203***  -0.6981** -0.8005* -0.6922** 
 (0.004) (0.059) (0.005)  (0.011) (0.061) (0.014) 
Tender Offer 0.0355*** 0.0165*** 0.0354***  1.4406*** 0.7419*** 1.4472*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Diversification -0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0003  -0.0614 -0.1930 -0.0592 
 (0.904) (0.384) (0.873)  (0.325) (0.100) (0.347) 
Constant 0.0047 0.0429** 0.0084  0.5090 1.9342*** 0.6699* 
 (0.693) (0.037) (0.477)  (0.164) (0.006) (0.064) 
N 8536 2405 8418  8536 2405 8418 
R2 0.039 0.060 0.039  0.052 0.066 0.051 
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.045 0.034  0.047 0.050 0.047 
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Table 4.12: Heckman selection model (two-step) of acquirer announcement performance (Examining star analyst predictive ability in the year 
before elections) 
 
This table presents results of Heckman selection model of the acquirer announcement performance for the sample of acquirers covered by analysts 
(Specification 1 and 4), the subsample of acquirers covered by star analysts (Specification 2 and 5), and the subsample of acquirers covered by non-star 
analysts (Specification 3 and 6). Star analysts are defined as analysts voted as the Institutional Investor all-star analysts in the year after the acquisition year. 
In these models, the dependent variables of selection equation and regression equation are pre-deal [-182, -7] recommendation coverage (analyst coverage for 
Specifications 1 and 4; star coverage for Specifications 2 and 5; non-star coverage for Specifications 3 and 6) and acquirer performance (CAR [-2, 2] for 
Specifications 1, 2, and 3; SCAR [-2, 2] for Specifications 4, 5, and 6), respectively. The key explanatory variable is Consensus calculated as the average 
analyst recommendations (Consensus of all analyst in Specification 1 and 4; Consensus of star analysts in Specification 2 and 5; and Consensus of non-star 
analysts in Specification 3 and 6). Control variables include acquirer firm characteristics and deal characteristics. For acquirer firm characteristics, Ln(MV) is 
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity measured 4 weeks before the announcement. M/B is measured as market value of equity 4 weeks before the 
announcement divided by book value of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement. Leverage is measured as total debt over total capital at the fiscal 
year end before the announcement. Cash Flows/Equity is measured as cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement divided by market value of 
equity 4 weeks before the announcement. RUNUP is measured as market-adjusted CARs over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Sigma is 
measured as the standard deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily abnormal return over the [-365, -28] window prior to announcement. Past Experience is 
measured as the number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question. For deal characteristics, Relative 
Size is measured as the transaction value divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement. Public dummy equals one if the target 
is publicly listed. Cash dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. Stock dummy equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. Hostile dummy equals 
one if the deal is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. Competing Bid dummy equals one if the number of bidding firms is more than one. 
Tender Offer dummy equals one if the deal is a tender offer. Diversification dummy equals one if the acquirer and the target have different first two-digit of 
primary SIC code. Past Coverage dummy is used as the variable of exclusion restriction. Past Coverage dummy equals one if the acquirer is covered by analysts 
(all analyst in Specification 1 and 4; star analysts in Specification 2 and 5; and non-star analysts in Specification 3 and 6) over the [-730, -180] window prior to 
announcement. This chapter also controls for industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. For brevity, they are not reported in the table. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at the 2% and 98% levels. The P-Values are shown in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
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 Regression of CAR on Consensus  Regression of SCAR on Consensus 
 All 
(1) 
 Star 
(2) 
 Non-Star 
(3) 
 All 
(4) 
 Star 
(5) 
 Non-Star 
(6)       
 Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression  Selection Regression 
Consensus  0.0029**   -0.0011   0.0024*   0.1358***   -0.0347   0.1084** 
  (0.048)   (0.580)   (0.093)   (0.005)   (0.636)   (0.021) 
Ln(MV) 0.4863*** -0.0005  0.3311*** -0.0042**  0.4468*** -0.0007  0.4863*** -0.0566*  0.3311*** -0.1724***  0.4468*** -0.0594* 
 (0.000) (0.575)  (0.000) (0.024)  (0.000) (0.494)  (0.000) (0.060)  (0.000) (0.009)  (0.000) (0.054) 
M/B 0.0099*** 0.0001  -0.0047* -0.0002  0.0119*** 0.0001  0.0099*** 0.0075  -0.0047* 0.0053  0.0119*** 0.0078 
 (0.001) (0.534)  (0.074) (0.437)  (0.000) (0.450)  (0.001) (0.117)  (0.074) (0.558)  (0.000) (0.104) 
Leverage 0.2160*** 0.0054  0.3300*** -0.0032  0.1709*** 0.0049  0.2160*** -0.0008  0.3300*** -0.2200  0.1709*** -0.0161 
 (0.001) (0.152)  (0.000) (0.638)  (0.007) (0.199)  (0.001) (0.995)  (0.000) (0.357)  (0.007) (0.896) 
Cash Flows/Equity 0.4954*** 0.0189*  0.6824*** 0.0210  0.4522*** 0.0151  0.4954*** 0.2868  0.6824*** 0.2481  0.4522*** 0.1834 
 (0.002) (0.095)  (0.001) (0.303)  (0.003) (0.185)  (0.002) (0.435)  (0.001) (0.732)  (0.003) (0.620) 
RUNUP -0.1331*** 0.0048**  -0.1570*** 0.0154***  -0.1318*** 0.0048**  -0.1331*** 0.1463**  -0.1570*** 0.3426**  -0.1318*** 0.1535** 
 (0.000) (0.028)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.028)  (0.000) (0.038)  (0.000) (0.018)  (0.000) (0.030) 
Sigma 5.5883*** 0.1582*  10.9648*** 0.1503  5.7249*** 0.1513*  5.5883*** -3.9577  10.9648*** -1.2256  5.7249*** -4.1789 
 (0.000) (0.056)  (0.000) (0.351)  (0.000) (0.069)  (0.000) (0.139)  (0.000) (0.830)  (0.000) (0.120) 
Past Experience -0.0024 0.0000  -0.0054*** -0.0001  -0.0012 0.0000  -0.0024 -0.0011  -0.0054*** -0.0021  -0.0012 -0.0009 
 (0.405) (0.997)  (0.001) (0.624)  (0.667) (0.923)  (0.405) (0.727)  (0.001) (0.662)  (0.667) (0.788) 
Relative Size  0.0127***   -0.0037   0.0115***   0.3307***   -0.0904   0.2706** 
  (0.001)   (0.583)   (0.003)   (0.007)   (0.703)   (0.030) 
Public  -0.0237***   -0.0201***   -0.0234***   -0.8372***   -0.7361***   -0.8313*** 
  (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000) 
Cash  0.0054**   0.0075**   0.0057***   0.2362***   0.3956***   0.2407*** 
  (0.011)   (0.048)   (0.008)   (0.001)   (0.003)   (0.001) 
Stock  -0.0010   -0.0013   -0.0008   -0.0556   -0.0138   -0.0476 
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  (0.706)   (0.774)   (0.759)   (0.503)   (0.932)   (0.569) 
Hostile  -0.0229***   -0.0217*   -0.0228***   -1.0407***   -1.0170**   -1.0288*** 
  (0.008)   (0.086)   (0.009)   (0.000)   (0.023)   (0.000) 
Competing Bid  -0.0199***   -0.0202*   -0.0201***   -0.6905***   -0.8034**   -0.6869*** 
  (0.007)   (0.055)   (0.008)   (0.004)   (0.032)   (0.005) 
Tender Offer  0.0353***   0.0166***   0.0353***   1.4351***   0.7440***   1.4433*** 
  (0.000)   (0.007)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000) 
Diversification  -0.0007   -0.0029   -0.0008   -0.0728   -0.1945*   -0.0702 
  (0.701)   (0.362)   (0.685)   (0.228)   (0.090)   (0.248) 
Past Coverage 0.8639***   1.0629***   0.8280***   0.8639***   1.0629***   0.8280***  
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)  
Inverse Mills ratio  0.0193***   -0.0049   0.0193***   0.4530***   -0.1400   0.4657*** 
  (0.000)   (0.339)   (0.000)   (0.007)   (0.436)   (0.008) 
Constant -3.0545*** -0.0149  -4.1099*** 0.0584**  -2.7934*** -0.0114  -3.0545*** 0.0484  -4.1099*** 2.3807***  -2.7934*** 0.1917 
 (0.000) (0.205)  (0.000) (0.016)  (0.000) (0.337)  (0.000) (0.899)  (0.000) (0.006)  (0.000) (0.618) 
N 11037 8536  11037 2405  11037 8418  11037 8536  11037 2405  11037 8418 
Pseudo R2 0.357 –  0.340 –  0.329 –  0.357 –  0.340 –  0.329 – 
Adjusted R2 – 0.026  – 0.035  – 0.026  – 0.036  – 0.040  – 0.036 
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Appendix 4.1: Definitions of control variables 
 
This table describes control variables in the regressions of this chapter. The definition for each variable is shown in the table. Panel A and B present firm 
characteristics and deal characteristics, respectively. 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
Ln(MV) 
 
The logarithm of the acquirer market value measured 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item 
PRC×SHROUT). 
M/B 
 
Market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT) divided by book value 
of equity at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item CEQ). 
Leverage 
 
Total debt over total capital at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item 
(DTLL+DLC)/(DLTT+DLC+SEQ)). 
Cash Flows/Equity 
 
Cash flows at the fiscal year end before the announcement (Compustat item IB+DP-DVP-DVC) divided by 
market value of equity 4 weeks before the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT). 
RUNUP Acquirer market-adjusted CARs before announcement date over the [-365, -28] window. 
Sigma 
The standard deviation of a firm’s market-adjusted daily abnormal return over the [-365, -28] window 
prior to the announcement. 
Past Experience The number of M&A deals made by an acquirer over the five-year period prior to the acquisition in question 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics 
Relative Size 
 
Transaction value (from Thomson One Banker) divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the announcement (CRSP item PRC×SHROUT).  
Public Dummy variable equals one if the target is a publicly listed firm. 
Stock Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by stock. 
Cash Dummy variable equals one if the deal is 100% paid by cash. 
Hostile Dummy variable equals one if the deal attitude is identified as hostile or unsolicited by Thomson One Banker. 
Competing Bid Dummy variable equals one if there are more than one bidding firms reported by Thomson One Banker. 
Tender Offer Dummy variable equals one if the deal is identified as a tender offer by Thomson One Banker. 
Diversification Dummy variable equals one if the acquirer and the target have the different first two-digit of primary SIC code. 
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Chapter 5 : Conclusion 
 
5.1. Summary 
This thesis focuses on the reputation-quality mechanism in the context of US mergers and 
acquisitions. The existing literature has examined the relationship between investment 
bank reputation and M&A advisory service quality, and the relationship between sell-side 
analyst reputation and quality of analyst stock recommendations. This thesis extends the 
previous research and provides further empirical evidence. Specifically, Chapter 2 
investigates whether top-tier financial advisors improve their clients’ performance in both 
the short and long term. Chapter 3 explores whether top-tier advisors can help their 
acquirer clients to gain a bargaining advantage, allowing them to pay lower bid premiums. 
More importantly, both Chapters 2 and 3 examine whether multiple top-tier financial 
advisors can cooperate effectively to create value for their clients, or whether they suffer 
from social loafing. In addition, Chapter 4 investigates whether the recommendations of 
star analysts have stronger predictive ability for acquirer announcement performance than 
those of non-star analysts, and how star and non-star analysts respond to M&As. 
 
Prestigious investment banks charge premium advisory fees, and therefore are supposed to 
have superior abilities to identify synergistic targets and guarantee clients a higher 
proportion of synergies. However, the empirical evidence on this reputation–quality 
mechanism remains inconclusive. Unlike previous studies that only focus on the 
relationship between bank reputation and acquirer announcement returns, Chapter 2 
examines the effects of top-tier advisors on acquirer performance in both the short and 
long term. Chapter 2 finds that bank reputation does not have any significant effects on 
acquirer announcement performance, but has significantly positive effects on acquirer 
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long-term performance. Specifically, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors do not gain 
significantly higher announcement returns than acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors. 
In particular, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors in private acquisitions even 
underperform those advised by non-top-tier banks around the announcement, suggesting 
that the market does not value the retention of top-tier advisors in relatively simple deals 
in the short term. In contrast, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors outperform acquirers 
advised by non-top-tier advisors in the long term. This chapter argues that if the synergy 
identified and secured by top-tier advisors does exist, such potential synergy needs time to 
be materialized, and therefore the positive effects of top-tier advisors should be shown in 
the long term. The results suggest that prestigious banks have superior skills to improve 
their clients’ acquisition performance. In addition, the effects of bank reputation differ 
across sub-samples of acquirers with different firm characteristics. Specifically, the 
positive effects of top-tier advisors on acquirer long-term performance is stronger for 
acquirers with smaller firm size and a lower cash flow-to-equity ratio. Large acquirers and 
cash-rich acquirers are more likely to suffer from overconfidence. The results suggest that 
although prestigious banks can provide a high-quality M&A advisory service, the positive 
effects of bank reputation could be offset by acquirer overconfidence. In addition, the 
number of top-tier advisors retained is positively related to acquirer long-term 
performance, whereas retaining more non-top-tier advisors can lead to acquirers 
underperforming. This direct comparison highlights the superior skills of top-tier advisors. 
More importantly, acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors outperform acquirers 
advised by a single top-tier advisor in the long term, suggesting that the collective work of 
top-tier advisors can lead to superior performance. 
 
Chapter 3 further examines the effects of top-tier advisors on bid premiums. Specifically, 
this chapter investigates whether top-tier advisors can help their acquirer clients gain 
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bargaining advantage, and therefore pay lower premiums. Consequently, this chapter finds 
that acquirers advised by top-tier advisors pay significantly lower bid premiums than 
acquirers advised by non-top-tier advisors, suggesting that top-tier advisors have superior 
skill to improve their clients’ bargaining power. In addition, acquirers advised by multiple 
top-tier advisors pay significantly lower bid premiums than acquirers advised by single 
top-tier advisor, whereas retaining multiple non-top-tier advisors was not found to lower 
bid premiums. These results are consistent with Chapter 2, confirming that having 
multiple top-tier advisors does not lead to social loafing. Instead, they can cooperate 
effectively to improve their acquirer clients’ takeover performance and bargaining power.  
 
Although acquirers using top-tier advisors pay lower bid premiums, prestigious banks 
charge premium advisory fees. There arises a question whether the benefits of a reduction 
of bid premium outweigh the cost of high advisory fees. Therefore, Chapter 3 defines cost 
reduction as the difference between cost savings in bid premiums and cost increases in 
advisory fees, and finds that the retention of top-tier advisors leads to cost reduction. 
Specifically, acquirers advised by top-tier advisors have lower costs than acquirers advised 
by non-top-tier advisors. Acquirers advised by multiple top-tier advisors are also found to 
have lower costs than acquirers advised by a single top-tier advisor. These results address 
the concern of overpayment in advisory fees to prestigious banks. 
 
Additionally, since top-tier advisors have superior skills, they should be able to help their 
clients complete deals in a shorter time. However, this chapter suggests that acquirers 
advised by top-tier advisors do not negotiate deals in a shorter period of time than those 
advised by non-top-tier banks. In other words, top-tier advisors do not rush to complete 
deals; instead, they work diligently to provide a better service than non-top-tier advisors 
within the same period of time. 
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Chapters 2 and 3 also examine in-house deals and find that experienced firms, glamour 
firms and small firms are more likely to make in-house deals. However, acquirers without 
an advisory service do not outperform acquirers advised by banks, and pay higher bid 
premiums. These results suggest that in-house expertise cannot improve acquirer 
performance or bargaining power.  
 
In addition to Chapters 2 and 3, which focus on investment banking divisions, Chapter 4 
further analyses banks’ securities research divisions. Specifically, Chapter 4 investigates 
whether sell-side financial analysts’ stock recommendations over the pre-acquisition 
period can be used to predict acquirer announcement performance, and how analysts 
respond to takeovers. More importantly, to examine whether analysts with a better 
reputation make more valuable recommendations than those without, this chapter 
compares star analysts’ recommendations and those of non-star analysts. As a 
consequence, Chapter 4 finds that acquirers with more favourable pre-deal consensus 
recommendations gain higher abnormal returns around takeover announcement, 
suggesting that analyst recommendations are a strong predictor of acquirer performance. If 
analyst stock recommendations effectively reflect firm valuation, this suggests that 
relatively undervalued acquirers with future growth opportunities tend to outperform 
relatively overvalued acquirers. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that analyst 
recommendations are predictive of deal completion. In addition, financial analysts respond 
to takeovers, updating recommendations based on acquirer performance. Specifically, 
analysts issue more favourable stock recommendations for better-performing acquirers 
over the post-announcement periods.  
 
Further empirical tests suggest that the predictive ability of recommendations for acquirer 
performance differ between star analysts and non-star analysts. Both star and non-star 
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analysts respond to M&As; however, there is no significant relationship between star 
pre-deal recommendations and acquirer announcement performance, while acquirers with 
more favourable non-star consensus recommendations gain higher announcement returns. 
These results suggest that non-star recommendations have stronger predictive ability for 
acquirer announcement performance than those of star analysts. In other words, non-star 
analysts’ recommendations have greater investment value than those of star analysts, 
indicating that analyst rankings do not effectively reflect analyst skills. 
 
Overall, this thesis examines the reputation-quality mechanism across the two divisions of 
investment banks – investment banking and securities research, and suggests that bank 
rankings are consistent with advisory skills, while analyst rankings are a popularity 
contest. 
 
5.2. Implications 
This thesis has implications for both research and practice. To begin with, this paper sheds 
new light on the mixed results found in the literature on the M&A financial advisor 
reputation–quality mechanism. Previous studies have mainly examined the effects of 
advisory service on acquirer performance in the short term. However, this thesis 
emphasises that merger synergies recognised and guaranteed by advisors should 
materialise in the long term, and therefore investigates acquirer short- and long-term 
performance together. As a consequence, this study highlights the novel evidence that the 
retention of top-tier financial advisors improves acquirer performance in the long term 
rather than in the short term.  
 
In addition, few studies have investigated the effects of advisor reputation on bid 
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premiums. This thesis suggests that top-tier advisors can improve their acquirer clients’ 
bargaining power to pay lower bid premiums, and secure a greater share of potential 
synergies. 
 
More importantly, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no previous paper has 
distinguished the effects of a firm having multiple top-tier advisors from the effects of 
having a single top-tier advisor. This research suggests that multiple top-tier advisors do 
not suffer from social loafing, since they care about their reputational capital. Instead, 
top-tier advisors can cooperate effectively to improve their acquirer clients’ performance 
and bargaining power.  
 
For practitioners, this thesis suggests that prestigious banks deserve premium advisory 
fees. The benefits of retaining top-tier advisors outweigh the disadvantages. This thesis 
supports the effectiveness of market share-based league tables. Investment bank rankings 
are also found to be reliable in reflecting advisory skills, and can be used as an appropriate 
reference for acquirers to make decisions on the retention of financial advisors.  
 
This thesis further analyses the securities research divisions of investment banks. Unlike 
studies that examine whether analysts forecast M&As, this chapter investigates whether 
analyst recommendations can be used to predict acquirer performance. Since changes in 
recommendations rather than recommendations themselves drive stock price drift, this 
chapter distinguishes between the effects of acquirer announcement and those of analyst 
revisions by examining stock recommendations. Whether analysts forecast acquisitions or 
not, this thesis finds that pre-deal stock recommendations are predictive of acquirer 
announcement performance.  
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More importantly, this thesis adds new evidence regarding the reputation–quality 
mechanism for sell-side analysts. Non-star analyst recommendations have stronger 
predictive ability for acquirer performance than star analyst recommendations. The fact 
that star analysts underperform is consistent with the nature of such popularity contests. 
 
For practitioners, it should be noted that non-star analysts’ recommendations have greater 
investment value to predict acquirer announcement performance than those of star 
analysts, although the recommendation revisions of star analysts are more influential 
regarding movements in stock price. 
 
5.3. Limitations and Future Research 
There are some limitations to this study that can be addressed in future work. To begin 
with, this thesis analyses US M&A activity and it would be valuable to examine whether 
the results are robust for different country samples. For example, China’s market is very 
different from the US market in terms of regulations, culture, investor sentiment and so 
forth, which may lead to interesting findings. Furthermore, it would be useful to consider 
the effects of structure break on acquirers’ long-term performance. More specifically, 
future research should distinguish advisors’ effects from other factors during the 
post-merger period, such as CEO changes or employee turnover. Finally, in addition to 
abnormal stock returns, acquirer long-term benefits can be measured by operating 
performance, such as return on equity and sales growth.  
 
In addition, there are several natural extensions of this thesis that the author will pursue in 
future. The existing literature focuses on the relationship between investment bank 
reputation and takeover performance. It is possible, however, that local investment banks 
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can provide a better M&A advisory service as local banks are more familiar with local 
market and companies, and therefore can more effectively identify synergistic targets. 
Therefore, the author intends to investigate whether local banks or prestigious banks 
create more value for their clients by analysing a comprehensive dataset of European 
domestic and cross-border M&As. In addition, most studies use market share-based 
rankings as a proxy for investment bank reputation but bank reputation can also be 
measured by investor attention. In line with Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011), the author will 
use the Google Search Volume Index (SVI) as a proxy of investor attention, and explore 
whether banks with more attention are found to improve their clients’ performance and 
bargaining power more than those with less attention. Furthermore, the decision to retain 
investment banks can be affected by CEO characteristics. For example, overconfident 
CEOs overestimate their ability to achieve synergies, and are more likely to conduct 
value-destroying deals (Roll, 1986; Doukas and Petmezas, 2007; Malmendier and Tate, 
2008). It is reasonable to predict that overconfident CEOs are more likely to retain 
prestigious banks to complete their intended deals. Therefore, the author plans to 
investigate whether the effects of investment banks alter across firms with different CEO 
characteristics, such as overconfidence, age, education, and so forth. 
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